Daily Times

The 1971 war against India was another adventure, which made no political or military sense. In political terms, it struck at the root of the concept of Pakistan. In military terms, it was a folly of Himalayan proportions. The distance from Karachi to Chittagong by sea is the same as from Karachi to the south of Europe. We, therefore, launched ourselves on a military adventure with impossible odds with the added disadvantage of a hostile population, in full revolt.

I visited East Pakistan about half a dozen times during the seven months of military action and was probably the only Pakistani from West Pakistan to do so. I mixed freely with the Bengalis amongst whom I had many friends and saw the absurdity of the whole operation. On my last visit to Dacca in October 1971, I was invited by the Chief of Staff of the Army Command in East Pakistan, for a briefing on the military situation.

I was told that we had ‘turned the corner’, that the ‘Mukti-Bahini’ had greatly complicated the problem, but now that General Headquarters of the Army in Rawalpindi had agreed to provide the reinforcements required to deal with the situation, “matters would soon be fully under control”.

The general said that reinforcements and equipment that they required would arrive by the end of the month and within another couple of weeks the ‘Mukti-Bahini’ would be completely eliminated. After a detailed briefing with the help of maps and charts (which took about three quarters of an hour), I was asked whether I had any questions. I said that I had no questions except that if they did succeed in eliminating the ‘Mukti-Bahini’ did he not think that India would intervene?

I said that with the snow on the Himalayas in another month’s time any possibility of intervention by China, if ever there was such a possibility, would be eliminated and India could be expected to move into East Pakistan.

‘Oh’, said the general, ‘that is GHQ’s problem’. The government had been giving people the impression that if India interfered, the United States’ Seventh Fleet would come to our rescue and arrange an end to the hostilities. As if to reinforce his argument, the general asked me to come again in a month’s time to see that things have changed the way he had forecast.

I told the general that I wished him and the army in East Pakistan all the luck but this was my last visit to Dacca as I did not think that I would be able to come again, and I was doubtful whether he would be there either. The Indians invaded East Pakistan on November 22 and the general who had briefed me flew out in a helicopter to Burma to escape being captured. The ceasefire was not brought about by the United States but imposed by India in a ceremony at Paltan Maidan which was the darkest day in our history.

It is with this background of seeking a ceasefire, almost before we commence hostilities that the Kargil adventure should be seen. The government claims that the ceasefire in Kargil was a military triumph. It is claimed that the object of the whole exercise was to internationalise the issue, and that this has been achieved. We have certainly internationalised the issue but what has been the result? All major powers, including our old ally China, told us to get back to the line of control and to ask the Mujahideen to do likewise.

This we have done in the timeframe laid down. Moreover the line of control has been given sanctity which it did not previously enjoy and we have shown to the world that the ‘Mujahideen’, if not controlled by us, are certainly amenable to our advice. It will, therefore, henceforth be assumed that their activities inside Indian-occupied Kashmir, well away from the line of control, are also controlled from Islamabad and will be seen as violations of the agreement reached in Washington. The high moral ground on which the struggle in occupied Kashmir stood will therefore have been eroded.

All our past wars with India have been fought for no purpose. We have suffered humiliation as a result and in one of these have lost half the country. It is time we realised that war is serious business, made more serious by the acquisition of a nuclear capability. It is also time we realised that spending our meagre resources on the well being of our people and not on building a powerful war machine, to fight for a ceasefire, will bring strength and prosperity to Pakistan.

It is time we realised that war is serious business, and has been made more serious by the acquisition of a nuclear capability. It is also time we realised that spending our meagre resources on the well being of our people — rather than on building a powerful war machine — will bring strength and prosperity to Pakistan

An economically strong Pakistan with a prosperous population and stable democratic institutions is the best guarantee for the survival of the country. It is also a guarantee that Kashmiris will strive to join Pakistan.

This urge will gather strength if they see happiness and prosperity across the border. No one will then be able to deny them the destination that they will have chosen.

Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report, Chapter V, Recommendations, Supplement to the Main Report.

