Afghanistan: talking about the talks

Author: Saman Zulfqar

It is reported that the Afghan government and Taliban representatives held secret talks in Qatar to resume the dialogue process to end the protracted war in Afghanistan. The first round of recent talks was held in September while the second round of talks was held in early October in the presence of a US representative.

The Qatar talks are the first initiative after the inconclusive Murree Process that could not reach its logical end due to changed circumstances given the death of Mullah Omar, the Taliban supreme leader. Later, Pakistan’s efforts to reach out to the new leader, Mullah Akhtar Mansour, and his death in a drone strike were a major setback to the efforts to bring peace in Afghanistan. The death of Mullah Omar and the resultant leadership crisis for the Taliban divided them into factions — those who were willing to continue fighting and those who were ready to hold talks to end the conflict. Mullah Mansour initially took a hard stance by setting pre-conditions for resuming talks with the Afghan government, but the short period of his leadership could not bring any significant change in Taliban’s stance. His successor has perhaps agreed to hold talks with the Afghan government.

The United States, being an important party to the conflict, has been a part of almost all the talks that were arranged with the Taliban, whether the Afghan government was a part of the process or not. In this regard, the first initiative was the secret talks between the US and the Taliban in November 2010 when direct contact between US officials and the Taliban was facilitated by German and Qatari officials in Munich, Germany. The preliminary talks started in February 2011 in Doha and came to be known as the Doha Process. The opening of an office in Doha office and holding of rounds of talks showed the willingness of the two parties to end the Afghan conflict; the US and the Taliban seemed ready to seek a political end to the war. The talks remained stalled due to the refusal of both parties to agree to conflicting points such as the release of Taliban prisoners, and were only revived after 18 months when the Taliban agreed to resume talks.

Similarly, the former Afghan government under President Hamid Karzai, formed the High Peace Council (HPC) to hold talks with the Taliban, but due to the presence of former Northern Alliance members in the council, it could not win over the trust and confidence of the Taliban, and remained ineffective in brokering talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban. There was mistrust between President Karzai and the United States and other Western partners regarding dialogue with the Taliban. But the Unity government in Afghanistan has been willing to resume the dialogue process with the Taliban, and has even asked Pakistan as well as other states to mediate the talks. The Murree Process was the result of President Ashraf Ghani’s efforts to reach out to the neighbouring states, China and Pakistan, to ask them to play a role in initiating the dialogue process.

The Murree Process was also important due to the presence of the United States and China as observer states. China, a neighbouring state, has stakes in the peace and stability of Afghanistan, which cannot be achieved unless all ethnic groups including warring factions are included in the political process. Pakistan on its part has done enough to bring the warring parties to the negotiation table. Pakistan being the neighbour has suffered more due to the Afghan conflict than any other state.

It is not surprising that the Taliban factions have continued talks and fighting at the same time. For many, this dual tactic represents the divide among the Taliban, but it can be attributed to the show of power by the Taliban as they overran Kunduz for the second time, and have been engaged in severe fighting with the Afghan forces. They perhaps want to negotiate from a position of strength to make a favourable bargain.

To move forward, it is also important to look at the causes of failures of previous peace efforts. To end the Afghan conflict, bilateral, trilateral as well as quadrilateral initiatives have been taken, but all these processes remained inconclusive due to one reason or other. The most important reason has been the lack of trust and confidence among the dialogue partners. Whatever the reason has been behind the previous stalled talks, it is the responsibility of the Taliban as well as the Afghan government to make compromises for the future of Afghanistan. Talking about talks is not going to resolve the issue, but there is a need to take concrete steps to end the conflict and bring peace for the people of Afghanistan.

The writer works at the Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI) and can be reached at samanz.pk@gmail.com

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