Daily Times

People, who were apprehensive of some unconstitutional/undemocratic change, breathed a sigh of relief on November 29 last, when Raheel Sharif retired without actually derailing the system. It reduced the political pressure which the ruling PML-N was reeling under throughout the three-year tenure of the outgoing general.

But if disappearance of the specter of a military takeover was a positive development, on the one hand, it gave birth to the possibility of the emergence of civilian despotism, on the other. While some steps taken by Nawaz Sharif (NS) can be positively interpreted as far as the bumpy democratic road is concerned, other unilateral actions of his government and his party speak of the dictatorial tendencies that the prime minister is identified with since his early days in power.

It is a general perception that NS brims with overconfidence once some imminent threat to him subsides. This overconfidence leads him astray. And instead of addressing real issues and challenges, he normally starts new adventures. Rather, misadventures. Adopting aggressive posturing when it is not needed or which is counterproductive is one of his trademark strategies to deal with political problems and/or opposition. Currently, he is again seen treading the beaten path.

The challenges which are staring him in the face and which should give him sleepless nights are; a) Panama Papers affairs — legally in the Supreme Court and politically at the popular level, b) PTI — as a distinguished political challenge apart from the Panama Papers issue, and c) threat to his political dynasty — symbolized in damage to his own image and the political death of the heir apparent (Maryam) in its infancy as a consequence of Panama Papers controversy.

Though the prime minister and his his group of firebrand associates are dealing with the above-mentioned challenges in their own way, observers believes that the strategy is inherently faulty; it is mostly the government or the ruling party that suffers the most in a tit-for-tat situation with political adversaries.

Though an effective recipe for political uncertainty, an aggressive posturing towards political opposition is not the only problem that the government of Nawaz Sharif is faced with. More troubling is his taking liberties with the military establishment. Taking policy initiatives back from the army or minimizing its role in the political sphere is what every political leader worth his salt has to strive for. This political disequilibrium is what is at the core of Pakistan’s internal and external problems. No democratic mind can debate or oppose the struggle of the political class to reclaim the political territory that the military has forcefully or through
behind-the-scene political machination, occupied — using resources meant for the defense of the motherland.

This purpose can be achieved through both positive and negative ways. One way to become ‘big’ is to do something that adds up to you weight or size. The other is cut your opponent down to size and appear big. The current strategy of NS falls in the second category. Whatever effort the civilian government is making behind the scene to wrest its lost authority in policy making, the measures adopted for public image building are outright negative. It started from DAWN story leak. Then came the systematic leak of Raheel Sharif joining Islamic Military Alliance. And now the allotment of land to him. All these developments have led to acrimony between the civilians and military sides. This is clear from the press release which the ISPR has released on the issue. Making the army’s displeasure public, it says that, ‘This debate (on the allotment of land to former COAS) with (the) intent of maligning Army also has the potential to create misunderstandings between state
institutions thus considered detrimental to existing cohesion’

So, wasn’t NS aware that his actions with regard to military could lead to serious division between the two? Sure, he is not a novice to this game of political dominance between the generals and the politicians. This is his assessment of the situation and the maximum that the military is capable of doing at the moment which emboldens him to do what he is doing.

Presuming that opposition forces are in disarray, with not any political party in a position to present him with a formidable challenge at popular level, NS seems to be thinking that it’s the right time to tackle the army after its most popular chief retired recently. According to this assessment, Panama Papers scandal cannot erode his support base in Punjab. And when that is there, there is less to worry about. This also explains his party’s belligerent attitude towards other political parties.

There are reasons at the moment that favor him vis-à-vis the army. 1) The new army chief has not yet tightened his grip within his organization. 2) He is not popular to the extent of his predecessor. 3) Country’s macroeconomic indicators are good. 4) Mega projects — including CPEC and power generation — will pay off. 5) Political forces despite their differences with him, and excluding PTI, will be on his side in the event of a showdown with the Establishment. 6) The change of guards at the White House which, if he wanted to manipulate in his favor, can come to his rescue. This won’t be just for the love of NS but for the hate the Pakistani military establishment and the US policy-makers have developed for each other. 7) The Pakistan Army’s top brass, at this hour of ecstasy on American scene, wouldn’t like to be on top — as then, it will be directly obliged to deliver, particularly on Afghanistan and terrorism fronts. Nobody likes to be in the eye of the storm if it can be avoided. All these assumptions may be correct. And the army may not be in a position to topple a civilian government at the moment. But there are four elements which NS must factor in; a) tarnishing army’s image cannot necessarily result in politicians’ — stigmatized by corruption scandals — gains at popular level; and that will always be a weak link, b) efforts at discrediting the army through targeting the generals will deepen the cleavages between the two sides resulting in further weakening the state, c) a unexpected outcome of the Panama case in the Supreme Court can negatively change the situation for NS overnight, and d) whether the army can intervene or not, it can cause indefinite political instability. And that’s in favor of none, whether it is NS, the army or the state.

The civilian side can be catapulted to position of strength and ascendancy vis-à-vis the army through four definitive means; 1) providing good governance, 2) strengthening institutions, 3) establishing personal integrity, and 4) showing vision and introducing/presenting policies that are better than the ones run under the military establishment so far.

Maligning a few individuals or tarnishing the image of an institution can’t change political realities with a bang. Quick fix solution are never a remedy to long-term, deep-rooted problems, as no alternative can be found to fill the vacuum created through such measures. At best, only disruptive powers can change hands. If yesterday it were the unelected army generals who tried to run the show it whim, tomorrow these will be elected political implants who will be steering the country to shipwreck.

The writer is an independent columnist and political analyst associated with a Pashto TV news channel. He is also a visiting faculty member at Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad. He can be reached at sethisaleem1@gmail.com