Daily Times

Pakistan has been at continuous crossroads when it comes to making, developing and then implementing a properly oriented foreign policy. What is it in foreign policy that its reverberations are felt through the much talked about civil-military discourse?

But in an era of increasing competition, what seems like a major lacuna is the almost non-existent mention of the Indian Ocean Region, colloquially known as the IOR or IO for the Indian Ocean. Pakistan is located at the cusp of the North Arabian Sea, protruding close to the Strait of Hormuz. Often described to be blessed with great geography, Pakistan’s Indian Ocean policy still seems at a halt. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) connects China’s western Xinjiang with Pakistan’s southern belt, and the Belt-Road Initiative (BRI) is a two-pronged strategy. The first consisting of a territorial/land economic Silk Route and the other of a Maritime Silk Route. Collectively known as the One Belt, One Road (OBOR), it now is known as the BRI.

The BRI is a twenty-first century manifestation of the centuries’ old Silk Route that connected Central Asia, Afghanistan, India and Pakistan. Its use in history saw the best effects of early ‘globalisation’ during the first Roman and Byzantine Empires, and also during the Tang Dynasty. The modern day Silk Road aims to connect these areas that now due to economic deprivation account for 6.2 percent of the intra-regional trade.

Pakistan’s role and isolation with these early regions and present day variants of energy rich Central Asian countries and the other IO littoral states can be seen as a product of the neglect of a cohesive Indian Ocean policy. Almost 95 percent of Pakistan’s trade comes through these ports. Pakistan despite being a primary littoral state in the IOR is not a member of the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA)and (Bay of Bengal Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation)(BIMSTEC). Much of the regional symposiums and forums go without Pakistan being a participant.

Pannikar, an Indian statesmen and a subcontinental strategist, in his essays titled “India and the Indian Ocean” presents an account of the Indian Ocean that after British Raj and decolonisation, and with the US as the hegemon, resonates with the strategic importance of the Indian Ocean. Written before partition, he has used Kautilya to delineate upon the science of geopolitics. Considered as a mostly western subject, with heavy influences of Second World War, geopolitics has been the subject of subcontinent for ages.

Described in terms of Chakarvarthipatha, “The territory (of the Empire) is the earth: viz. the area between the Himalayas and the sea which is 9,000 Yojanas in extent running northward obliquely.” Kautilya thus, in his famous work Arthashasthra, emphasises on having good ties with the neighbour of your state, as the neighbour of the state in subject is the enemy. Contemporarily, Delhi derives most of its strategic thinking from the subcontinental father of geopolitics.

As geopolitics is touted to exude much of the influence in today’s world, what can be seen as a natural approach is the rise of focus and literature on the Indian Ocean. In Panikkar’s work, he, in detail, describes the Indian Ocean and its significance for a subcontinental India, whilst setting the stage for the discourse by discussing the Kautilyan geopolitics. Panikkar’s essays hold significance as much for Pakistan as for India.

According to Panikkar, Mackinder in his ‘World Island Theory’ considered the Indian Ocean to be as only a “link area”, having the importance of Atlantic and Pacific to be its boundaries. But his essays contribute extensively to the important islands, such as Seychelles, Mauritius, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), Socotra, and Zanzibar. In a much similar fashion, the Indian Maritime Security Strategy (IMSS) has also highlighted the essential choke points/sea lines of communications (SLOCs) for India, and therefore, the Indian Navy to have a militarised footprint in the Indian Ocean.

Panikkar in comparison with the Atlantic and the Pacific describes the Indian Ocean as a “land-locked sea.” Discussing the geographic features of the ocean, he writes: “The most part of its area is walled off on three sides by land, with the southern side of Asia forming a roof over it. The continent of Africa constitutes the western wall, while Burma, Malaya, and the insular continuations protect the eastern side. The vital feature that differentiates the Indian Ocean from the Pacific and the Atlantic is not the two sides but the subcontinent of India that juts out far into the sea for a thousand miles to its tapering end at Cape Comorin. It is the geographical position of India that changes the character of the Indian Ocean.”

