Daily Times

For a moment, forget the dharna politics and its implications. Let’s talk about the interesting politics of JUI with the historical and future perspective for a better understanding of its future politics. Shah Waliullah’s disciples (Rashid Gungohi and Qasim Nanotvi) battled the British when Shah and his son, Shah Abdul Aziz, started pushing Indians to get freedom as their country was enslaved by imperialism (1808 to 1915).

But the 1857 war of independence proved that their efforts were a disaster.

More than 50,000 religious scholars were dead till the end of this war or sepoy mutiny. Although at the same time, a feeling grew that these madrassas and seminaries should keep alive the legacy of Shah Waliullah. A soft image was required then for survival. For that purpose, Dar-ul-Uloom Deoband was founded as the centre of education and teaching, and eventually developed a reputation as the Al Azhar of India. Its first student was Mehmud-ul-Hussun Madni, later known as Sheikh-ul-hind. Jamiat Ulema-i-Hind was founded in 1919 for a political face. JUH openly demanded freedom from British raj in 1924 and continued its political struggle, having an alliance with the Congress.

The formation of Tableeghi Jamat in 1926 was again a blessing in disguise to present a soft image before the public and raj. Initially, there were serious differences between TJ and JUH on the creation of the new offshoot. Roughly at the same time, a so-called Indian government was formed in exile. Its headquarters was established in Madina with the help of the Ottoman ruler, which later ended with the”Reshmi Romal” movement.

Leaving apart the split of JUH on the question of the partition, JUH in India and JUI in Pakistan continued their politics with two to three faces. JUH is still the proponent of secularism in India while JUI in Pakistan is considered a far-right party. JUI has its influence in the southern districts of KP and northern Balochistan. Recently, the JUI has increased its influence in Sindh but in Punjab, it is still marginalised. Molana Fazal-ur-Rehman’s politics is, in fact, the continuation of his predecessors. His politics is more or less the same as the politics of Molana Mufti Mehmood (his late father).

The JUI has always had the ideology of Shah Waliullah in its pocket but never exercised it. The lesson of the history for them is not to confront the real power centre but make an arrangement for power-sharing. It is considered a far-right party but most of the time, it takes the position as right wing party for better political gains. Many times in history, the JUI challenged the establishment but never crossed the red line. The quid pro quo was always the best option after showing muscle. At the time of the Russian-Afghan war, the JUI had to face a split on the question of whether to support the Zia regime and Afghan jihad or to join the opposition parties alliance. Molana Fazal-ur-Rehman joined the movement for the restoration of democracy against Zia and kept a distance from the Afghan jihad. Molana Sami-ul-Haq broke his ties with JUI and made his small faction under the name of JUI-S.

This faction fizzled out over time. As a political force, the JUI-F was thriving for democracy in the country but on the other hand, it never challenged the Afghan jihad and its handlers in the area of her influence. Quite surprisingly, in that period, we witnessed a mushroom growth of madrassas generally in whole Pakistan and especially in the Pashtoon belt under the umbrella of JUI-F or the Deoband school of thought. The JUI was successful in creating its offshoots as it had traits to have many faces from its inception.

Most of the jihadi groups fighting in Afghanistan belonged to this same school of thought. Their ideological and physical support was coming from these same madrassas. More interestingly, a part of this politics was the creation of sectarian parties. Haq Nawaz Jhangvi had been the local leader of JUI-F (Jhang) before he made his party and named it Sipah-i-Sahaba. Recently, his son joined JUI-F when he won the MPA seat as an independent candidate. Other jihadi organisations, including Hukutul Jihad Al Islami, Hurkutul Mujahideen, Jaish-i-Mohamad and Jamia Ninoria seminaries, are all offshoots of JUI. With these offshoots, Fazal-ur-Rehman increased his muscle power along with political power by avoiding a confrontation with movers and shakers. Gradually, he was also considered a part and parcel of movers and shakers. That’s why from 1988 onwards, he has always been a part of every government, no matter overtly or covertly. Molana Fazal-ur-Rehman’s role became more vital during the Taliban regime. Again, Molana played his cards smartly. He maintained a distance from the Taliban regime but all offshoots of his party were hand-in-gloves with this regime. His role became more critical for establishment in that era to influence the Taliban on many issues.

