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Former U.S. Defense Secretary, retired Marine General James Mattis, with Francis (“Bing”) West, authored a remarkable book on leadership applicable well beyond the frontiers of military service. Call Sign Chaos: Learning to Lead is a modern day equivalent of Marcus Aurelius’ Emperor’s Handbook. CHAOS, Mattis’ Marine Corps call sign, arose from an irreverent compliment for “colonel has another outstanding solution” made by his staff. I have had the good fortune of knowing both authors.

Before discussing the book, a vignette concerning Pakistan is relevant. In a visit to GHQ in Rawalpindi with then Chief of Army Staff, General Ashfaq Kayani, proudly produced a letter from General Mattis. The letter complimented General Kayani for his presentation to the NATO Military Committee in Brussels and what Mattis called the best presentation he had heard at that forum. But Kayani’s reaction spoke volumes on how well General Mattis was regarded. His book reinforces the reasons for that regard.

The book focuses on three levels of military leadership and how the general learned for and from each. The first is Direct Leadership or what Clausewitz called “tactical.” This applies to small units or organizations in which the leader knows virtually everyone. In the Marine Corps this means platoons of about forty to battalions of 6-800.

Second is Executive Leadership or in Clausewitz’s lexicon “operational.” Because of size the leader only knows key subordinates. Regiments or brigades of 5000; divisions of 15,000 or more; and corps or a Marine Expeditionary Force that can number 50,000 fall into this category.

Last is Strategic Leadership conforming with Clausewitz’ terminology. In the U.S., “combatant commanders” who preside over huge geographic regions such as Asia, Europe and Latin America fill this level. Mattis twice commanded here: in Norfolk, Virginia as Allied Commander Transformation and as Central Command commander in Tampa, Florida with responsibilities from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean.

As Commander of the 7th Marines and Task Force 58 that put the first major American combat units ashore in Kandahar, Afghanistan in late 2001, Mattis’s accounts of how higher authority in Central Command lost the opportunity to capture or kill Osama bin Laden are stunning

While Mattis has been criticized for checking fire and commentary on President Donald Trump, reading his letter of resignation in the book makes clear that the commander-in-chief would not have fared well as a Marine under Mattis’ command. That said, Mattis’ story from commanding a battalion in the fabled 7th Marine regiment spearheading Operation Desert Storm in 1991 that drove Saddam Hussein from Kuwait to his time as Central Command commander is as compelling as any great work of war fiction.

As Commander of the 7th Marines and Task Force 58 that put the first major American combat units ashore in Kandahar, Afghanistan in late 2001, Mattis’s accounts of how higher authority in Central Command lost the opportunity to capture or kill Osama bin Laden are stunning. Because of inter-service jealousy on the part of the then Central Command Commander that I reported in my book Anatomy of Failure: Why America Loses Every War It Starts, Mattis’ Marines at Operating Base Rhino in Kandahar were prevented from exploiting that beachhead.

Instead of using Marines who were better trained for high altitude combat, the ill-prepared Army Tenth Mountain Division as assigned to trap Osama bin Laden in Tora Bora. Bin Laden escaped. Had the Marines been used, who knows if bin Laden would have been brought to justice and ending that war more promptly.

Mattis also raised profound questions of American strategy. He was incredulous that the U.S. was preparing to invade Iraq as a consequence of September 11th. During the march to Baghdad in March 2003, commanding the First Marine Division, Mattis was dumbfounded as to why his advance was halted at one stage. Later, he questioned why the American Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad dissolved the Iraqi army and vacillated in the taking of Fallujah that would claim undue amounts of American blood and treasure.

About his two years as Secretary of Defense, Mattis is relatively silent. Readers would like to know how Mattis derived his three main lines of effort for the Pentagon on increasing lethality of the force; reform to get the maximum from our resources; and the need to engage allies. And the same applied to Mattis’ thinking behind the National Defense Strategy (NDS).

CHAOS is must reading for anyone in, interested or affiliated with the military and not only in the United States. And it is a must read for those seeking perspectives on leadership. Mattis’ story largely reflected how largely “mano a mano” war was waged in the late 20th century. Fellow Marine General John Allen writes of “hyper war” in the 21st century. If there is a next book, Mattis might take that topic up. But he says that will not happen.

Too bad!

The writer is UPI’s Arnaud deBorchgrave Distinguished Columnist and a Senior Advisor at the Atlantic Council