Daily Times

Japan is expanding its strategic landscape by improving relations with India. India has been repeatedly reported to have often shown reservations in welcoming the Japanese delegation to the annual Malabar naval exercise between India and the US, notwithstanding pressure from the latter. India’s reluctance was seemingly intended to avoid Chinese provocation. At that time, Japan’s inclination towards India was not seen as a union against China but a move to reinforce Japan’s own presence in the Indian Ocean. Japan’s naval posture has been focused on protecting home islands and its skimpy fleet of vessels, which are capable of resupplying ships with fuel and munitions, and its recent developments seem to focus on this policy. The country has been relying on the US for the security of its supply lines for years. However, with its recent military advancements, it can now be presumed that Japan is fast developing its ability to independently secure its supply lines. Both Japan and China are greatly dependent on the Strait of Malacca and Indian Ocean for trade. Undoubtedly, Japan’s presence in these critical waterways is enhancing its capability to secure its supply lines while improving its strategic position alongside increasing tension with China in the South China Sea. Besides improving its military relations with India, Japan was also seen bolstering its economic relations with countries in the Indian Ocean basin. In 2013, Japan concluded first bilateral naval exercise with India in the Bay of Bengal and also affirmed that similar exercises would also be held in future. After that, India and Japan are continually getting closer in order to pursue their respective interests.

Compared to the past, Japan and India are now more closely cooperating on a number of issues. The perfect example for this proximity is the civil nuclear cooperation between the two states. At a bilateral summit held in New Delhi last December, Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, signed a memorandum of agreement on civil nuclear cooperation with Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi. And on August 14, 2016, both prime ministers reportedly agreed to finalise a full-fledged nuclear cooperation agreement in November 2016. Lately, on November 11, 2016, Japan and India signed an accord for peaceful usage of nuclear energy.

After this treaty, India would be able to import nuclear power plants, nuclear fuel and technology from Japan. India is the world’s third largest importer of crude oil and now realises that nuclear energy is a more reasonable way to meet the country’s energy demands without emitting carbon on a large-scale. Although India already has civil nuclear cooperation with other countries, it still needed to sign a nuclear agreement to import large forged components from Japan. From an economic point of view, the transfer of nuclear technology is not only significant for India’s growing economy but also an attractive reason for Japan to invest. Japan seeks to build nuclear power plants to revive its nuclear market after the Fukushima nuclear disaster. Apart from the economic standpoint, India’s potential to compete with China and its strategic cooperation with the US further adds weight to this civil nuclear cooperation. The deal will also have security implications in the South Asian region. Pakistan has expressed concerns over the controversial nuclear deal while urging Japan “to objectively assess the consequences of discriminatory approaches to our region.”

It is presumed that this deal would further develop India’s credibility as a responsible nuclear weapon state. However many argue that being victims of a nuclear bomb, Japanese should not have entered into an agreement with a non-NPT state. The deal also has a separate nullification clause that would cancel the pact if India were to conduct a nuclear test, even for peaceful purposes, because there cannot be any assurance that the technology provided by Japan has not been used for military purposes. The intensity of Japan’s concern over this can be understood from the December 2015 Japan-India joint statement when Prime Minister Abe stated “the importance of early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) which should lead to nuclear disarmament.”

There was also a political resistance seen to the deal in Japan. Therefore, the deal can become unstable if India is developing a thermonuclear weapon, as has been reported by different sources. However, if India will be allowed to receive this nuclear technology without banning its future nuclear tests, it would further reduce the chances of states signing CTBT because many states already have reservations over India’s preferential treatment, as was seen in the last Vienna plenary meeting. In the aforesaid scenario, this will be another deal having an adverse impact on the non-proliferation regime.

The writer is a member of an Islamabad-based think tank Strategic Vision Institute. She works on issues related to nuclear non-proliferation and South Asian nuclear equation, and writes for national and international publications