Daily Times

According to Julian Lindley, Paul-Cornish, and Andrew Rathmell “Clear, Hold, Build” is a comprehensive approach to tackle the contested zones in counterinsurgency environments; involving kinetic as well non kinetic operations. The armies employ kinetic force through armed action and use of intelligence to identify and erase the imprint of insurgents operating in contested zones. After clearing the pockets of resistance, the area has to be held through a stable administrative setup to restore the semblance of governance by the civilians, supported by the law enforcement agencies including police and paramilitary units. In the absence of police and due to inefficacy of paramilitary forces the “hold” phase also involves armed forces in several cases. Any “hold” phase where the army is still involved in stability operations is at the cost of clearance operations. What needs to be understood is that the civilian institutions need to take the lead in hold and build phases as armies are not ideally suited to the rebuilding phase due to lack of training.

The “build” stage is the post hold phase when the areas recaptured from the insurgents are rehabilitated for public use through reconstruction efforts. This stage also involves the settlement of internally displaced persons. The build stage comes only after successful clearance and effective holding operations wherein the insurgents are prevented from sneaking back into the conflict prone zones. The US Army and NATO coined several terms and raised organisations for this comprehensive counter insurgency approach that did not stop at clearance alone and treated civilian rehabilitation and infrastructure restoration as the integral part of counterinsurgency campaigns. Michael J. Mcnerney in his article “Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a Muddle?” writes that US hold and build strategy in Afghanistan was predicated on capacity building of the insurgency ravaged communities through Provincial Reconstruction Teams called PRTs. One of the interesting metrics used by them to measure their effectiveness was to “see a smile on the face of Afghan children”.

The smile on the face was an indication of the confidence the communities reposed in the US PRTs. The true measure of effectiveness of the US reconstruction efforts was the good governance. In order to extend the reach of the government through administrative organizations, a large bureaucratic structure was required which was not available with the Afghan government. At one time in Vietnam, the US government had 6,464 military advisors, 1,137 civilians and 223 international experts for Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) in 250 districts and 40 provinces of South Vietnam. The Vietnam CORDS model was replicated in a modified form in Afghanistan through ISAF but little impact was made by PRTs due to lack of civil society empowerment and decision making in governance efforts making the sustainability of these efforts questionable. Due to this failure, the Taliban have staged a resurgence in Afghanistan.

Pakistan must cleanse the remaining pockets of TTP resistance and sanctuaries post-haste along with completion of the border fence between Afghanistan and Pakistan on the Durand Line

The Afghan Taliban are on a roll in Afghanistan. They will not stop at anything but complete capitulation of the US propped Afghan regime. Why should they go for power sharing and half measures now when they are winning? The US defence establishment and the intelligence community do not want to acknowledge their failure in building sustainable peace structures in Afghanistan. Perhaps Eisenhower was right in his premonition about the military industrial complex when he sounded his warning about its self-serving nature. War is a lucrative business for certain communities who make a fortune during wars. Contracts for defence manufacturers and logistics providers combined with the promotions and bureaucratic expansion for the armed forces are the reasons the Pentagon and CIA would not throw in the towel despite burning US tax payers’ money in this trillion dollar long war in Afghanistan.

Interestingly a person who has displayed an uncanny ability to see through the charade of the war racket is none other than US President Donald Trump. He has demonstrated a rare sense of coup d’oeil while surveying the Afghan scene and has rightly concluded the futility of the US project in Afghanistan. The current US brokered dialogue between the Taliban and the Ghani administration is likely to founder on the rocks of mutual suspicion. When Donald Trump finally orders the US troops out of Afghanistan it would certainly boost his electoral success prospects in the next elections. Afghanistan meanwhile is fated to slip into a final round of conflict at the end of which a Taliban government is likely to be formed in Afghanistan. Any other variation of Afghan solution would result either in an unstable peace or the continuation of the present mess. The role of Russia and Iran in bleeding the US to the maximum extent would be the rider clause in all future US options.

The big question that arises is Pakistan’s response in this scenario. What happens in Afghanistan is going to impact Pakistan strongly. If the US leaves as Trump desires there would be a fallout on Pakistan as well, in the shape of cross border movement of militants to support their allies across the border. The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) insurgents who have crossed over to Afghanistan would try and cross over to Pakistan to make use of any existing vacuums in FATA. The Afghan Taliban may or may not discourage them from that undertaking depending upon Pakistan’s relations with them. Another exodus of civil war affected refugees from Afghanistan is also within the realm of possibilities for which Pakistan should have a response. The best strategy is to hold and build our tribal belt ravaged by the war between TTP insurgents and the Pakistani state. For effective holding of the areas cleansed of the insurgent presence the effective involvement of civil administration and police cum paramilitary is absolutely essential.

Pakistan must cleanse the remaining pockets of TTP resistance and sanctuaries post haste alongwith completion of the border fence between Afghanistan and Pakistan on the Durand Line. All national resources should be marshaled to secure our Afghan border so that it could subsequently be guarded effectively by the FC and other law enforcement agencies. The integration of FATA into KP should also be ensured in an evolutionary spiral instead of a paroxysm of rapid change. While extending judicial and tax laws to FATA the local environment, sociology, culture, and tribal dynamics should be factored in. How for instance would the property be taxed in FATA where the individuals do not own the land? The land in FATA belongs to state that cedes the space to tribes based on an ancient practice of “NATIC”, according to which the importance of a tribe is determined on the basis of its power and not the mere numbers.

A warlike tribe might have more land in possession due to its power weightage compared to a more populous tribe. Then there are other interesting realities like the use of roads which belong to the state where the laws like FCR operate. The tribes residing away from roads are governed by the Rewaj and Pakhtunwali code. How would those be integrated into provincial laws after integration? For effective hold and build operations, the state needs to engage more effectively with the propaganda of PakhtunTahafuzz Movement (PTM) on the epistemic front. The dissemination of counter narratives on media needs to be made more effective. For example the issue of road blocks and IDPs being exploited by PTM needs to be addressed through exposure of the hollowness of PTM arguments. Instead of shunning their arguments those should be rebutted squarely.

The nation needs to know the extent of sacrifices made by the army and the patriotic civilian allies in its endeavor to rid TTP infested FATA of the militants’ presence. People need to know that it were the fathers and brothers of these young PTM activists who fearing the wrath of TTP had requested the army to launch a military operation. It was the army that took care of the sisters and mothers of these PTM activists in IDP camps where they were given education and a secure life while the army shed blood to rid their land of the TTP menace. To hold and build FATA effectively a national effort is needed as army alone cannot do it. The sustainability of the rebuild phase depends on changing the existing realities of the FATA region. That can only be achieved if in addition to infrastructure we could restructure the cultural, educational, and administrative foundations of FATA’s governance environment and succeed where the americans failed i.e putting a smile on the faces of FATA children.

The writer is a PhD scholar at NUST

Published in Daily Times, February 5^th 2019.