Daily Times

The simple lesson of war is this: it is always better to resolve differences at the negotiation table than on the battlefield. And the sooner really is the better.

US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson flew into Islamabad this week, at the behest of Foreign Minister Khawaja Asif. The aim was to get diplomacy back on track — especially given that Pakistan had refused to welcome any US officials tasked with elaborating on Donald Trump’s strategic vision for exiting the Afghan quagmire. A shame, perhaps, that this visit took place against the rubric of giving Pakistan a ‘second chance’.

The first victim of our studied nonchalance was, of course, Alice Wells, the Acting

Assistant Secretary of State in-charge of South and Central Asia, and Acting Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Yet soon afterwards the September 4 BRICS declaration and with it our realisation that we couldn’t afford to disengage from either the region or the US.  For the Xiamen communiqué acknowledged the presence of certain terror networks operating within the region (but from safe-havens inside Pakistan) that sought to destabilise both Afghanistan and India. Thus Islamabad woke up to the fact that not addressing the elephant in the room was no longer an option. Why else did our Foreign Minister suddenly feel the need to put forward his country’s position and then put it forward some more — first dashing off to Washington and then inviting Tillerson over here?

Before flying to Pakistan and then on to India, the Secretary of State was in Afghanistan, the central focus of the Trump South Asia policy. And it was there that the American message came loud and clear: the choice facing Pakistan was one between compliance and facing the consequences. Meaning do more or else.

In a break with convention, this time around the visiting US delegation did not choose to hold separate meetings with the civilian set-up and the security apparatus. This was a prudent move given how in the past this has caused more problems than solutions at both the civil-military level in Pakistan as well as in terms of the Pak-US bilateral relationship. Tillerson, leading the American charge, negotiated with the Pakistani side, led by Prime Minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi; with the Foreign Minister, COAS General Qamar Javed Bajwa and DG ISI Lt General Naveed Mukhtar in attendance.

Both sides of Team Pakistan are said to have reassured the US on at least two fronts.

Firstly, Pakistan was not forsaking the war on terror; indeed, it remained as committed as ever. In other words, the two countries were strategic partners solemnly vowing to push ahead with bilateral cooperation and strengthening ties, especially on the economic front. At least this is how the joint objective was declared, shared and merged.

Islamabad’s contention that regional peace and security is not possible without the resolution of the Kashmir issue was met by American attempts to persuade it that a peaceful Afghanistan would bring security and stability to the region, including Pakistan. The future doesn’t appear to bode well

Secondly, Pakistan was not seeking to de-link from the future of Afghanistan. In fact, it had the greatest confidence that the strategic Islamabad-Washington partnership would ensure a stable and peaceful Afghanistan, while eliminating terror networks, including ISIS.

The above must have allayed American concerns that emerged following the response of Pakistan’s National Security Committee in the immediate aftermath of the Trump speech.

This is not to say that all was smooth sailing during the Islamabad talks. There were also five major disagreements.

First up were the Pakistani claims of its significant war on terror contributions that had produced on-the-ground results. To its credit, the US side duly acknowledged this. Yet still the calls came for Pakistan to do more. Perhaps the time has come to understand that Islamabad’s ‘no more’ stance became untenable after Xiamen.

Second, the US begged to differ regarding Pakistan’s assertions of wholehearted participation in the war on terror. The former charged the country with only fighting those elements within its borders that threatened the Pakistani state; lending little or no support to the bigger battle taking place across the border. Cue the US call to ‘do more’.

Third, Washington rejected Pakistani claims that it had eliminated all Afghan Taliban and Haqqani network safe-havens from its soil. It argued that the militant footprint could be traced to the Afghan refugee camps in the areas surrounding Quetta and Peshawar. This goes back to Pakistan’s claims that the only solution lies in expelling all refugees; given the impossible task of stopping the latter moving to and fro across the shared border. Not to mention the Pakistani assertion that it cannot be held responsible for what the refuges get up to from the Afghan side. This may or may not have been a double bluff, given that the US cannot ask Islamabad to repatriate all refugees. As for the US, it maintains that the Afghan refugee camps represent the support base of a resurgent Taliban as it launches attacks against the Kabul regime.

Fourth, is the introduction of India by the Americans into the Afghan peace process; a role that is no longer limited specifically to economic development and reconstruction but now extends to playing a strategic part in the fight against militants. Pakistan is naturally jittery about this.

Fifth, Pakistan’s contention that regional peace and security is not possible without the resolution of the Kashmir issue, where human rights abuses have now become a daily occurrence. Yet this was met by American attempts to persuade it that a peaceful Afghanistan would bring security and stability to the region, including Pakistan.

Thus it becomes apparent that the call to ‘do more’ may be seen as the ultimatum that, in reality, it is. Nevertheless, the additional demand to vet Afghan refugees living on the outskirts of certain urban centres is troubling. As are moves to put more pressure on Pakistan while India is offered an enhanced presence in Afghanistan. And even though this was perhaps the first time the US has hinted at Kabul’s potential to export instability and insecurity to the region, especially to Pakistan — the future doesn’t appear to bode well for this country.

The writer can be reached at qaisarrashid@yahoo.com

Published in Daily Times, October 28^th 2017.