Jamiat Ulema-i-Hind openly demanded freedom from British raj in 1924 and continued its political struggle, having an alliance with the Congress

When the Taliban regime was toppled by the allied forces after 9/11, this move-and-shake policy touched its peak. The JUI-F was furious, along with other right wing parties, at the Musharraf regime for allying Pakistan with the allied forces. Very soon, they were on the streets with popular anti-US sentiment. Many feared a head-on situation among the “natural allies” but these protests never went out of control. Movers and shakers of all sides again sat together and after elections, the KP government was handed over to MMA (led by JUI). The coalition government was formed in Balochistan and JUI again got a lion’s share. Quite interestingly, Molana Fazal-ur-Rehman also got the seat of opposition leader in the national assembly but the MMA opted to vote in favour of the Musharraf’s indemnity and LFO. In that same period, the Pakistani Taliban got control of FATA and started attacks in Pakistani territory. The JUI-F kept a distance from TTP but always parried to condemn their attacks. Its leadership always insisted to negotiate with TTP till the time Molana Fazal-ur-Rehman was attacked by them. Not surprisingly, Molana Fazal-ur-Rehman’s attitude seems entirely changed after the 2018 elections. He and his party were kept out of parliament, and space was filled by the PTI under this new “arrangement.” He has always been considered a manageable politician but is now left with no other option except to challenge the new “arrangement.” Through dharna, is he taking a head-on position like Shah Waliullah’s ideology? Eh, he is wise enough and knows how to play his cards. Religious and regional parties are always kept on board while creating such a political system. But only this time, these parties, except TLP, were badly ignored. The JUI-F, as the major stakeholder of such political arrangements in the past, can’t digest this unjust distribution for a longer period. Unfortunately, this system is not working, and bad governance has created an opportunity to challenge this regime. Molana knows it will not last for a longer period then why would he hesitate from putting pressure on this system for a better future arrangement?

When the US is all set to pull back its forces from Afghanistan, who else can better serve on the Afghan border area except Molana Fazal-ur-Rehman? People who see Afghanistan and Kashmir as more serious issues than any political wrangling in Islamabad are more anxious about the recent international developments. Due to the recent move-and-shake policy, the PTM has emerged as a nightmare for state and its national security interests on the Afghan border areas. The ANP, Achakzai or other Pukhtoon nationalists are already annoyed due to 2018 elections or have vanished before the PTM’s popular movement. Moreover, these nationalist elements don’t have influence like the JUI-F on the western border and Pushtoon areas of KP and Balochistan. Molana knows his worth for Afghanistan and the Pakistani border areas in the new arrangement of the international establishment. Through an announcement of dharna, he has successfully conveyed his message to the real power centres. Molana Fazal-ur-Rehman is more important for those who are interested in Afghanistan and want to club Afghan and Kashmir issue in negotiations with the US. He is still manageable, yet his behaviour is still commendable. Did he endorse the PTM’s stance? No. Did he turn down the requests of meetings by PTM leadership? Yes. Nevertheless, he was abused and bullied by the PTI leadership, but he’s rightly least interested to negotiate with the present government, knowing the fact that they are least important. He knows his worth and now it’s time to be recognised by those who are worried about Afghanistan and Kashmir. Hopefully, it has been recognised otherwise he would never announce the dharna, which is, in fact, a head-on position.

He doesn’t want to be another Shah Abdul Aziz or Shah Waliullah. His slogan is very simple for the concerned people. Grab this opportunity; this system is a failure; accept your mistakes; give me my due share and let’s move forward. He Is Still Manageable.

The writer is a politico-religious expert, researcher, teacher and freelance columnist