The above-given passage holds true for a post-partition India. Whilst both India and Pakistan are still rolling over the drums of their common history, the two states have some very basic obsessions. Pakistan’s identity crisis that can only be termed as amnesia is its total lack of connection with its subcontinental past. Trying to amalgamate the Middle Eastern, ‘Gulf-esque’ features, Pakistan’s history is fraught with examples that to date ring the bells of a civil-military discord. Not trying to incorporate some of the most important lessons, like Panikkar’s work, is now a continuous loss for the state. India, on the other hand, breeding the fascist ideology of Savarkar’s Hindutva, is keen to fulfil its obsession of a ‘united India.’ This aspect has clearly created chasm between the two nuclear powers of South Asia.

India’s approach to the Indian Ocean in terms of its ‘Act East, Think West’ policy is a pure Panikkar demonstration, and is consequentially, a saffron variant of the Monroe Doctrine

Panikkar, in another of his geographic description of the Indian Ocean, writes: “The Indian Ocean washes the entire east coast upto Somaliland, the South coast of Arabia, the Southern shores of Iran and Balochistan, the peninsula of India, the western shores of Burma, the Malay Peninsula and Sumatra. Its eastern and western entrances are guarded by two narrow straits, the Bab-el-Mandeb and the Straits of Malacca. From the Bab-el-Mandeb the entrance is into the Red Sea, which being an inland sea is controlled by land of either side. The Straits of Malacca lead to the vast expanse of the Pacific, but here again the lands on either side become so narrow as to be easily capable of effective control of ingress and egress.”

The above passage, if seen closely, has exact similarities with the policies and actions taking place in the Indian Ocean. Post partition, Pakistan once during the Bhutto era, offered the US to develop the Gwadar port, which did not materialise. This opportunity now taken up by China is considered to be the next great game in the ocean, having repercussions for South Asia.

Historically, Kipling’s Kim made the phrase ‘Great Game’ common in today’s parlance. The old Great Game was played between Britain and its apprehension of another European power (first France and then Russia), taking up Afghanistan and then Central Asia. Broadly, today’s New Great Game has a different chessboard, different players but somewhat similar interests.

The Sino-Pakistan alliance is touted to be a sheer manifestation of Pakistan being in the Sino camp in the brewing (new) cold war. This new cold war between the US and China has been the single greatest concern for India in South Asia, Japan in East Asia, and the US as the hegemon.

According to Graham Allison, the ‘Thucydides Trap’ is what best describes the US-China dilemma. According to his article in Foreign Policy in 2017, “When one great power threatens another war is almost always the result, but it doesn’t have to be.”

This statement manifests the rift between the US and China that has now shifted to the Indian Ocean. The US through India has effectively been implementing its offshore balancing strategy-inrealist terminology, an established power using the regional states to contain/counter hostile states. In IMSS, India is a self-proclaimed ‘Net Security Provider’. India’s aim of having a blue economy, a 200 ship fleet, and completing its nuclear triad after the successful deterrent patrol of SSBNArihant, all point to the ratio of interests that can outplay the need of having a common ground for regional growth.

As mentioned earlier, Pakistan and India’s rivalry can be in the regional initiatives (IORA, BIMSTEC, SAGAR-Security and Growth for All), of which Pakistan is not a part. Modi after his reelection (and seen through a more Panikkar lens) made his first official visits to Sri Lanka and Maldives. He announced plans to develop the Colombo Port in Sri Lanka and Assumption Islands in Seychelles, and to move forward to set up a naval base in Djibouti with Japan.

It is understandable that the US, France and other states desire to set bases in territorially far away regions. But India being a major Indian Ocean state only increases the militarisation of the Indian Ocean. Pakistan therefore, in this regard does not have a framework to pursue the trends of the India Ocean. Prime Minister Imran Khan’s recent visit to China, and then President Xi Jinping’s subsequent visit to India also highlight a slight undertone, a contradiction. That trade and conflict both can work simultaneously.

India’s approach to the Indian Ocean in terms of its ‘Act East, Think West’ policy is a pure Panikkar demonstration, and is consequentially, a saffron variant of the Monroe Doctrine. On the other hand, Pakistan is devoid of any policy that would cater to its relations with East Africa, Mauritius and Southeast Asian states, looking south, and developing a coherent, cohesive Indian Ocean policy as a whole. Pakistan needs to refocus its lens through what Panikkar has taught in his essays on Indian Ocean that are of as much vital importance for India as for Pakistan.

The writer is a freelance columnist. She can reached at faizafarid37@gmail.com