Daily Times

Ever since the 1962 war, relations between India and China have been plagued by a lack of trust. In an effort to improve bilateral ties and to seize the opportunity of Chinese investment in India’s emerging economy, President Xi Jinping visited India in September 2014. He announced a $100 billion investment proposal, spread over a period of 5 years, to India. His visit to India and the reciprocal visit of the Indian Prime Minister to China, in May 2015, did not bring about an upswing in bilateral relations.

India, on its part, has been maintaining strict neutrality in its foreign policy by not aligning with any country, which could be perceived by China as an attempt to counterbalance its growing influence in Asia.

At a time, when the relations between the two countries seemed to be improving, the Doklam incident happened. India was wary of the Chinese soldiers entering the disputed Doklam Plateau for the purpose of upgrading infrastructure and building roads. Although India is not a party to the dispute, as the Doklam plateau has been claimed both by the tiny Himalayan Kingdom Bhutan and China. Bhutan which does not have diplomatic ties with China, had approached India under a ‘1949 Friendship Treaty’ with it where India is bound to protect its interest. In a bold move, India sent its soldiers and physically stopped the Chinese from building roads in the disputed territory. Bhutan also referred to a 1988 agreement with China, where China had agreed to maintain the status quo in the area until a resolution to the dispute was made.

India has been maintaining strict neutrality in its foreign policy by not aligning with any country, which could be perceived by China as an attempt to counterbalance its growing influence in Asia

Apart from responding to Bhutan’s call, India was also wary of the Chinese incursion, as the disputed area falls at the tri-junction bordering Bhutan, the Cumby Valley in China, and the state of Sikkim in India. In the event of any future conflict with China, the roads would provide easy access to the Indian states in the North East through the Siliguri Corridor of “the Chicken’s Neck.’ Moreover, there was a threat that such an act by China would cut off these states from the rest of India. It is this concern that prompted India to respond to Bhutan’s call and stopped the Chinese from building roads. The Chinese media went ballistic and warned India of serious consequences, if the Indian soldiers did not vacate Doklam. China failed to realise that it was dealing with a very bold and decisive leader in Narendra Modi.  India did not budge and ultimately the Chinese stopped construction activities in the disputed territory

After the Doklam standoff, and also due to repeated attempts by China to block India’s membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), and its blocking of the United Nation’s attempt to blacklist the Jaish-e-Mohammad Chief, Masood Azar, who was implicated in the terror attack at the Indians Air Force base at Pathankot, India was forced to review its China policy.

As a result of these unsavoury developments, India agreed to part with the quadrilateral grouping consisting of the United States, Japan, Australia and India. India recently participated in the first Quad meeting held on the sidelines of the ASEAN meeting in Manila.  India, though, had joined the quadrilateral meet, but did not support any attempt to condemn China over the South China Sea controversy, as it had no stakes there.  Moreover, India is acting cautiously, as it is not keen to put its relations with China in jeopardy.

The idea of a strategic alliance between the United States, Japan, India and Australia is not something new. In fact, the idea was first mooted way back in 2007, when the Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, addressing the Indian parliament suggested a “confluence of two seas” which would promote shared values and mutual interests. This strategic alliance was envisaged by Japan to check a rising China, which had disputes with Japan over Senkaku Island in the East China Sea. Barely, a month after the proposal, Shinzo Abe resigned from the post of the Prime Minister and it was left to the United States to take the alliance forward. However, both Australia and India were lukewarm to such a formation, as they felt it would affect their relations with China.

However, Shinzo Abe, attempted to revive the Indo-Pacific strategic alliance immediately after coming back to power. This time, all the countries showed interest in joining the grouping. The rethink to such an alliance was largely due to the aggressive build up of military installation by China in the disputed Islands in the South China Sea, in spite of a ruling by the International Tribunal against their claim over sovereignty rights on the Spratly islands. India was also not happy over the Doklam incident and decided join the Quadrilateral group to protect its interests.

Australia, a major trade partner with China, was concerned regarding the growing commercial and military expansion by China which was encroaching on its territory. It also did not want to rely solely on China for its trade. It felt that an emerging India would give it an opportunity to expand its trade and defence ties. It was also felt that such Quadrilateral grouping would also provide regional security architecture in the Indo-Pacific region to counter an aggressive China. The first quadrilateral meeting was recently held on the margins of the ASEAN summit in Manila. Australia also came around in joining the alliance because of its concern

In spite of several advantages that may accrue to India by joining the strategic alliance, India’s interest will be well served if it restricts such an alliance for improving its trade with these countries.  India should be careful not to use alliances to check a rising China, as such a move would not only be in India’s long term interests. The only country that has the power and resources to check China is the United States. But with the unpredictability and impetuousness of Donald Trump’s leadership, that has come under attack, both at home, and also from America’s allies.

There is no assurance that the US will come to the aid of other member countries, especially India, in the event of a conflict with China. Moreover, the recent decision of the United States in withdrawing from the Trans-Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (TAFTA) has not gone down well with Japan, Australia and several South East Asian countries. It is because of the unreliability of US leadership, with Trump at the helm that has forced the Philippines and Malaysia to negotiate directly with China, without the involvement of a third party.

In spite of the geopolitical calculus; India should keep engaging with China to settle its contentious border dispute. The overarching challenge is to explore ways to improve bilateral relations by reducing the trust deficit. Even after 19 rounds of negotiations, no solution has been found to the border dispute because of Chinese inflexibility. India, on its part, should keep pursuing its efforts to engage with China till a resolution is found. However, to the credit of India and China, they have not allowed a few stray incidents at the border to impact their relations.

China, on its part, should dispel India’s misgivings over the NSG and Masood incidents, and work towards improving bilateral relations.  As both India and China are now at a watershed moment being the two of the fastest growing economies of the world, such a collaborative approach would be of mutual interest. In fact, the ability of India and China to be global powers hinges on forming close economic and political ties.

The writer is a researcher and a freelance journalist based in India

Published in Daily Times, November 23^rd 2017.