Daily Times

Public discourse in Pakistan has been replete with almost hysterical claims about India’s violations of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT). Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has also quite unhelpfully ratcheted up the rhetoric against Pakistan by threatening to pull out of the IWT.

During every flood season, it is standard mantra in Pakistan, Punjab in particular, to hold India responsible for deliberately flooding Pakistan by releasing excess water into rivers. So much so that India’s hydro-aggression has now entered the security lexicon of Pakistan. This overly alarmist and emotional approach to the question of water distribution and the IWT is not only unwarranted but also, in fact, dangerously counter-productive for Pakistan’s interests.

I am no fan of the IWT. I think it is symbolic of the Cold War times when it was signed. But the IWT is what it is and we have to live with it. We have to find innovative solutions to our country’s water problems within the framework of the treaty. That said, Pakistan has to be much more intelligent in its dealings with India, within the IWT framework, to ensure that its long-term water security objectives are met.

Firstly — we have to be mindful of the reality that it had been recognised by Pakistanis quite early on during the negotiation process that the IWT was more to the advantage of India, than of Pakistan. This has been established in research conducted by Indiana University geographer Majed Akhter. Pakistan had entered the treaty because of the promise of water infrastructure development projects it could fund through international aid secured from the World Bank.

As a lower riparian, Pakistan had a right by all international conventions to equitable apportionment of all rivers that flow into its territory. Instead, we chose to give up on the entire flow of the three eastern rivers of Ravi, Beas and Sutlej, in return for the exclusive right to the waters of the three western rivers.

India has agricultural land, and water demand from eastern rivers, in Punjab, Haryana and Rajastan. Through the treaty, it secured its interests by making sure that it does not have to entertain any pesky demands for equitable apportionment of waters from these rivers. For western rivers, there simply is no significant demand for irrigation water in Indian regions through which they flow into Pakistan. Still, by virtue of the IWT India ensured a right to local-level water development projects on western rivers. In others words, India didn’t give up anything in the treaty and got international financial aid to further develop its water resources in Punjab. Pakistan gave up its historical right to the eastern rivers and gained substantial financial aid to build storage and link canals to compensate itself for the water lost to India. Against this backdrop, Indians would be mad to rescind IWT, and they know it. Besides, the treaty is not just between India and Pakistan but also between the two countries and the World Bank. No one country can withdraw from it unilaterally.

But Mr Modi wants to appear tough to his electorate by talk of rescinding the treaty. He has to make these noises to appease his nationalist right, and why not, it is his constituency. In the process, however, he also helpfully provides ammunition to our right-wing nationalists.

We, in Pakistan, should be quite clear that India has never violated the IWT. We have legitimate claims about the transparency of water flow data, which remains classified. But India classifies this data not so much to spite Pakistan, but rather to keep its own federating units from getting on each other’s throats over water distribution. India could be forthcoming with water flow data with Pakistan, and that ought to be the focus our hydro-diplomacy.

As for its hydro-electric projects on western rivers, India is well within its rights to build those as long as technical specifications do not violate the criteria laid out in Annexure D of the IWT. In the past, Pakistan has taken unnecessary risks by taking the case of the Baglihar dam to the neutral expert and that of the Kishenganga, Neelum-Jehlum project to the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Both disputes were largely technical in nature and could have been resolved bilaterally. But we went for the nuclear option of preventing the construction of Baglihar altogether, which Jamaat Ali Shah, the then Indus commissioner, knew was not possible. In that instance the neutral expert handed a victory to India by conceding the principle that technical and economic feasibility of the project trumped the painstakingly negotiated criteria laid out in the Annexure D of the treaty. This was a disaster because it basically nullified Annexure D — the best protection Pakistan had against India’s over reach with projects on western rivers.

In case of the Kishenganga project, the Court of Arbitration ordered India to modify project design so that it could not adversely affect the downstream Neelum-Jehlum project. In effect, this decision restored the principle that, as per Annexure D, upstream projects could not adversely affect downstream projects. The damage done by the neutral expert was undone by the Kishenganga ruling.

The moral of the above stories is — be calm and reasonable in water negotiations and don’t take unnecessary risks. The IWT and the physical geography of the Indus basin has plenty of protection built into it for the lower riparian, Pakistan. Legal and rhetorical brinkmanship can undermine these protections and make us appear as an unreasonable actor in hydro-politics. Hydro-diplomacy needs calmer heads and rational engagement. It is too sensitive a matter to be driven by firebrand nationalists who know nothing of the law, geography, hydrology, or even good sense.

The author is a reader in Politics and Environment at the Department of Geography, King’s College, London. His research includes water resources, hazards and development geography. He also publishes and teaches on critical geographies of violence and terror