“In the concluding portion of our Main Report, submitted in 1972, we had made a number of recommendations based on our study of the various aspects of the causes of the debacle of 1971. Some of these recommendations need to be modified, or amplified, in the light of the fresh evidence, which we have now recorded: while the need for the others has only been further emphasised, we believe that the object of setting up this Commission would be fully realised only if appropriate and early action is taken by the Government on these recommendations.

2. Even though it involves a repetition of what we have already said in the Main Report, we consider that it would be appropriate if all our recommendations are now finally set out at one place, for facility of reference and action. Detailed reasons and justification for these recommendations will be found in the relevant Chapters of the Main Report as well as this Supplementary Report. We are aware that some of these recommendations have already been implemented, but this would not appear to be a reason for not including them in this final summing up.

“There is consensus on the imperative need of bringing to book those senior Army Commanders who have brought disgrace and defeat to Pakistan by their subversion of the Constitution, usurpation of political power by criminal conspiracy, their professional incompetence, culpable negligence and willful neglect in the performance of their duties and physical and moral cowardice in abandoning the fight when they had the capability and resources to resist the enemy. Firm and proper action would not only satisfy the nation’s demand for punishment where it is deserved, but would also ensure against any future recurrence of the kind of shameful conduct displayed during the 1971 war.

We accordingly recommend that the following trials be undertaken without delay.

“That General Yahya Khan, General Abdul Hamid Khan, Lt Gen SGMM Pirzada, Lt Gen Gul Hasan, Maj Gen. Umar and Maj Gen Mitha should be publicly tried for being party to a criminal conspiracy to illegally usurp power from Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan in power if necessary by the use of force. In furtherance of their common purpose they did actually try to influence political parties by threats, inducements and even bribes to support their designs both for bringing about a particular kind of result during the elections of 1970, and later persuading some of the political parties and the elected members of the National Assembly to refuse to attend the session of the National Assembly scheduled to be held at Dacca on the 3rd of March, 1971. They, furthermore, in agreement with each other brought about a situation in East Pakistan which led to a civil disobedience movement, armed revolt by the Awami League and subsequently to the surrender of our troops in East Pakistan and the dismemberment of Pakistan.”

The Commission said that the general officers mentioned above should also be tried for criminal neglect of duty in the conduct of war both in East Pakistan and West Pakistan. It cited several instances of criminal and willful neglect of duty by each of these general officers. First on the list was Lt Gen AAK Niazi, former Commander, Eastern Command. It called for his court-martial on 15 charges since “he had showed willful neglect in the performance of his professional and military duties connected with the defence of East Pakistan and the shameful surrender of his forces to the Indians at a juncture when he still had the capability and resources to offer resistance.”

Other general officers were also called out for court-martial. Among them, Maj Gen Mohammad Jamshed, former GOC 36 (ad-hoc) Division, Dacca. The Commission said he “should be tried by court martial on five charges listed against him for willful neglect of his duty in the preparation of plans for the defence of Dacca and showing complete Jack of courage and will to fight, in acquiescing in the decision of the Commander, Eastern Command, to surrender to the Indian forces when it was still possible to put up resistance.”

Also on the list was Maj. Gen. M. Rahim Khan, former GOC 39 (ad-hoc) Division, Chandpur, in East Pakistan. He “should be tried by court martial on five charges listed for vacating his Divisional Headquarters from Chandpur on the 8th of December, 1971; for his willful insistence on moving by day owing to fear of Mukti Bahini and thus causing the death of fourteen Naval ratings and four Officers of his own HQ, besides injuries to himself and several others, due to strafing by Indian aircraft; for his abandoning valuable signal equipment at Chandpur; for spreading despondency and alarm by certain conversation on the 12th of December, 1971, at Dacca; and for willfully avoiding submitting a debriefing report to GHQ on being specially evacuated to West Pakistan in early 1971 so as to conceal the circumstances of his desertion from him Divisional Headquarters at Chandpur.

The list also included Lt Gen Irshad Ahmad Khan, commander I Corps, under whose command “nearly 500 villages of the Shakargarh tehsil of Sialkot district in West Pakistan were surrendered to the enemy without a light and as a consequence the Army offensive in the south was seriously jeopardised.”

The writer is a defence analyst and economist. He has authored Rethinking the National Security of Pakistan (Ashgate Publishing, 2003)

Published in Daily Times, September 13^th 2017.