Daily Times

In 1991, Pakistan emerged successful from the Cold War (1947-1991) but with an over-sized and over-trained Cold-War machinery in both diplomatic and defence realms. Pakistan is still struggling with the apt utility of this machinery loaded with Cold War terminologies, thoughts and tactics. Perhaps, Pakistan thinks that the Cold War era is continuing and Pakistan has the option to pretend that the world has not changed. There is a reason for this delusion.

Pakistan’s diplomatic and defence machinery was trained to endure the Cold War, as is evident through the lexicon being vocalized and concepts being recounted by retired ambassadors and retired generals appearing on various TV talk shows. These commentators also reassure the viewers that a kind of Cold War is continuing unnoticed or at least one is in the making. The reassurance, which is the upshot of their assumption, offers them a leeway to vent their own feelings (replete with scorn and sneer) in the guise of experts’ opinion. Though these commentators, as a research sample, may not be actual representatives of their respective departments, none from their departments are found contradicting them, thereby confirming the impression that the successor of these commentators are also of the same thought and leaning. The tyranny lies in the similarity.

Pakistan does not understand that the Cold War was a cold conflict of politico-economic ideologies between the Western bloc (comprising the US and Western Europe) and the former USSR. Like many other countries supporting the Western bloc, the standing of Pakistan was of a utility: Utilitarianism did Pakistan’s bidding and invited the West to use Pakistan, a willing commodity.

Interestingly, later on, Pakistan became the champion of the end of the Cold War and it still thinks that it can revive the same. For instance, Pakistan thinks that, opposed to the US, if it sides with Russia, the US will be in a quagmire in Afghanistan offering countless opportunities to Russia to equal the score. Pakistan seems to have attained the position of a global equaliser.

The tragedy is that Pakistan grew up in the Cold War era and Pakistan learned manners and methods to survive the Cold War as a result of coercion. Now, the problem is that neither Pakistan is trained to look beyond the Cold War nor are these commentators ready to accept its nonexistence. Interestingly, the absence of the Cold War is hurting Pakistan’s machinery. This makes Cold War’s revival necessary. What complexity troubles Pakistan is how to brave challenges which are translational; how to tap opportunities which are shared; and how to face risks which are common. Pakistan has only occasionally improved upon this account, such as Pakistan’s joining the CPEC.

Whereas it is understandable that Pakistan could not foresee the kind of the post-Cold War world emerging, it is equally evident that Pakistan has not able to reconcile with the realities of the post-Cold War world. The Cold War stunted Pakistan’s growth politically and consequently Pakistan shied away from indulging in rounds of negotiations to solve any problem. Instead, Pakistan learnt to use one time feedbacks or commands to settle issues.

The post-Cold War era offers a time of complex relations based on rounds of negotiations. Like a child who retreats home when faced with real world challenges, Pakistan craves for a Cold War to evade trials transcending multiple fields simultaneously. The complexity is a horror. The failure to adjust with new realities makes Pakistan relish the time it spent as a beneficiary to count on its geopolitical importance.

With hindsight, an avowal such as ‘a regional intelligence agency is instrumental in conspiring against Pakistan to infuse misgivings into its vaunted relations with the West’ must have been fascinating to earn the goodwill of the Western bloc and sufficient to justify indigenous failures. What change the post-Cold War era has brought about is that the Western bloc (against the communist ideology) is over, but Pakistan successfully persists with the habit congealing into the practice of extenuating (indigenous) failures. The excuses for the failures are not only blamed with all authority, but these are also rationalized by most people.

Interestingly, the absence of the Cold War is hurting Pakistan’s machinery. This makes Cold War’s revival necessary. What complexity troubles Pakistan is how to brave challenges which are translational; how to tap opportunities which are shared; and how to face risks which are common. Pakistan has only occasionally improved upon this account

The vicious cycle of reinforcement continues. For instance, the conflict in Afghanistan is still portrayed as a ‘great game’ fought between superpowers in Afghanistan where the US is present with an undisclosed intent of occupying the country indefinitely to control local and regional hidden natural resources, whereas Russia is looking for equalising the score. Pakistan still thinks that Russia can outsmart the US internationally and that in case of US’ annoyance, Pakistan has an option to hide behind Russia.

Sometimes, it seems that Pakistan has taken upon itself the authority of offering a leadership role to Russia. Interestingly, Pakistan has not ever asked Russia if it were also ready for playing the role of big brother in the region to outclass the US. Perhaps, Pakistan relies on unrequited and unwarranted expectations. Pakistan innocently assumes that Russia might have forgotten Pakistan’s (malicious) role in sabotaging the Afghan project and that Russia would never turn Pakistan against the US.

Historically, perhaps Pakistan’s relations with the US are the only relations initiated by a politician, the founder of Pakistan. Otherwise, the army defined most relations affecting Pakistan strategically. More precisely, the army-to-army relations took precedence over civilian-to-civilian relations: the former are free of hassle and easy to manage compared to the latter.

For instance, if the army thinks that Russia can be befriended, the whole country has to convince itself of the benefits of improving ties with Russia, otherwise not. Any civilian dwarfing the army in taking such an initiative is a traitor. The trend of issuing a Fatwa (a religious decree) has also permeated the national security sphere where army generals (serving or retired) can be seen issuing a national security decree. The culmination of both kind of decrees is in the death penalty. This cohabitation of approach and practice is another legacy of the Cold War blighting the national scene of Pakistan rather recurrently.

The writer can be reached at qaisarrashid@yahoo.com

Published in Daily Times, December 4^th 2017.