Daily Times

A new Government has taken office in Pakistan — and as expected — announced its intention to reform the civil service. While many would be willing to talk about what needs to be done, it will be pragmatic to take a quick stock of what others did in the recent past and try to figure out the lessons from the earlier reform efforts in Pakistan.

Prime Minister Bhutto’s endeavours can be seen as the first “whole hog” go at elusive civil service reforms. Near arbitrary removal of several hundred public servants; taking away the constitutional protection; doing away with elite civil service of Pakistan ( CSP ) and putting in place a dozen occupational groups with a handful of lateral entrants rammed in for good measure.

Little thought was given as to how this “shake and awe” effort would result in improved service delivery and enhanced public sector performance.

The next big reform moment came during President Musharraf’s tenure (1999-2007). The controversial National Reconstruction Bureau (NRB) led the process that entailed elimination of the office of District Magistrate, introduction of new Local Government as well as Policing systems in quick succession. However, NRB was unable to address the more complex issues of civil service reforms (like Bhutto’s reform drive) including performance challenges, service delivery loopholes or questions of terms, conditions and career progression. Towards later years of Musharraf era, a comprehensive report by Commission on Government Reforms was unveiled but before any implementation could be considered, the Musharraf’s time was over.

Movement on further civil service reforms remained stalled during the last decade that saw two elected governments complete their terms. But three instances merit mention from this period. The focus of public sector reforms was shifted to service delivery improvements in health and education sectors and a good number of innovations in performance monitoring and human resource management reforms were witnessed — especially in the provinces of Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

Secondly, an experiment of “governance through companies” was embarked upon in Punjab where over five dozen public sector companies were created for leading priority sectoral interventions. What has now come to be known as “companies’ fiasco in Punjab” – for right or wrong reasons — was also around about attempt to solve some of the tricky civil service reform logjams in the areas of remuneration and public procurement.

Implementing public sector projects worth billions of rupees through BS-18 or 19 officers in a timely manner was deemed inappropriate. By employing the company mode of governance, public officials were paid market-competitive salaries and execution of complex infrastructure, energy or service delivery interventions was seen to be improving through fast track execution — often side-stepping routine procedural and procurement regimes. Propriety or legality of this strategy to address essential challenges of ineffective public sector remuneration and performance enhancement remains unclear. The jury is still out.

Interestingly, it was the same Punjab Government that in its first tenure (2008-2013) had abolished the practice of granting “project allowance” to government officers with fanfare (which itself was a legacy of outgoing Punjab Government, prior to 2008) but reverted to the notion of market-based competitive salaries in public sector companies in a big way.

Civil service reforms championed through special purpose Units, Bureaus or Cells have a brief shelf life, corresponding to the tenure of incumbent government or reform leaders. Examples of NRB or NCGR are cases in point

Lastly, the outgoing federal government had a go at doing away with the notion of “guaranteed promotions” in higher scales (BS 21 and 22). Additional avenues of performance assessment were roped in alongside historic annual confidential report (ACR) system and seniority considerations. Resultantly, every round of highest level promotions led to hotly contested court cases, challenging the “acute subjectivity” in such assessments, purportedly designed to separate horses from those who were not horses.

If anything, this system led to worsening of inter-cadre rivalries, unending rounds of litigation and a pervasive sense of deprivation in most of the occupational groups in civil services.

Keeping this historical context in mind, one can see where past endeavours in civil service reforms have encountered trouble due to insufficient homework and flawed diagnoses.

Inability to conceive the full scale of “civil services” in public sector is the first and foremost challenge. What do we consider as civil services to be targeted in the reform process? Are we talking about federal civil services (inducted through CSS) and provincial civil services (inducted through PMS examination) alone? Or do we also want to include the professional cadres in our reform remit — doctors, engineers, agriculturists, foresters, professors, and teachers? Or do we intend to include all government servants between BS-1 and BS-22?

Frankly this is an extremely problematic area. In the first instance, you are dealing with a few thousand generalists alone; in the second category, tensof thousands of specialists; and in the third case, numbers boom to near one million strong. It’s the enormity of the challenge and scope which is invariably ignored — and with serious consequences.

Secondly, civil service reforms can have unintended consequences. Bhutto demolished CSP and felt victorious. The elite civil service group returned as District Management Group with more power and greater sting. Musharraf got rid of District Magistrate/Deputy Commissioner only to reincarnate the office as DCO as a mini, all-powerful Chief Secretary in the districts — with unprecedented administrative and financial powers that erstwhile DC could not even imagine. Shehbaz Sharif started by cutting paltry project allowance for civil servants — emphasizing missionary spirit of public service with minimal monetary considerations in his first tenure. Ironically, his second tenure saw selected and hand-picked civil servants drawing dazzling remunerations, dwarfing even the ones in the private sector.

Thirdly, civil service reforms championed through special purpose Units, Bureaus or Cells have a brief shelf life, corresponding to the tenure of incumbent government or reform leaders. Examples of NRB or NCGR are cases in point. Therefore the legally competent outfits of the government, enjoying legitimate mandate for civil service reforms and HR issues (Establishment Division and Services Departments at federal and provincial levels respectively) need to act as hubs of reform efforts.

Fourthly, questions of emoluments and remuneration in civil services are highly complex. Granting pay raise to selected service groups or pockets within service groups will be challenged sooner than later in courts on touchstone of equity by those may be ignored. On the other hand, an across the board raise to all and sundry will have an undoable price tag for a government, besides being a perverse incentive for under-performers. Take the case of subordinate judiciary in districts where an across the board remuneration increase — judicial allowance — covers everyone from the district judges down to readers and clerks of courts and all others. It is unclear if this has improved judicial performance.

Lastly, optics of civil service reforms typically force the reform champions to ignore the less attractive (yet highly relevant) aspects of public sector reforms. Improving the procurement systems, revising rules of business, revisiting and “operationalizing” performance assessment regulations, promoting IT and technology usage , PFM reforms, grievance redressal — all of these would appear less catchy than, say, abolishing office of DC or allowing online FIR registration or selling out a palatial, historic dak bungalow? It’s a tight balancing act with huge political economy implications both for the reformers and the reformed-to-be.

By way of ending on a lighter note, here is an apt quote from famous tiger hunter, Jim Corbett, dedicated to civil service reform practitioners: “Never consider a tiger dead, unless you have actually skinned it”.

Reforming public sector in Pakistan will always be a slow, stressful, fiercely contested and long gestation endeavor but no meaningful change will ever happen without it.

The writer is a retired officer of Pakistan Administrative Service. He worked in district, provincial and federal governments during his public service career

Published in Daily Times, September 16^th 2018.