Daily Times

Ever since President Donald Trump called off dialogue with the Taliban in the second week of September, the situation in Afghanistan continues to be uncertain. Although there have been a couple of rounds of informal talks between Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad and Taliban both sides have been avoiding public pronouncements about the outcome. However, some confidence building measure, including exchange of prisoners, by the two sides have taken place to keep the process of dialogue on.

Pakistan has been particularly concerned about the failure of talks between the parties as peace and stability, which has eluded the country for the past four decades, has only added to Pakistan’s problems. The CIA and Pentagon, on whose behest President Trump had to call off the dialogue, have perhaps miscalculated certain ground realities as the evolving situation in the region with regard to Afghanistan has been witnessing substantive changes. It is not a coincidence that Taliban maintain workable, if not friendly, relations with all the neighbours of Afghanistan. In a way the US has already been checkmated in the region that would be a big challenge if it continues to harp on 9/11 emotions and insist on maintaining its military presence in Afghanistan. That Al Quida has been effectively neutralized, and Daesh has no future in the country when bulk of the Taliban are against the hydra group whose motives are not only dubious but their ideological moorings are equally doubtful and less appealing to the people.

During the past 18 months when the dialogue between the US and Taliban was on, it became clear that it has been a sheer power play between the intra-Afghan groups. The US relied on its kinetic power while the Taliban thrived on their asymmetric responses. The Afghan war turned out to be the longest overseas military engagement in the US history and they are still counting political and military losses. The ongoing US approach of maintaining dominance is unlikely to succeed if it could not achieve those objectives during the past 18 years.

The US will have to introspect the Afghan situation for variety of reasons. First, the sympathy and support generated after the 9/11 has started giving diminishing returns, as the Afghan front has fast become a wasteful expenditure costing US$ 50 billion per annum to the American exchequer. This is over and above the loss of 2500 soldiers and injuries to thousands others. Second, US have failed in the nation-building project in Afghanistan. According to the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), corruption, nepotism and inefficiency have been the hallmarks of successive governments in Afghanistan. Mind you, all this happened under the US watch. SIGAR also acknowledged in its various reports that narcotics have become a mainstay of war economy of the country that serves as lifeline for the warlords and drug barons. Third, on the political front, the country remains a divided house to say the least. Afghanistan lacks a democratic culture where “victor and vanquished” psyche dominates the political scene and likely to stay for couple of generations unless a decent level of literacy is attained and uninterrupted elections are held in the country.

There is no comparison between the US and Taliban’s military strength, but continuation of war during the past 18 years serves as a guide to strategic planners that the US has failed to achieve the desired results, President Trump’s rhetoric of “annihilating Taliban” notwithstanding. According to the American analyst James Schwemlein, “the US could have made a better deal in 2001 or 2002, after the initial intervention, than we could have made in 2010 or 2011, at the peak of US-NATO military presence in Afghanistan…by extension we could get a better deal today than we could be able to get tomorrow”. The Afghan watchers are keenly watching how the Trump administration deals with the ongoing stalemate. The following interlinked aspects of the Afghan imbroglio should guide the stakeholders for a possible solution in the future.

First, there is a need to accept the reality that Afghanistan is a conservative society; democracy cannot be injected without letting the political process maturing within the society and a conscious effort is made at all levels of government and political forces to nurture democratic culture in the country. Such an enterprise would be a tall order and may not be possible anytime soon. Whether controlled form of governance, approved through the Grand Jirga, would be acceptable to the wider spectrum of Afghans is yet to be discussed. However, due care has to be taken that no major tribe in the country is left out in the future dispensation of the country.

Second, Taliban may be averse to the idea of a Grand Jirga or elections as they would be interested in having a major share in the cake. It all depends on the success of the intra-Afghan dialogue and readiness of the influential ethnic and religious leaders to give peace a chance. The previous experience with the Taliban did not contribute to the stability of the country and kept it divided and allowed external influences to promote their agendas. The net losers were the Afghan people. Taliban’s behaviour in the post-withdrawal period would be minutely watched by the major powers, especially the neighbours.

Afghanistan is a conservative society; democracy cannot be injected without letting the political process maturing within the society and a conscious effort is made at all levels of government and political forces to nurture democratic culture in the country

Third, the UN’s role has so far been subdued ever since the US has been leading the charge in Afghanistan. The US’ lack of experience in rehabilitation and reconstruction work in post-war situations has compounded the problem. Despite spending US$ 187 billion on rehabilitation and reconstruction in the country the situation on the ground hardly matches the expenditure, a fact repeatedly highlighted by SIGAR. The moot question is whether the US would continue with its commitment to Afghanistan even after withdrawal of its troops from the country? Right now the US supports 90% of the Afghan security forces expenditure; after the withdrawal if the US stops this support the Afghan security apparatus may crumble in no time. How the US and other partners materially support post-withdrawal Afghanistan would matter the most for the future stability of Afghanistan.

Fourth, role of Afghanistan’s neighbours would be crucial for durable peace and stability of the country. So far, there seems to be broad understanding between Pakistan, China, Iran and Russia to encourage Taliban to agree for an intra-Afghan dialogue and ceasefire. The US also agrees with the approach although it is not inclined to include Iran in the ongoing dialogue. However, with increasing understanding between the direct neighbours of Afghanistan the US would be losing leverage in the situation unless it starts playing a spoiler’s role and join the ranks with India to derail the entire peace process.

Finally, for Pakistan, stakes in Afghanistan are very high but the path ahead is infested with landmines requiring careful treading. The foremost lesson Pakistan must have learnt by now is to never play favourites in Afghanistan. Historically, British India’s divide-and-rule policy had kept Afghanistan on the boil. Therefore, no succession in Afghanistan was ever peaceful while rival groups in Afghanistan kept the British on their toes. We don’t have to repeat the history and have the confidence that the symbiotic relationship between the Afghans and Pakistanis would not allow outsiders to dent this relationship. Of course, this would require deft handling and respect for Afghanistan’s sovereignty. Simultaneously, following a regional approach would increase the trust level about Pakistan amongst the Afghan factions and the neighbours of Afghanistan.

The writer is a former ambassador