Daily Times

At independence Pakistan had five major ethnic groups-Bengalis, Punjabis, Sindhis, Pathans and Baluchis; since independence, one ethnic group (Punjabis) has dominated the rest. This was possible perhaps for two reasons. The Punjabis had been the backbone of the British Indian army, and became so also of the Pakistan army. The political leadership’s concern with Pakistan’s territorial security catapulted the military to political prominence, which created a permanent role of the military high command in national politics. This apart was the fact that the Punjabis comprised 56 per cent of West Pakistan’s population at the time, also led to Punjabi domination of the affairs of the state. In the then ethnic distribution except Punjabis, Sindhis constitute 22 per cent, Pathans 13 per cent, Baluchis 4 per cent and rest 5 per cent.

Regime of Zia-ul-Haq

The coming of Zia-ul-Haq as the new ruler of Pakistan was responsible for the ethnic disturbances in the country. Some sectarian groups-Sipah-i-Sahaba and Tehrik-i-Jafena surfaced and flourished under Zia’s patronage. Ethnic parties especially Muttahida Quami Movement, formerly Muhajir Quami Movement (MQM) and its rival group Haqiqi were also said to be creation of the martial law administration. He started a calculated move to part between Sindhi and non-Sindhi, Sindhi and Mohajir. The hanging of Z.A. Bhutto in 1979 had further widened the gap not only between the Sindhi in rural areas and the military regime but also with the people of Pakistan in general. The new incident had created an overt hostility between the military and the Sindhi population. The power of the central government became identified with a particular ethnic group. In order to undermine the political support of Pakistan Peoples’ Party (PPP) in Sindh Zia encouraged the Mohajirs who constitute about 20 per cent to come together under one political platform, and it was for the first time that an All Pakistan Mohajir Student’s Organisation (APMSO) was formed in 1978. In nutshell, General Zia was responsible overtly and covertly for the confrontation in both rural and urban region of the province. In targeting the Sindhis Zia succeeded in assimilating discontended Pathans into Pakistan national politics.

The regime of General Zia witnessed the growing importance of Islamic militants in the political system. The two main Islamic parties of Pakistan, Jamiatul-ulema-i-Islam (JUI) and Jamaat-i-Islamic (JI) had been actively involved in Afghanistan, first in the anti-Soviet Jehad and later in support of the Taliban. The Jamaat-i-Islami had organised itself as armed cadre of workers, particularly among students. The external arms and money linkages developed by Islamist forces. What mattered here was the existence of these militant organisations, their initial training in Pakistani Madrassas, their operations in Afghanistan, their links with political parties, the ISI and the army. As a fallout from Afghan turmoil, guns, drugs and state sponsored terrorism have proliferated; a mafia-like culture prevailed in parts of Pakistan, further straining its weak institutional framework and thereby creating a threat to internal security and stability. Thus, Zia’s laws and policies resulted in making vast sections of the population extremely vulnerable to the Islamic militancy by replacing a tolerant and liberal civil society with an intolerant and retrogressive one. Zia-ul-Haq used Islam to perpetuate his autocratic rule but left behind a legacy of division, disruption, contradiction and conflicts.

At independence Pakistan had five major ethnic groups-Bengalis, Punjabis, Sindhis, Pathans and Baluchis; since independence, one ethnic group (Punjabis) has dominated the rest. This was possible perhaps for two reasons. The Punjabis had been the backbone of the British Indian army, and became so also of the Pakistan army

The Islamisation drive of Zia-ul-Haq brought to the surface all sorts of contradictions among Muslim trends and sects. The difference between different religious trends produced alienation among the Muslims and pushed them in open antagonism, enmity and bloodshed. The Deobandi school is extremely intolerant of all Islamic trends, its radical part looks at the Shi’ites as infidels. The enmity between them in central and southern Punjab developed into a blood feud typical of the local folk culture and a string of terrorist acts that were going on for many years. By the late eighties detachment of militants had been strengthened with the people who fought in Afghanistan. The Jihad against the Soviet troops was felt in Punjab and other provinces. The geopolitical sickle of Islamic extremism stretched from Afghanistan and Kashmir in the north and reached Pakistan its middle part. This situation survived throughout the last decade of the twentieth century and the beginning of the new century and was even strengthened with the sickle of radical Islamism.

Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif

Further in the regimes of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, despite restoration of democracy, orthodoxy nexus of Zia’s period remained unchanged. After the death of Zia-ul-Haq in a air crash in August 1988, Benazir Bhutto became the Prime Minister of Pakistan. Though the PPP did show an inclination to roll back the Ziaist Islamisation but it was not in a position to make much headway. In her period the military maintained a decisive authority but under overall civilian supremacy. Her government became soft to military power to deal with the near anarchic situation in the province. Nawaz Sharif in the year 1990 succeeded Benazir Bhutto and the former too was known as working on behalf of the old power cocktail. In his second term he gave a new diplomatic twist to Pakistan’s Kashmir policy asserting that Islamabad would extend ‘moral, political and diplomatic support to the Kashmiri people on the Indian side of the Line of Control LoC’. In this phase Nawaz Sharif also declared Shariat or the social system of Islam through the 15th Constitutional Amendment (1998), and like his predecessors he used the Islamic card for his political survival in the face of imminent economic collapse and growing sectarianism in the country. The amendment to the constitution aimed to change the complexion of state from democracy to theocratic and of the leader from elected representative to absolute monarch. As expected in post-Kargil humiliation, the democratic government of Nawaz Sharif was overthrown in a military coup by General Pervez Musharraf on October 12, 1999.

General Parvez Musharraf

General Pervez Musharraf inherited the ethnic tension and a more acute and formidable ‘Islamisation Programme’ in the then Pakistan. The post-Zia regimes headed by Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif continued with more or less the same sort of highly centralised, repressive and negative approach as adopted by their predecessors to deal with the regional tensions. The already complicated scene in the Sindh province was wrecked by violence. Thousands of innocent people had fallen victim to the sectarian fanaticism of armed militia. The polarisation of Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM), Pakistan Muslim League (PML), Awami National Party (ANP) and other factions of Pakistan sharpened when the Sharif government unveiled its plan to introduce a constitutional amendment to amass more powers.

At the time Pervez Musharraf tookover, the Islamist hardliners, who were on the defensive in the initial days, had started to make a comeback with their characteristic assertiveness. After the regime’s retreat on the issue of rationalising the blasphemy law, the Islamist political forces had even found the courage to challenge the military establishment. Alike to Zia-ul-Haq, Musharraf began to tell the world that Jihad in its true understanding delineates war cultures and shuns terrorism and therefore, the two should not be confused. The implied meaning of his statement was that his military regime has no control over the Mujahideen whom he called freedom fighters and that their actions are purely voluntary. Hence, Pakistan is following Jihad, not terrorism. In a hurridly convened press conference in Karachi Lieutenant General Tareeq Wasin Ghazi, the Corps Commander of the Sindh province made it clear that no official campaign was going on against the Jihadi organisations to stop them from collecting funds.

In fact Pervez Musharraf never initiated a crackdown on Jihadi, its organisations and producing factory-madrassas in order to appease the religious support for his rule. As part of the alleged ‘deal’ the military government, not withstanding its public statements, turned a blind eye to the Jihadi activities. The ordinance promulgated to regulate the functions of madrassas on 19 August 2001, remained a piece of paper and madrassas remained factories for the mass production of zealots ready to die for Jihad all over the world. Madrassas are the labour suppliers, producing the raw material on which Jihad is driven. The wheels of which are well oiled by the wealthy Pakistani diaspora who pour in money along with Wahabis of Saudi Arabia. Besides, Pakistan’s government has encouraged the establishment of such a large number of Islamic militant organisations and groups-Taliban, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, Lashkar-e-Toiba, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, Hizb-e-Wahadat, Sipah-e-Sabaha Pakistan, Lashkar-e-Jhougvi, Spipah-e-Mohammad Pakistan and Jaish-e-Mohammad in the last 10 to 15 years. The most typical of these organisations, and the one with the largest manpower and resources is the Lashkar-e-Toiba. The Lashkar was formed after the Afghan Jihad against Soviet occupation was nearly over and it is primarily meant to train recruits to fight battle in Kashmir.

In a dramatic development the general elections in Pakistan were held for the National Assembly in February 2008 and restoration of democracy in the country was welcomed by all. As a result of the victory a coalition of PPP and Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz Sharif) an elected government took over the administration with Yousuf Raza Gilani as the new Prime Minister of Pakistan in March 2008. But the restoration of democracy had hardly made any difference on the promotion of religious fundamentalism. In the name of Islam it has created an image of being the most potent source of religious terrorism, which poses a threat to peace and stability in large parts of the globe. It has become the biggest source of most of its internal conflicts in recent years.

The writer is a university teacher in Bihar, India