Daily Times

Donald Trump, along with most Americans, wants to end “endless” wars. But how many Americans know that the Trump defence strategy, a continuation of President Obama’s, may inadvertently be doing the opposite? A key objective of the current National Defence Strategy (NDS) is “to deter and if war comes defeat” a list of potential adversaries topped by China and Russia. Yet, war with China and Russia would be catastrophic and “endless” in the sense of what destruction would be wrought.

Better strategic options exist. Before contemplating war with China, former Secretary of Defence Robert Gates’ advice should be heeded. “Any secretary of defence who engages in a land war in Asia needs his or her head examined.” Crudely put, the U.S. does not have enough bullets to defeat China.

If Russian doctrine counts, war with Russia could be thermonuclear meaning the evisceration of society as we know it. Does that make sense? The answer is no. The Cold War, when both sides had tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, ended peacefully.

Besides being unwinnable, this strategy is unaffordable for the long-term. A nuclear aircraft carrier costs nearly $15 billion; F-35 Lightning II’s $100 million; and personnel costs are skyrocketing. The less visible but dangerous threat to the force, possibly greater than China’s or Russia’s, is (according to the Department of Defence Business board) uncontrolled annual cost growth of 5-7% above inflation for everything from people to precision weapons to pencils.

Thus, today’s active duty force of about 1.3 million personnel is unsustainable without a change in strategy or considerable annual increases in defence spending above this year’s $750 billion budget, made unlikely by swelling debt and deficits. A further measure of growing costs is the half billion dollars the Army will spend on a new pistol! Given even modest defence spending increases, the force will shrink substantially over time no matter how much more technologically capable with greater unmanned, information warfare, cyber and space systems due to uncontrolled real cost growth.

If two peers are the threat, is the current and future force, sufficient to win a global, possibly nuclear war against either? And this force is still designed around a 20th century industrial era base and not for the 21st century information age. Specifically, how long does it take to build new ships and aircraft or repair damage if USS Fitzgerald and McCain are relevant?

If defence were a business and it is not, its CEO and board would be scrambling to define a different strategy in line with resource and technological realities that would mandate dramatic organizational changes. Such tectonic shifts usually come after a Pearl Harbour disaster in which the nation’s battleships were sunk or with reformers such as British Admiral Sir Jacky Fisher who revolutionized the Royal Navy at the turn of the 19th century. That said, technology in the form of nuclear weapons and, later, precision weapons, likewise was transformational for militaries after 1945.

Given even modest defence spending increases, the force will shrink substantially over time no matter how much more technologically capable with greater unmanned, information warfare, cyber and space systems due to uncontrolled real cost growth

A more effective and affordable defence strategy to end “endless” wars should be based on the ability to contain, deter and engage China and Russia (or others) in concert with allies and friends to prevent aggression, encroachment, intimidation and “active measures” short of war. In the Pacific, containing China’s military from breaking out beyond the “first island chain” off its coasts is achievable at affordable costs through a “Mobile Maritime Line of Defense” that will reinforce deterrence should conflict be threatened.

NATO’s Article 5 is a sufficient deterrent vis a vis Russia especially since Vladimir Putin has no intention of attacking the alliance. Fielding a relatively inexpensive “Porcupine Defense” that raises the cost of any potential Russian military aggression or incursion in Europe will also bolster deterrence.

After eighteen years of fighting irregular forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, given the proliferation of advanced weapons, high end conflict must remain a central planning criterion against potential Iranian, North Korean and other conflict scenarios.

Under this strategy, a future force would number under a million active duty personnel and appropriate reserve components with the ability to deploy or have deployed a joint force around 150,000 from each coast for a total of 300,000. About one-third would be in this deployed status; another third preparing; and the final third on leave and stand down. Preparation for high end operations remains vital. This force along with the nuclear component could be maintained at high levels of readiness and morale for about $600 billion a year with modest annual increases.

Will we change our thinking? Or will we allow the current strategy that inadvertently could lead to “endless wars” to persist? If history counts, be worried.

The writer is a Senior Advisor at the Atlantic Council and was Professor of Military Strategy at the National War College and the Naval War College