Daily Times

Although maldeveloped and least integrated, South Asia remains a region of incontestable significance from a variety of perspectives. Responsible for producing exotic stuff and holding a thriving fabric industry along with significant trade routes, the region has unique features. Once a colonised region, it now attracts global players with its untapped and peculiar geo-economic value. After China’s geo-economic expansion to seek and consolidate partnerships in South Asia, Russia has come back in the run again. There was a time when elites in Kremlin were floundering not to consider this part of Asia since Soviet experiences in South Asian region were very embittered. For years since Soviet withdrawal, the public and political mood were unwilling to engage in the chaotic environment and war-mongering theatres of South Asia.

The focus of the Russian strategists and policy planners was not to react to the evolving situation in that region and rather focus on their domestic economy. In the case of the Afghan war, Kremlin had initially supported the US war on terror but when the objectives and strategies changed during the war, the Russian position also changed accordingly.

It still didn’t engage in South Asia for almost a decade but experienced the dynamics silently to have a more conducive space for intervention.

In the first decade of the 21st century, since the Russian economy was reviving under President Vladimir Putin, Russia started to resurge geopolitically in the global arena.

Seeking lessons from the past when Sino-Russia relations were fractured badly back in the 1960s and provided the US bloc with an opportunity to dominate the Soviet bloc.

This time, Russia forged strategic ties with China, despite differences. It also consolidated the Kremlin’s efforts to fix the domestic economic turmoil. With Russia’s growing revenues from the oil and defence industry and China and India as significant importers, Kremlin was able to invest and win the influence of its immediate neighbours as well as block the NATO’s eastward expansion close to the Russian borders.

Nonetheless, the growing health of economy and defence clout changed the strategic thinking of Kremlin to focus on shaping the global order in convergence with China rather being a reactionary state to the evolving world order. These revisionist tendencies of Kremlin provided an impetus to expanding its spheres of influence and reviewing its paradigm of conducting international relations. With the onset of this decade, the changing global dynamics and shifting of alliances drove Kremlin to benefit from these dynamic changes. In this pursuance, Russia embraced many of its erstwhile opponents in a diverse set of relations. Having India a strategic defence partner in South Asia, Russia started to improve its relations with Pakistan.

In early 2014, when the pro-Russian Ukrainian president was deposed and replaced, Russia perceived its security in jeopardy. Thus, in a limited span, Russia attacked Crimea, which lies on the west of the Russian border. It installed a pro-Russian government there and, eventually, annexed through some formal legal procedures. This incident left the US and its Western partners in wrath and they decided to retaliate furiously. Consequently, the US imposed restrictions on significant defence trade with Russia under Countering American Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) legislation. The West also cut its trade ties with Russia leaving the Russian economy in severe trouble. Amid all these developments, the Russian economy was sliding downward and hinges largely on China for immediate economic compensations. However, faltering oil prices and the crippling impact of sanctions was a great setback for Russia in the long run. Russia relies heavily on oil revenues, and the West was a significant trade market for Russia.

Russia thinks not less than to re-profile its stature on the global arena at the moment

Now, Russia had two options either to withdraw from Crimea and cede its control to Ukraine or to seek new geo-economic partnerships if it has to support its foreign policy ambitions beyond its borders. And that is what Kremlin did; revising its foreign policy concept in November 2016. The major change in Russia’s foreign policy calculation in this revised version was to seek more partnerships, new markets for oil and gas as well as for its defence trade. Among many other regions Russia tries to approach, South Asia carries a unique value. From India as a burgeoning partnership and a significant defence trade partner to improving its Pakistan, Afghan stakeholders and Bangladesh, Russia revisited its relations in the region. Since South Asia remains an active theatre of hostility between India and Pakistan, It was a complicated challenge for Russia to pursue a balanced foreign policy in the region that doesn’t favour relations with one state at the expense of other. Analyzing the Russia engagement in South Asia over the years, Russia has been successful to draft an over-arching and balanced foreign policy. The primary underlying motivations to consider South Asia are to access to the warm waters of the Arabian Sea, incorporate South Asian in Eurasian integration and boost up the defence and economic trade relations with regional states. Some experts are of the view that the primary trigger of Russian engagement in South Asia drives from Afghanistan whereby it direly needs to have peace since Afghanistan lies at the immediate borders of Central Asia, often dubbed as Russian backyard. There is no doubt that Afghanistan remains paramount to Russia as the cascading effects of insurgency and narcotics proliferation threaten the stability of neighbouring regions. Thus, peace in Afghanistan would mean a secure Southern trajectory where Russia could expand its sphere of influence and reap significant untapped dividends.

There can be various layers to assume what was the strategic drive that pushed Russia to ambitiously foster its relations in South Asia. However, the decline of Russia-EU relations remains a primary driver. Since relations with the West frayed, it was quintessential to approach–horizontally and vertically–more partners to compensate the economic jolt in the aftermath of sanctions. South Asia has its peculiar milieu and its own dynamics influence external player priorities and interests. For instance, Amidst India’s increasingly growing defence ties with the US, it was a strategic necessity for Kremlin to counterweigh by lifting the arms embargo on Pakistan.

Nevertheless, Russia’s willingness to sell sophisticated defence procurements to South Asian nuclear antagonists fulfils its commercial and strategic interests while unbalancing strategic stability in the region. Owing to its economic constraints, Pakistan could not proportionally match India’s defence purchases. Thus, it relies on qualitative deterrence to counter-balance India. While fostering its defence relations, Russia should be wary of the fragile atmosphere of South Asia where defence technology drives policy, not the other way round.

To wrap it all up, Russia thinks not less than to re-profile its stature on the global arena at the moment. In this pursuit, it finds itself comfortable to engage new partners in whatever capacity it could. The new generations of Russians will better think to engage erstwhile opponents in pursuit of their economic and political imperatives. They will not be haunted by the bitter emotional catharsis and sour relics of the past. This transition is already in the making and with the prelude of the next decade, wider changes would expectedly be incorporated.

The writer is a research fellow at the South Asian Strategic Stability Institute, Islamabad