Daily Times

The focus on health, education and  infrastructural development is what makes a state a truely ‘developmental state’. Such states prioritise resource allocation for development needs as opposed to national defence needs

Professor TV Paul in “Warrior State” has drawn a comparison between a “National Security State’ and a “Development State”. Put simply a “Warrior State” is a state that puts national security and external threats above development needs. This compulsion might be due to a lot of factors like geography, politics, and the history of a state or nation. National security in a “Warrior State” is defined with reference to external threats and is close to Walter Lipmann’s definition ie “a nation has security when it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interests to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by war”. American political scientist Harold Lasswell has also defined national security employing external threats as the main referent. He defines national security in the following words; “The distinctive meaning of national security means freedom from foreign dictation”. The notion of national security was broadened in the eighties by including elements such as political, economic, cyber, environmental, and energy security.

The concept of “Development State” as advanced by TV Paul in his book should be differentiated from the popularly understood term, “Developmental State”, referring to a state, which through state intervention focuses on macroeconomic stability. An apt example is that of East Asian economies that focused on export led growth and industrialisation through state policies that promoted groups and interests geared towards industrial growth. The channelisation of foreign loans on low interest rates to “Chaebols” in South Korea by a development oriented government is an apt example of a “Developmental State”. A “Development State” however is a slightly different concept coming closer to the North European “Welfare State” model where human security is the main referent of national security. The focus on health, education, infrastructural development, and education makes a state a true “Development State” where priority of resource allocation is towards development needs as opposed to defence needs.

The classic notions of a national security and Garrison State need to be understood before commenting on the Pakistani context of the two opposing notions of national security. As per Nelson Pallmeyer, there are seven characteristics of the national security state. It is a state where the military is the highest authority and even if there is a façade of democracy the real power lies with the military which is obsessed with external as well as internal enemies. The militaries fear is often invoked to appropriate a lion’s share in national resources for defence needs. The population in such a state is kept intimidated with limited public discourse on national security and with the clergy pressed into national service for ideological indoctrination. Harold Lasswell who advanced the concept of Garrison State differed with Pallmeyer on the cultural and social aspects of a national security state. He focused on socio-cultural aspects and coined the term Garrison State for a state that was dominated by a warrior class who were experts on violence.

The time has come to move from the current garrison state model to that of the developmental state. In the latter, water resource depletion, economic meltdown, and health and education sectors should be seen as issues concerning national security

Harold Lasswell’s concept of a Garrison State has found resonance in Dr Ishtiaq Ahmed’s narrative on Pakistan as a Garrison State that emerged out of a British colonial proto-garrison state and was nurtured in Cold War alliance environment. Faced with a perennially hostile India, the Pakistani experts in violence in cahoots with civilian bureaucrats assumed such salience that all political institutions paled into insignificance. The military rulers nurtured a docile and credulous population through state sponsored indoctrination co-opting the religious leaders in this endeavour. Dr Ishtiaq differed with the explanation of Hamza Alavi, an eminent political scientist, who propounded the concept of an over developed state that in collaboration with a global power center ie USA encroached upon the democratic institutions to extract resources of the periphery nation. The famous “Periphery-Centre” theory however was debunked by Dr Ishtiaq according to whom Pakistan’s domestic politics had a greater role to play than the machinations of a global capitalist centre to extract surplus from a peripheral nation such as Pakistan.

Just as “Resource Curse” had consigned some nations in Africa and Middle East to a rentier economy status, Pakistan’s “Geopolitical Curse” consigned it to a Garrison State status with external aid dependency. A praetorian class was thus created spawning a praetorian culture placing premium on perpetual fear of external aggression. The political and economic development thus followed an overly militarised trajectory with diplomacy and development playing second fiddle to national defence from external aggression. The reliance on non-state actors for thwarting external aggression during the Soviet aggression in Afghanistan created a militarised class of religiously motivated zealots that sedulously grew into a recalcitrant lot challenging the writ of state itself. The high priority accorded to national security defined narrowly in terms of military security relegated development and human security needs to second priority. A skewed allocation of resources ultimately led to progressive atrophying of the state infrastructure as well as human security needs.

