Daily Times

Sometimes it seems that Pakistan is shy about working in collaboration with the US. In the past, under the rubric of ‘hammer and anvil operation’, when the US-NATO forces kept on entreating Pakistan to launch a military operation from its side of the border to crush militancy in the Pak-Afghan border lands, Pakistan preferred to reply that it would act at a time of it’s own choosing.

Owing to deteriorating domestic circumstances in June 2009, Pakistan launched an operation in South Waziristan (named Operation Rahe-Nijat), the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan fled to Afghanistan. Pakistan is still counting its operations and losses, both men and material.

However, after the recent visit of the US delegation led by Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, it is now clear that Pakistan and the US are ready to collaborate once again but within the context of the second chance given to Pakistan.

The main characteristic of this chance is a conditions-based approach from the US. That is, the US links peace and stability in Afghanistan with Pakistan’s willingness to refuse the Afghan Taliban any support base in Pakistan. The conditions-based approach of the US narrows down US’ demands from Pakistan by making them specific.

A trust deficit engulfs Pak-US relations. The Abbottabad raid launched unilaterally by the US in May 2011 was a vivid expression of the lowest ebb of mutual trust

Hitherto, at least, four points are clear. First, a trust deficit engulfs Pak-US relations. The Abbottabad raid launched unilaterally by the US in May 2011 was a vivid expression of the lowest ebb of mutual trust. Contrary to his early statement, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Khawaja Asif has said recently that Pakistan is averse to launching any joint military operation against the Afghan Taliban on its soil.

However, Pakistan has shown its willingness to launch an operation against the Afghan Taliban if Pakistan is provided with credible intelligence information. This is how Pakistan has made its actions conditional. The point is; Subsequent to 2011, what has convinced the US to trust Pakistan? The reply is in the negative. The raid also showed what the US was capable of doing. Does Pakistan want to test the US another time is the next best question. Apparently, Pakistan’s condition to share intelligence with it is fraught with more crises at the diplomatic level.

Even if it were assumed that the US arrogates to itself the prerogative of acting alone against a high value target and that Pakistan can be assigned a low-value target to contend with, it means that the target stands classified into categories, and so are the actors. Pakistan may be asked to chase down a low-value target.

In the commando operation on the land of Pakistan to rescue an American-Canadian family recently from the clutches of the Haqqani network, Pakistan had a choice to not act. In such a case, the US also had a choice to act alone.

The episode shows that Pakistan has reduced the option of launching any operation to the either-or phenomenon, where the US is found ready to act alone as an alternative actor for both low and high value targets. Interestingly, Pakistan has not made it clear what would happen if the US did not share intelligence and launched a unilateral action against a target on Pakistani territory.

Second, disagreement on the existence of Taliban sanctuaries consumes Pak-US relations. Whereas Tillerson made it clear that the US was not ready to accept that there were no sanctuaries for the Afghan Taliban on Pakistani soil, Pakistan insisted that its land was shelter free. Though Pakistan has been substituting it’s help with the offer of persuading the Afghan Taliban to come to the negotiating table, the US seems unsatisfied. Apparently, Haqqani network operatives were shifting the hostage family to some safe shelter inside Pakistan.

Third, the obsession with India blurs Pakistan’s view on US policies in Afghanistan. Pakistan sought guarantees that India’s role in Afghanistan would not be beyond the field of economy from Tillerson.

This was another condition Pakistan put on its willingness to cooperate with the US. Pakistan envisions all US moves in Afghanistan in the context of gains to India and losses to Pakistan. It is not known what made Pakistan assume that the US or Afghanistan was supposed to consult Pakistan before awarding any role to India. Pakistan seems to have been deciding on the time and space of other countries in Afghanistan and this again reeks of Pakistan’s wish to enjoy a monopoly on influence over Afghan affairs.

Whereas Tillerson made it clear that the US was not ready to accept that there were no sanctuaries for the Afghan Taliban on Pakistani soil, Pakistan insisted that its land was shelter free

Fourth, the state of security in Afghanistan affects Pak-US relations. Interestingly, the security concerns of both Pakistan and the US converge in Afghanistan, but for different reasons. The US thinks that peace and stability in Afghanistan would avert any new 9/11. However, Pakistan thinks that instability in Afghanistan has the potential to creep into Pakistan through the shared Afghan ethnic corridor.

This is where security concerns have become mutually competitive: the competition is between whether Pakistan’s security concerns in Afghanistan are more important or those of US’s security concerns in Afghanistan. Both Pakistan and the US have not been able to agree as to what kind of system should be in place to protect their security.

Generally speaking, the major challenge the US has been facing regarding Pakistan is that it cannot go beyond a certain level of persuasion or coercion. The US fears instability in Pakistan. Currently, the US is trying to gauge what pressure or action is significant to watch American interests in Afghanistan without destabilizing Pakistan. The US finds the latitude to work quite narrow. In a way, Pak-US relations have been relegated to conditions and counter-conditions. The question is this: can Pakistan afford to balk at US conditions and foist its own conditions?

The major mistake Pakistan is currently making is that it assumes that the present turmoil in Afghanistan will last forever. That is, Pakistan looks at the Afghanistan (troubled) phase of US history as permanent and has been overlooking the importance of stability and permanence in Pak-US relations. Pakistan is squandering an opportunity to act in collaboration with the US.

The writer can be reached at qaisarrashid@yahoo.com

Published in Daily Times, November 13^th 2017.