Daily Times

Islamic Military Alliance to Fight Terrorism (IMAFT) comprises 39 Islamic countries with notable omissions like Indonesia, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Tajikistan. The alliance with its military Command Headquarters based in Riyadh was announced as an Inter- Governmental Alliance first by Saudi Defence Minister Muhammad bin Salman on 15 December 2015.Its mandate was to counter terrorism from organisations such as ISIL and their other variants. Pakistan’s Defence Minister in a press statement revealed that Pakistan’s ex-COAS General Raheel Sharif would be appointed as the Commander in Chief of that alliance. Several questions begged an answer as a befuddled public grappled with the import of the news.

What would be the organisational structure of the purported alliance? Hastroops and military hardware contribution agreement amongst the member countries been tied up? What would be the stance of Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen? What would be the alliance’s stance against the state sponsored terrorism i.e. Israeli repression of Palestinians and Indian atrocities in Kashmir? Who would fund the organisation and in what measure and proportion? Would a conventional force based response come handy against a nebulous foe resorting to asymmetric warfare? Would the alliance be structured on the pattern of NATO or WARSAW Pact military alliances, or follow a different model? Would the military component of the alliance comprise serving or retired officers and troops from member states? Is General Sharif’s appointment an advisory sinecure or an effective military command? Would the alliance take orders from the Saudi leadership or OIC?

The answers to above and several other questions germane to the employment and structure of the organisation still beg answers. That General Sharif’s incumbency was announced in an opaque manner without answering or even debating above questions in the parliament, and the policy think tanks have led to a fusillade of unfair criticism targeted mostly at him. The entire episode of the announcement of the appointment of a government minister and later ambivalence at government as well as the incumbent’s level betokens a non-institutionalized decision making approach vis-à-vis national security. The nature and significance of the appointment should have been debated at all relevant tiers of national security policy formulation namely Cabinet Committee on National Security (CCNS), National Security Directorate, and Parliamentary Committee on National Security with inputs from armed services as well as civilian think tanks.

Why this opacity in an age where nations debate even minuscule policy issues at length? We seem to have learnt no lessons from our repeated failures in the past. Kargil conflict is an apt example where desultory decision making without a coherent cogitation linking foreign policy and defence components of national security led towards international opprobrium and censure. Joining an international coalition whether military, political or economic should be based on dispassionately rigorous analysis of the costs and benefits vis-à-vis national interests. Did someone carry out that analysis? If yes, then why were the major conclusions of such analysis not shared with the public and the parliament? The answer lies perhaps in our propensity for personaliseddecision-making without institutionalised inputs and deliberation. The upshot of the national uproar over the alliance issue has been a cautionary statement by the incumbent commander of the military alliance about are thinking of his decision to join the alliance based onfulfilment or otherwise of three conditions.

The three conditions include making Iran part of the coalition, allowing General Sharif to act as an arbitrator between two conflict-prone Muslim countries, and his independence of command. Now a cursory glance at the above conditions reveals some potent landmines waiting to sabotage the scheme of the alliance. Iran that already has a contrary an view on several issues in the Middle East and is embroiled in an active conflict in Yemen that borders on the future alliance’s locale would be difficult to convince joining such an alliance. Though a serious effort to persuade Iran would do no harm, it is the efficacy of the military diplomacy of the future Commander of IMAFT that is doubtful. The intractable political differences and historical animosities straddling “Arab-Ajam” divide that eluded efforts of statesmen and diplomats would hardly be amenable to the anodyne diplomacy and personal charm of the head of a military alliance. Iraq and Syria would continue to pose problems as the playgrounds of proxy sectarian warfare lending themselves to no palliatives.

While the Trump threat might bring Iran and Saudi Arabia close for a while, the sectarian cleavages and antipathy would soon result in recrudescence of proxy wars due to divergent strategic interests of the two leading Middle Eastern nations, politically controlled and influenced by theocrats. The political differences that could not be bridged on a political forum i.e. OIC would scarcely lend themselves to a harmonious solution through the military alliance. While despite much pretensions the OIC has earned sobriquets of an effete coalition, that only talks and delivers little, what makes us so sanguine about the dues ex-machinestatus of a military alliance? Without political consensus and a steely resolve to put some muscle behind the boneless wonder called OIC,a new military alliance would remain equally ineffectual. About the third condition that he would not serve under anyone one can comment that the Saudis would be loath to grant such autonomy to a force commander actually in command of troops on their soil. For better or worse, in order to resolve this commanddilemma, the IMAFT would have to be placed under the political control of OIC.

The answer to above may lie in the IMAFT aping a Western model with a dominant country accompanied by two or three serious and several token allies wreaking havoc on countries with or without UN sanction. In that case, IMAFT would mainly be brandishing the military muscle of countries like Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia with several countries on the fence cavilling at the need and appropriateness of such military interventions. And then there is the knottier question of the military alliance’s strategy and tactics against an amorphous enemy wielding asymmetric tactics. Before joining the IMAFT, Pakistan needs to get answers to all the above questions raised including the most important one of its ability to contribute troops and military hardware in the current hostile environment of two front threats.

There is a need to carry out a rigorous analysis of all the questions raised in this discourse and debate several options for troop contribution and leading the coalition. If the analysis yields positive benefits for Pakistan, then the troops contribution from the armed forces could be considered without ambivalence and temerity sans which it is best to shelve the idea for the time being.

The writer is a PhD scholar at NUST and can be reached at rwjanj@hotmail.com