Daily Times

Recently, the Afghan interior minister, accompanied by the Afghan Spy Master, visited Islamabad on an unscheduled visit, to discuss common security concerns. Not only do we share a long border with Afghanistan, we share ethnicities and both countries suffer from the same problems, created for the same reasons. But most importantly, our future is intertwined.

In the recent fortnight, however, Afghanistan has been repeatedly hit by terrorists in Kabul and Jalalabad. Their government is justifiably concerned and, if it has provided actionable and reliable evidence of the perpetrators acting from our soil, Pakistan must act on it. Just as Afghanistan should have acted promptly when we provided it indisputable actionable intelligence of attacks being carried out on Pakistan by perpetrators who enjoy sanctuaries in Afghanistan.

The IS has laid claim to one attack but the previous three were promptly claimed by Taliban; not the Haqqanis. Let us try to understand these developments in perspective.

The patriarch, Jalaludin Haqqani, led the Haqqani Network, for many years. He fought the Soviets, and later, the Taliban until 1996. During the anti-Soviet war, he was an exclusive asset of the CIA, refusing to depend on the ISI. But, by 1996, felt himself abandoned by the CIA.

When Kabul fell, he was of the view that Pakistan and the US were determined to emplace Taliban in Kabul and, and reluctantly accepted the suzerainty of Mulla Muhammed Omer, in 1996. Even as he did, he guarded the independence of his group. Haqqani Network attacks have always been marked by ingenuity, meticulous planning, and intrepidity of the highest order.

For more than a decade, the US has carefully been singling out Haqqani Network as the villains in Afghanistan and their supporter, Pakistan as the villain-in-chief. And while desirous of talks with Taliban, US ignored the Haqqani Network

During his era, Jalaludin, was very particular about ensuring that their targets were only security forces and took care to avoid collateral damage to Afghans. When Siraj, Jalaludin’s son, took over, he too guarded the HN’s independence, even more fiercely than his father; and avoided collateral damage. Many Haqqani Network attacks were not claimed by anyone, not even Taliban.

The Haqqanis belong to the Zadran Pashtun tribe which is the majority in the region surrounding Kabul-Jalalabad. The (now) Akhundzada led Taliban are essentially Durranis and Ghilzais, centred in Southern Afghanistan. Consequently, by virtue of location, it is easier for the Haqani Network personnel to sneak into Kabul, rather than Taliban, who would have to pass through heavily protected regions where, in addition to being peppered by check posts, there is unscheduled patrolling. Even if Taliban personnel were the actual perpetrators, they would need succor and support of Haqqani Network.

The foregoing reasoning has two implications i.e. Haqqani Network is no longer a separate organisation owing nominal allegiance to Taliban, but is now prepared to be considered an extension of Akhundzada’a Taliban; and, Haqqani Network has, like Taliban, accepted the fact that collateral damage is inevitable, as it has been during revolts throughout world history. The question then is, what brought about this change?

For more than a decade, the US has carefully been singling out Haqqani Network as the villains in Afghanistan and their supporter, Pakistan as the villain-in-chief. And while desirous of talks with Taliban, US ignored the Haqqani Network. Initially, this suited Siraj. Afghans desirous of opposing American occupation realised that Taliban might compromise but Haqqanis would not; and began to join the latter.

With the advent of IS and their targeting the region north of Kabul, the internal dynamics of Afghanistan has changed. Hardliners among the Afghan are now joining IS instead. And Haqqani Network, which were the sole group that could have severed the lines of communication for IS, did not feel it was worth the risk; which would also assist the government in Kabul.

The IS has now taken root. Meanwhile, just as the US policy of wanting to talk only with the Akhundzada group had isolated Haqqani Network and splintered the Taliban, Trump announced his Afghan policy. By refusing to talk to anybody unless on his terms, he automatically made them all equals. Thus, undoing all the good resulting from, what was a silly, and counterproductive idea when it was put into effect. Whether Taliban again morph into one unit or not, time will tell. However, the latest US decision on talks, has created an ideal situation for Haqqani Network and Taliban to join hands more firmly.

Trump’s announcement of ‘no talks till…’ resulting in convincing, even the pro-talks Taliban that they needed to reassert themselves. Since the Ghani government has, over time, like Karzai’s, been restricted to Kabul and surroundings, to make an impact, this region needed to be targeted. With IS in the north, Haqqani was again their sole hope.

And, under these changed circumstances, when Taliban sought assistance, Sirajudin, a more enterprising person than his father and more amenable to change, was more than willing to accept a lead role for which Taliban, now including Haqqani Network, take credit.

Recent attacks on Kabul-Jalalabad have the Haqqani mark except for the collateral damage these have caused. If my rationale is correct, this development is not good for Afghanistan. I would have thought this would be bad for the US too. I do not give the current US administration the intellectual ability to seek success by such devious means. However, it might suit the current US policy of creating and exporting instability in the region to contain China. If I am right, even the errors of US policy makers seem destined to assist their ill-intentions.

The writer is a retired brigadier. He is also former vice president and founder of the Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI)

Published in Daily Times, February 4^th 2018.