Daily Times

Book Review: Dragon On Our Doorstep: Managing China Through Military Power

Authors: Pravin Sawhney and Ghazala Wahab

In one of his seminal books entitled “Conventional Deterrence,” John Mearsheimer asserted that deterring a potential attacker is not only a function of weaponry and numbers but that of military strategy. In other words, denying an adversary its battlefield objectives has got a lot to do with how a state employs its forces. One’s ability to fight is not only one of the constituents of deterrence but that of compellence, and most importantly, of escalation.

In one of his all-time classics, Herman Kahn argued, “You really don’t want to escalate further because it is too dangerous; in fact, it is even dangerous to stay where we are; therefore you’d better back down.” Given that adversarial relations are typified by compellence, deterrence and escalation, military power becomes paramount in affecting a change in a state’s stature.

The interplay between a country’s military power and its rise up the power ladder is the focus of Pravin Sawhney and Ghazala Wahab’s book “Dragon On Our Doorstep: Managing China Through Military Power.”

Bringing their vast journalistic and professional experience on strategic affairs into play, the authors contend that India cannot win a war against Pakistan, let alone China, not because of the possession of nuclear weapons by both the countries but because of New Delhi’s lack of military power. Both argue that this is the reason why India remains bogged down against them. This basic argument runs against some of the clichés that are now a part of South Asia’s strategic discourse. While India toys with ideas of fighting a two and a half front war, achieving escalation dominance and becoming a counterweight to China, its military power spectrum remains inadequate to realise these end-states.

The book is lucidly divided into different sections that deal with China’s ascendancy, the trouble with India’s Pakistan-specific refrain, and issues like the indigenous defence industry, Tibet and the insurgencies within. However, with tensions rising between India and Pakistan, after the former revoked Article 370 and dispossessed Jammu and Kashmir of its special status, a closer engagement with the authors’ principal arguments on India’s war-withal vis-à-vis Pakistan is fitting and timely.

The authors rightly enunciate that years of operations inside Indian Occupied Kashmir, and manning the Line of Control (the authors call it Line of Constraint) have tied down the Indian Army with training inertia creeping in when it comes to fighting a conventional war. On the contrary, the Pakistan Army, the authors contend, has not only perfected the way to operate on interior lines but also trained and prepared itself for war. The authors outline how the widening gulf between Indian security forces and Kashmiris could exacerbate the troubles for Indian security forces, if and when they face Pakistan, for their lines of communication would be vulnerable. At this stage, nothing could be truer than this.

As of this writing, the Indian Army is deployed inside IOK to quell an anticipated uprising after stripping their special status off the Kashmiris. Pakistan, on the other hand, will be free from such threats due to the peaceful state of affairs in Azad Jammu and Kashmir. Its decreasing commitments on the Af-Pak border make redeployment of forces a much more viable option; giving a cost-effective boost to conventional deterrence.

For a defender and deferrer like Pakistan, an ability to lengthen India’s initial war effort and deny it quick tactical and operational aims will be enough to engender deterrence or even control escalation. The authors take a deep dive into why New Delhi’s Cold Start Doctrine may not do the trick against Pakistan. Interestingly, they delve on Pakistan’s strengths other than its tactical nuclear weapons that could counter India.

Predicating their assessment on the growing strategic bonhomie between Beijing and Islamabad, Sawhney and Ghazala discuss the increasing interoperability between the two countries, terming it as one of the advantages that bolster Pakistan in a conflict with India. While the authors rightly allude to the commonality of equipment and at times, training, it remains to be seen if the interoperability is put into action when the push comes to shove.

This book is based on extensive research and is reflective of a deep understanding of the art and science of war. One of the most important policy implications of this work could be to cause a rethink amongst Indian decision-makers about war-fighting. India looks to exploit a band to apply force against Pakistan under a nuclear umbrella, thinking that it can dominate some of the conventional rungs. A careful reading of this book will identify where India lags and what needs to be done to achieve substantial escalation dominance without running the risk of unbridled escalation. The book deals with, as aforementioned, a host of other issues that are intrinsic to the Indo-Pak feud. Notably, the chapter on Ladakh becomes a must-read after China reacted to India’s decision to tinker with its status, for it will help understand how the three-party dispute between Beijing, Islamabad and New Delhi plays out in the near future. The book is also useful for academics working on escalation dynamics in South Asia. Also, it lays bare India’s actual capability mix, casting aspersions on its propensity to be a linchpin in Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy.

The writer is a Research Associate at the Centre for Security, Strategy and Policy Research (CSSPR), University of Lahore