Daily Times

Game Theory explains the process of modelling the strategic interaction between two or more players in a situation containing set rules and outcomes. While used in a number of disciplines, game theory is most notably used as a tool within economics. It studies interactive decision making, where the outcome for each participant or player depends on the actions of all. If you are a player in such a game, then before choosing your course of action or strategy, you must take into account the choices of others. But in thinking about their choices, you must recognise that they are thinking about yours, and in turn trying to take into account your thinking about their thinking, and so on.

It would seem that such sophistication about thinking must be so complex and subtle that its successful practice must remain a profound art. Indeed, some aspects such as figuring out the true motives of rivals and recognising complex patterns do often resist logical analysis, but many aspects of strategy can be studied and systematized into a science.

If we apply the Game Theory to the Afghan peace process, we see that there are two primary players in the game i.e. the Afghan government and the Taliban. Apart from these two, China, US, Pakistan, Iran, India etc. are secondary players in the conflict.

For a very long time, Afghan conflict was seen to be as a zero-sum game – a game where the success of some players must equal the failure of others. The US employed an aggressive military strategy, and the Afghan government fully supported it in order to defeat the Taliban and other insurgents, but in vain. Taliban also thought they would be victorious soon and establish their rule again in the near future; that did not materialise either.

Nonetheless over time, particularly in the recent years, the Afghan conflict seems more to be a non-zero sum game, and it seems that all nations involved in the conflict are losing, except the ones involved in narcotics and defence.

One type of Game Theory is Prisoner’s Dilemma. It explains why two completely rational individuals might not cooperate, even if it appears that it is in their best interests to do so. For instance, the police interrogate two suspects separately, and suggest to each that he or she should sell out the other and turn state’s evidence.

This was the exact case with Afghan government and Taliban. Taliban did not respond to the government’s peace offer, as they did not know what the National Unity Government (NUG) was really up to. Similarly, the government was also confused on how to move forward if the Taliban were willing to talk. Both players were involved in international diplomacy, but rarely talked to each other directly; so the Prisoner’s Dilemma precipitated. They both were thinking about each other’s moves, and that only led to more problems.

The most promising type of game theory with respect to Afghanistan, is that of Nash Equilibrium.It is a term used in Game Theory to describe an equilibrium where each player’s strategy is optimal given the strategies of all other players. A Nash Equilibrium exists when there is no unilateral profitable deviation from any of the players involved. In other words, no player in the game would take a different action as long as every other player remains the same. Nash Equilibria are self-enforcing; when players are at a Nash Equilibrium they have no desire to move because they will be worse off.

To work towards Nash Equilibrium, Taliban must talk with NUG. The Taliban’s decision to respond publicly and positively to Kabul’s offer on June 9, 2018 did not come out of the blue, but was indeed a lock-step process. First came the concessionary climb-down by Kabul with a February offer for peace by Afghan President Ghani. This involved recognising the group as a political actor and legitimate political opposition; agreeing to review Afghanistan’s constitution; and removing Taliban commanders from the UN and other international sanctions lists. Second, to overcome Taliban’s initial reluctance to accept the peace offer, the Afghan government announced a unilateral ceasefire. Apparently,Taliban’s ceasefire was merely to show the group’s legitimacy in the eyes of people.

The point to ponder here is that the Taliban did not extend the ceasefire despite Ghani’s announcement of a 10-day extension. This may have signaledl that fragmentation has occurred within the Taliban and that their infrastructure has
become very weak

A combination of backchannel mediation and sustained pressure from an invigorated air campaign this summer worked to recalibrate the calculus of the insurgency leadership. The targeting of Taliban revenue-generating infrastructure, including weapons caches and staging facilities, increased the insurgency’s opportunity costs of not making a political concession. The final strategic factor was a realignment of American, Chinese, Afghan and Pakistani objectives, with all four parties in tandem seeing an end to the stalemate as necessary to repair bilateral communication and advance the cause of peace. Significantly, sustained military and diplomatic outreach by Islamabad to the Afghan establishment this year coincided with a concerted move by the military high commands in Washington and Rawalpindi to salvage the Pak-US relationship.

The point to ponder here is that Taliban don’t seem interested in a ceasefire despite Ghani’s announcement of a 10-day extension. This may be a sign that there exists fragmentation within the Taliban and that their infrastructure has become very weak.

A noteworthy point is that if the Taliban respond positively to the Afghan government’s offer of peace talks and take part in upcoming election, it would then be a win-win situation for them. It would imply that the US and its allied forces accept them as legitimate stakeholders. Taliban’s biggest resentment towards the US is that the latter had ousted them from power and waged a war against them. So, now, when the US and Afghan government want the Taliban to be a part of a future government, is it not what they want? Is it not the best outcome from the Taliban’s perspective? It will give them the reins of state affairs legitimately, bring peace in Afghanistan, protect Chinese economic interests, and positive spill-over effects for Pakistan and the region, and more.

This is the perfect realisation of the Nash Equilibrium, but the simpler it seems on paper, the more complex it is on the ground. Only time will tell how things can unfold in this game, which has now become just a game of nerves.

The author is a Research Fellow/Program Officer at Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS), Islamabad. He graduated from School of Public Policy, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE), Islamabad. He tweets @saddampide

Published in Daily Times, July 14^th 2018.