Daily Times

Previous op-ed in this series has taken the position that a counter insurgency policy, aligned with the overall national security policy, is a must for winning the peace. To that end, a Pakistani counter insurgency policy of reconciliation is recommended.

This policy of reconciliation is tasked with curbing the insurgent tendency that aims to usurp power away from the government. Terrorism is one of the main strategies that executes this insurgent policy. Therefore, it stands to reason that – after deliberating the counter insurgency policy – a counter terrorism policy is also envisaged and adopted. That is also because, in the sequence of events, generally insurgency will come first and lead to terrorism, which comes second. That is why, even in the order of responses, nominally counter insurgency comes first and counter terrorism second.

The counter insurgency policy of reconciliation was explained as assimilate where possible, eliminate where needed. In-fact, the counter terrorism policy speaks to the later; i.e. eliminate where needed. That is the key link between the counter insurgency policy and counter terrorism policy.

Policy is defined as a conscientious and galvanising vision that imagines a favourable end state. A counter terrorism policy needs to be setup similarly. In Pakistan’s case, the counter terrorism policy is deemed to stand resolute in the elimination of, and protection from, insurgents. This would translate into a one-word counter terrorism policy of resolve. That is, the policy will espouse and ensure the resolve to ensure an end to the wide-activities of insurgents. There are three objectives of this policy. One, eradication of insurgent leadership. Two, elimination of terrorist safe heavens and protection from them. Three, removing conditions that non-state actors use to cultivate resources.

Additionally, the counter terrorism policy will also defend, promote and align to the five national interests of Pakistan described by previous pieces in the series. First, Pakistan should become a nationally harmonious country – a survival level national interest. Second, it should become a secure state especially with regards to its territory, citizens, and constitution – a national interest related to Pakistan’s survival. Third, Pakistan needs to be a successful economy and enhance the standard of its citizens through favourable social opportunities. This is a vital level national interest. Fourth, promote a morally stable and secure world governed by the rule of law. Fifth, initiate friendships globally by acting as a democratic and credible partner. The last two being major level national interests. Mostly, the counter terrorism policy of resolve will explicitly underpin the second survival level Pakistani interest of becoming a secure state.

The Pakistani armed forces and the current political administration have done well but embarked upon only some components of the POTENT strategy

As established earlier, strategy is ‘ways and means to an end’. That end being the goals established by the policy. Thus, strategy defines how operations are executed to accomplish policy objectives. In its entirety, strategy is a continuous process where ends, ways, and means are aligned to accomplish desired policy end goals while keeping risk at an acceptable level. In the case of the counter terrorism policy of resolve, a POTENT strategy is to be actioned. Here each alphabet of POTENT stands for a specific operational and tactical action. One, a prepared government and people. Two, Organised for firm action. Three, tenacious in their beliefs and ends of this strategy. Four, enabled to stand together. Five, never give an inch to terrorism and terrorists – six.

From an operational stand point, the POTENT strategy will be underpinned by the following five universal pillars of counter terrorism. One, prevent – combat radicalisation and eradicate fertile grounds for terrorism recruitment to safeguard people and stop them from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. Two, pursue – detect, investigate and disrupt terrorist networks to hinder terrorists’ capacity to plan, organise and hit their targets. Three, protect – from terrorist attack by reducing vulnerability of the country and its interests overseas and protecting citizens and infrastructure. Four, prepare – to mitigate, manage and minimise the impact and consequences of a terrorist attack if and where it cannot be stopped by bringing any attack to an end rapidly and recovering from it efficiently. Fifth, persevere – with engaging international partners and security organisations to operate on a global scale because Pakistan’s security is closely linked with the situation in other countries, particularly in neighbouring states.

In the above model, the counter terrorism policy is an extrapolation of the counter insurgency policy which itself is linked to Pakistan’s national security policy and national interests. Thus, ensuring alignment throughout the chain. The instruments of statecraft, defined as all governmental structures that run the affairs of the state, will need to be required to support this counter terrorism policy of resolve throughout its implementation and until it reaches its stated objectives.

The Pakistani armed forces and the current political administration have done well but embarked upon only some components of the POTENT strategy. Mostly that of detecting, investigating and disrupting terrorist networks. The need of the hour is to enact the other universal pillars of counter terrorism so that the policy objectives are achieved.

In his seminal book, On War, Clausewitz writes “woe to the government, which, relying on half-hearted politics and a shackled military policy, meets a foe who, like the untamed elements, knows no law other than his own power!” For a foe such as that, and one Pakistan is facing on multiple fronts, the order of the day is to have a persuasive and effective counter terrorism policy of resolve to go hand-in-hand with the counter insurgency policy of reconciliation! Anything less will surely miss the mark!

The writer is Director Programmes for an international ICT organisation based in the UK who writes on corporate strategy, socio-economic and geopolitical issues