Pakistan’s development dilemma can be explained with the help of the warrior state concept that did not allow full flowering of its development potential. Max Weber points out well in “The Sociology of Religion” that the Muslim societies to their detriment came to be dominated by the warrior ethos instead of the trader ethos of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) that resonated well with the post-colonial sensibilities of an India scared Pakistani population. The military takeovers according to SE Finer, the author of “The Man on the Horseback” are facilitated in countries where the oligarchies or autocracies rule the roost. Samuel Huntington, an eminent scholar on civil-military relations considers the rise of a technically advanced and professional military class essential for the development of a nation that is in need of a vibrant middle class. The military can fill the vacuum as an entrepreneurial middle class in countries that lack a vibrant class as per his understanding. He put forward his concept of a “Subjective Control” of the military by the civilians where the military professionals are co-opted or civilianised by integrating them in policy making and leadership roles in civilian spheres. Through this integration the military develops a greater understanding and stakes in civil system minimising the proclivity for coups and military takeovers.

In Pakistan’s chequered political history, the military has often been viewed as a “Deus ex Machina” or the legendary “Godot” that could fix all ills in a jiffy. Through socialisation in dangers a population has been mentally conditioned for the wars and insurrections considering trade, economy, and diplomacy as effete accompaniments of a decadent Western liberal political order. To wean our public imagination away from a messiah complex the political leadership will have to lead from the front presenting the image of altruism and sincerity. Moral scruples, integrity, and vision are the only shields with civilian leadership with which to defend the implacable push of the militarism in a state conditioned by seven decades of Garrison mentality.

The military because of its institutional strength, organisation, esprit de corps, and technical prowess would be loath to ride into a political sunset leaving visionless and venal politicians fighting over the spoils of office in a country beset with existential threats both internally as well as externally.

Perhaps  time has come where the civil and military leadership needs to think in terms of national survival and not institutional upmanship. The best way the civil-military leadership symbiosis can occur is perhaps by heeding Huntington’s advice about a subjective control of the military by the civilians. Time has come for greater cooperation and integration between the civilian and military institutions.

The process must start with an empowerment and capacity enhancement of national security institutions like Cabinet Committee on National Security and Defence, National Security Committee, Ministry of Defence and Joint Services Headquarters. Military human resource can be integrated in civil services, Intelligence Bureau, police, NACTA, and attached departments of the government. The infusion of military expertise with varying specialties like engineering, management, intelligence, aviation, and logistics to name a few would invest civilian departments and institutions with much need vigour in addition to developing a military stake in the system reducing the propensity of extra constitutional military interventions. One way of doing that would be to induct capable military personnel in civil departments soon after retirement to serve till 60 years of age since the military personnel retire at a young age.

Across training regime between the civilian bureaucracy and the military has been proposed by Richard Simpkins in his book ie “The Race to the Swift” where he suggests sending serving military officers to civilian departments including the corporate world to groom them for strategic decision making. On similar lines the civilian bureaucrats can also spend some time on deputation with the military to develop greater appreciation and understanding of rival cultures. A time has also come to develop synergies and operational efficiencies between the three services in the military as well. The country needs a strong Chief of the Defence Staff who commands the three services administratively leaving maximum operational autonomy to the Army, Air and Naval components of the military triad. That way wasteful spending on administration, weapon procurement, logistics, engineering services, health, and welfare would also be avoided for a resource starved nation.

The time has come to morph into a development state from a Garrison state. It is time we treated water resource depletion, economic meltdown, health, education as national security threats and organised all national resources both civil and military to counter these.

The writer is a PhD scholar at NUST. He can be reached at rwjanj@hotmail.com

Published in Daily Times, October 4^th 2017.