Daily Times

Before I continue to sell geography to my readers, allow me a slight digression, if you would be so kind. Of the sort that leads me to put forth what I believe to be an eternal truism. Namely, that of the seven deadly sins — man is primarily driven by avarice.

As a corollary, this desire for more-more-more finds itself transferred to the realm of statecraft. This is to be expected as each nation wants nothing more than to be the richest and most powerful that it can be. Yet leaders have always sought to exploit the weakest of those over whom they rule. And so it will be until the end of time. For this is a truism that governs not just statecraft but geo-economics, too.

Webster’s Dictionary defines geo-strategy thus: “the combination of geo-political and strategic factors characterising a particular region; and, the use by a government of strategy based on geo-politics”. Since these two concepts appear bound together by an umbilical cord — let us go the whole hog and link them to their often forgotten third triplet: geo-economics.

Since geographic dictates are immutable and, given my initial premise about the greed of states and their ruling elite — what is this, if not geo-economics?

Despite our access to seas at a point that has now become an international strategic hub — we have never considered making our mark as a sea-faring nation

If a nation seeks to befriend another or else chooses to make an enemy of one, such policy decisions should be made on the exclusive basis of whether or not it benefits the state and its people. Yet as with everything, there are exceptions. Whereby pathological considerations overpower economic pragmatism. And since we are here sitting in South Asia the most obvious example that springs to mind is India’s Pakistan policy. Though, fear not, that is a story for another time. Especially given that New Delhi would likely point a similar accusatory finger at us.

Geo-strategy when based on the national interest becomes hinged on the dual focus of military and economic power. And to fulfil these, we must add geo-politics to the mix. In real terms this may include the driving force of diplomacy.

Any country intent upon on formulating geo-political considerations will automatically have to keep in mind three fundamental points when assessing other nations. Firstly, geographic location. Meaning both in terms of neighbouring countries as well as further afield. Secondly, intrinsic to gauging the economic and military might of any particular nation is asking how it may give benefit or do harm. Linked to this is a pragmatic understanding of what comprises these twin facets of power. Economic might is best measured in terms of available resources, production and deficits. Whereas military might is best seen through the prism of manpower and technology, not to mention efficiency. This is because some armies can achieve distinct results with varying quotas of the above.

In last week’s proffering I outlined why only sea-faring nations can export military might. It therefore stands to reason, then, that no landlocked nation can pose the kind of threat that a maritime power can. Similarly, a nation without access to the sea becomes dependent upon others to just exert its economic power. In such cases, diplomatic options remain limited. Thus the compulsion to seek the seas is always there. Russia, as we know, provides us with the best example of this.

Keeping all the above in mind, therefore, let us now review our own national power status. Unfortunately, it soon becomes clear that Pakistan’s economic might is severely limited. But given that we can provide access by the sea to resource-rich Central Asia, Afghanistan and now China — our economic strength is all set to grow exponentially by way of commerce; and as a knock-on effect we will see our options on the diplomatic front follow suit.

Needless to say, Pakistan enjoys formidable military might. True, not perhaps so much in terms of the number of boots on the ground but certainly when it comes to skilled efficiency. However, despite our access to seas at a point that has now become an international strategic hub — we have never considered making our mark as a sea-faring nation.

For many years past and probably for many more to come, China has — while overtly strengthening its economic power — been quietly investing huge sums in its military Strategic Development Programme. What is not so well known is that 80 percent of its annual budget goes to its navy. And some of its technological breakthroughs in this field are acknowledged as by far surpassing those of any other country.

Beijing is not wanting when it comes to accessing maritime corridors. Though this is mostly limited to the China Seas and part of the Pacific Ocean. And ever since it chose to close down the oil pipeline project with Kazakhstan, the surrounding region to its west has become a primary industrial hub. Taking proximity into account, it makes more economic sense to move goods from here to Gwadar, than to any East China port. That is why the Western Chinese industry needs Pakistan.

In the post-World War II environment, the US continued establishing military bases in the Pacific. Initially, this was to guard against another Japanese military resurgence. Yet over time, Washington came to see these as a means of containing a rising China. Meaning that despite Beijing’s access to the sea — the US has the military capability to interdict its maritime passage at will. This therefore places caps on China’s exertion of military power.

Yet if China were to manage to secure a permanent naval base somewhere beyond the US reach — one can but imagine the new giddy heights of its military strength.

Now to conclude, we need to go back to the beginning, to the truism with which I began. If this is the geo-eco-politico-strategic potential we currently enjoy — we can surely embark upon the path that will render us a nation to be reckoned with. But there exists one important condition and it is this: the potential must remain under our absolute control; to be shared only when and with whom we so choose.

The writer is a retired brigadier. He is also former vice president and founder of the Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI)

Published in Daily Times, October 1^st 2017.