Daily Times

As the wisdom goes that all politics is local. We try to generalize the linkages between higher, national assembly by-election trends at the local constituency level, and the decentralization debate regarding empowering the local governments. In order to do so, this article refers to some literature (Javed 2012; Ali 2018) to illustrate the discussion.

Most elections, other than the one held in 1970, are contested by mobilizing the political factions and patronage politics at the local constituency level. Factional politics at the local level is woven around the familial, kinship, and reciprocal ties; as well as by the relations of ‘economic dependence’. Patronage politics is localization or ‘municipalisation’ of party politics in terms of delivery of services and provision of infrastructure through building roads, sanitation, sewage systems; and providing employment, as the prime means of garnering votes.

During the by-election in Multan (as studied by the above-cited Javed’s 2012 paper), the influential politician appointed someone from the family as the ‘caretaker’ of this constituency; this person’s job was to keep the ‘intermediaries and the middlemen’ satisfied and happy; and leave no grounds for complaints by the potential voters. Citing other literature, Javed (2012) states that there is also the rise of the middle or ‘intermediate class’ in constituency level politics; this ‘intermediate’ class consists of “small contractors, agro-traders, wholesalers, transporter owners, and other assorted businessmen, reflecting the petty nature of capitalist accumulation. Straddling the line between the formal and informal economy, members of this upwardly mobile class formulate hybrid relationships – using clan and biradari linkages – with local bureaucrats and politicians on the one hand, and with dependent labour on the other. They have become indispensible actors on the political landscape not only for their economic contributions during elections, but also for their ability to channel, coerce, and manipulate the support from the ‘below'”. Some people vote at the local constituency level out of personal allegiance to the candidate or supporters, others do due to the decision made by the elders, yet more vote to get their local or ‘municipal’ concerns addressed. Politics is essentially ‘local’, ‘self-contained and inward-looking’, and expensive.

There is also the need to strike balance between empowering people at the grassroots level through local government, as well as, for the state to preserve its autonomy through impersonalisation of bureaucracy

Coming to the devolution of power to the local government tier;in the post-2008 phase, the 18th amendment was a watershed moment in Pakistan’s federalism history by devolving powers from the federal government to the provincial governments; yet the same zeal was not shown in terms in instituting devolution from the provincial tier to the local government tier due to certain historical legacy as well as political economy reasons. Historically, the local governments were established by the non-representative regimes to bypass the political class at the national and provincial level. In terms of political economy imperatives, the national/provincial political leadership competes with the local level leadership in the politics of patronage, hence there is not that kind of enthusiasm by the elected political governments to devolve further from the provincial level to the local government level. Transition to democracy took place in 2008 followed by the 18th amendment and respective provincial legislation to the local level; yet local governments were not formed till 2015 under the pressure from the highest court and most of them do not enjoy effective decision-making powers and financial resources to do their job properly. The scope of the devolution of power has been broader in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa than the other three provinces. In KP, power was devolved even to the village and neighbourhood council level, going well beyond the district, sub-district, and union council levels. The KP government also announced to allocate over 30% of its budget to the local governments; yet for the financial year 2017-18, this allocation was only 8% due to the issues of corruption, capacity, and underutilization of funds. In Punjab and Sindh, the local government laws bestowed less powers to the local governments; they both have also done away with the sub-district (tehsil) tier of the local government and have not introduced any other tiers of the local government beyond the union council level. In both Sindh and Punjab, the local governments are relatively weak. In Sindh, MQM has majority in the city district governments of Karachi and Hyderabad; and PPP is in control of the interior Sindh. It has introduced another ethnicity-based political economy angle, as MQM wants stronger local governments.

There is need for ‘substantive’ administrative as well as fiscal devolution for the local governments to work effectively. Provincial Finance Commissions have not been successful to work out a viable mechanism to distribute funds from the provincial tier to the local government level, though Punjab made some progress on that count. There is also the need to overcome the issues of lack of capacity at the local government level as most of local councilors were considered not to be fully aware of their role, functions, and powers under the new local government legislation. There is also the need to strike balance between empowering people at the grassroots level through local government, as well as, for the state to preserve its autonomy through impersonalisation of bureaucracy. For example, it was observed that in the past, the vested local interests such as the property dealers have been able to ‘unduly influence’ local government functions of zoning and town planning through corruption.

There is also the need to make sure the only genuine and deserving candidates for the reserved seats of women, peasants, workers, minorities, and youth are nominated and elected. The reserved candidates need to represent the interests of their constituents rather than further the interests of political parties that nominate them. A gradual movement towards the direct election for the reserved seats may be a more effective long-term solution to this issue of true representation of the interests of the marginalized.

The writer is an Islamabad-based social scientist