Daily Times

The Reko Diq saga continues to captivate and confuse its observers. The 7-billion-dollar copper-gold project recently caught the attention of the Egyptian business mogul, Naguib Sawiris. Recognised as one of the largest unexplored copper and gold production sites, Reko Diq can potentially produce 200,000 tons of copper and 250,000 ounces of gold annually for over 50 years. Hence the international interest in the reserves. However, the question we should be unearthing is, “what does that mean for Pakistan financially? and how has this pot of gold actually become a liability for the country over the years?”

Pursuant to the provisions outlined in Clause 3.4 of the 1993 agreement, BHP and BDA entered into an agreement to distribute revenue in a proportionate manner, specifically in a ratio of 75:25. This meant 75 per cent of the shares were awarded to BHP while only 25 per cent remaining with the Government of Baluchistan with a 2 per cent royalty. Furthermore, as stipulated in Article 15, any conflicts that may arise from the aforementioned 1993 agreement are to be resolved through arbitration. The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) shall serve as the designated forum for arbitration unless ICSID declines jurisdiction, in which case the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) shall assume responsibility for the arbitration process. In the year 2000, the Baluchistan government officially approved the 1993 agreement, along with all the measures that had already been implemented in accordance with the 1993 agreement (referred to as the 2000 agreement).

In the year 2006, the Australian joint venture TCC engaged in a Novation agreement with the Baluchistan government, referred to as the 2006 agreement. This agreement resulted in TCC taking the place of BHP as a participant in the 1993 and 2000 agreements. Through this transaction, TCC successfully obtained the rights previously held by BHP to conduct exploration activities in the Reko Diq region. Additionally, TCC entered into an agreement with the Baluchistan government, stipulating a revenue-sharing arrangement in the proportion of 75:25. Furthermore, any potential conflicts arising between TCC, and the Baluchistan government will be subject to arbitration by either the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) or the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). Following the 2006 agreement, the legality of the 1993 agreement was called into question and brought before the Baluchistan High Court. The primary contention was that the Baluchistan government had unlawfully eased the applicable regulations and awarded mineral rights for Reko Diq to BHP. The petition was dismissed by the Baluchistan High Court on June 26, 2007, as per its order.

To answer how the Reko Diq went from a financial goldmine to a liability, it was due to the sheer ignorance of the leaders involved back then.

In response to the rulings of the Baluchistan High Court, the concerned parties and numerous others have lodged petitions with the Supreme Court, contesting the licences issued to BHP/TCC. These petitions are based on allegations of unfairness, lack of transparency, legal violations, and potential threats to the crucial interests of Baluchistan and Pakistan. In the comprehensive ruling issued by the three-member panel of the Supreme Court, consisting of former Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhary, Justice Azmat Saeed, and Justice Gulzar Ahmed, it was determined that the 1993 agreement ran counter to legal principles and the welfare of the public. Consequently, both the 1993 agreement itself and the subsequent agreements of 2000 and 2006, which were based on it, were deemed null and void.

One of the most interesting claims of the Government of Baluchistan was “undue influence” by BHP in convincing them into signing the 1993 & 2000 agreements. Regardless of the claims and the arbitration the fact of the matter is that a $6.927 billion fine was awarded to the claimants BHP/TCC by the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). With all options out of the window and its hands tied, in 2022 then Prime Minister Imran Khan congratulated the nation on a new and successful negotiation to the Reko Diq fiasco.

By virtue of the Reko Diq Deal, a liability amounting to $10 billion would have been effectively absolved. The foreign entity, Antofagasta, previously engaged in a transaction, subsequently withdrew following the resolution of a $900 million payment obligation imposed on Pakistan. In accordance with the newly established agreement, Barrick has acquired a 50% ownership stake in Reko Diq and is actively engaged in its development and subsequent operational activities. The Baluchistan province, being the host of the deposit, possesses a 25 percent stake, while the remaining 25 percent is held by the federal government through state-owned entities. However, one thing that the readers here must realise is that this deal cost Pakistan a fine of 10 billion dollars and international embarrassment.

To answer the first question posed at the beginning of this article, all is not gold and glitter in the case of Pakistan. Yes, financially the new agreement may seem like a huge win-win but according to Barrick Gold’s new projections, the production may not begin until 2028 – a time that Pakistan’s economy does not have.

To answer how the Reko Diq went from a financial goldmine to a liability, it was due to the sheer ignorance of the leaders involved back then. While unearthing Reko Diq, we discover the fact that the federal and Baluchistan governments, as respondents in the various cases before the Supreme Court, were aware of the arbitration clause in the TCC-Baluchistan agreement. They were also aware that TCC’s investment was controlled by Pakistan’s Bilateral Investment Treaty with Australia (BIT Australia), and that TCC had previously filed a dispute with ICSID under BIT Australia, in which Pakistan was designated as the respondent. All of this was blindly looked over and the political leaders continued to put Pakistan’s sovereignty at stake. What is worse is that our leaders have still not learnt their lesson and are yet to pass the Foreign Investment (Protection and Promotion) Act 2022.

I hope this piece of writing brings some sense of responsibility to the key decision makers and they realise that before signing agreements and falsely glorifying them, their primary role is to read and scrutinize them to ensure that such investments are in the best interest of the nation.

The writer is Foreign Research Associate, Centre of Excellence, China Pakistan Economic Corridor, Islamabad