Daily Times

Recently, the news of Iran stepping further away from the nuclear pact has surfaced and ignited a debate of nuclear proliferation once again. Iran, the P5 (USA, Russia, China, France and UK) and the EU had made a ‘Nuclear Deal Framework’ in 2015, which the USA had withdrawn from in 2018, and had imposed economic sanctions on Iran. In response of the withdrawal and sanctions from the nuclear pact, Iran has also taken a detour from the pact. Earlier, during Obama’s administration, Iran had agreed to put a stop to making any fissile material to be used in making of bombs. The uranium enrichment at Iran’s Fordow plant is being considered as a fourth step away from the agreement, and has alarmed the western countries that were party to the agreement back in 2015.

Iran that has always denied the non-peaceful use of nuclear energy is enriching uranium at Fordow to the level of 4.5 percent. The2015 pact set a limit of enrichment of uranium at 3.7 percent at the time when Iran was doing it at 20 percent level. However, a concentration of more than 90 percent is required for both uranium’s isotope 235 and plutonium’s isotope 239 for making of nuclear weapons. These figures do comply with Iran’s claim of using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes as it clearly lacks in capacity of building a nuclear weapon programme at this stage.

Though the seven stages of the nuclear fuel cycle (NFC) are all peaceful elements yet uranium enrichment and plutonium separation through reprocessing are its most crucial aspects. However, the enrichment and reprocessing capabilities do not inherently signal the intent to develop nuclear weapons. Highly enriched uranium and plutonium both can also be used in a nuclear fuel reactor to generate electricity. Thus it becomes difficult to judge the intent of a country at a stage as early as this one.

Nuclear proliferation is not an issue of concern limited to the western countries; it obviously concerns the world peace. However, the problem does not lie with Iran or another non-nuclear state in search of attaining peaceful nuclear technologies. The real problem lies in the ‘structural prejudice’ that dominates the international regime. The hypocrisy of the international nuclear non-proliferation regimes has been quite evident as it favours the nuclear ‘haves’ (the P5) and is biased against the nuclear ‘have-nots’.

‘Nuclear diplomacy’ and ‘nuclear non-proliferation regimes’ based on the principles of inclusiveness and fairness are the only means to achieve enduring peace

According to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), all member states (which do not include Pakistan, India, Israel, South Sudan and North Korea) have an agreement to facilitate the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. This includes exchange of relevant equipment, materials and scientific and technological information. However, significantly, the NPT is weak on execution, as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is only expected to inspect or verify whatever the NPT members have willfully declared. There is no mechanism to verify the disarmament aspect of the treaty, lack of designated oversight body and penalty in case of failure to comply with this clause. By facilitating the exchange of nuclear equipment, technology and expertise, NPT members would simultaneously increase the risks of horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons amongst the P5, particularly. This relates to the dual use of nuclear science and technology. The irony is that the ‘additional protocol’ that allows the agency to search for undeclared nuclear materials and facilities is a ‘voluntary’ mechanism.

The non-proliferation regimes clearly have double standards; the nuclear weapon states rely heavily on nuclear weapons and lack in progress towards disarmament. While the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) that are outside of the nuclear umbrella believe that the acquisition of nuclear weapons is a sure path to security, power and prestige. History reveals that the policies of isolation and sanctions have stimulated a country’s sense of national pride, and in some cases, has accelerated the nuclear programmes, which are taken as a matter of national priority. The lack of dialogue, policies of isolation and sanctions and western inability to uphold their part of the bargain has always deteriorated the situation. Proliferation begets proliferation, so the only solution is ‘multi-nationalisation of fuel cycle’ and ‘complete universal disarmament’.

Instead of keeping the NNWS and ‘rogue’ states out of the system, the issue of proliferation can only be curbed by strengthening the institution of IAEA. The agency shall be provided with the legal authority that it lacks in order to be able to detect and pursue clandestine nuclear weapon operations. ‘Nuclear diplomacy’ and ‘nuclear non-proliferation regimes’ based on the principles of inclusiveness and fairness are the only means to achieve enduring peace.

The writer is a Ph.D. scholar at SPIR, QAU, and the author of Balochistan Conundrum