Daily Times

A phenomenon that was devised to understand the role of nuclear weapons and the concept of mutually assured destruction in the overall stability of a region. The concept of MAD prevails during the confrontation between two states having nuclear weapons. Consequently, the presence of nuclear weapons maintains stability at the strategic level due to MAD but at the same creates a venue for instability at lower or sub-strategic levels.

One could understand the phenomenon by considering the examples without involving nuclear weapons. For example, when a defaulting country borrows money from international monetary institutions, it helps to avoid default (stability at the strategic level) but causes inflation or higher taxes (instability at the lower level) – a difficult situation for the general masses. The same applies to the states with hostile relationships having nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons avert the escalation of a conflict to a level of full-scale war but create instability at the lower level and induce states to wage limited conventional wars below the nuclear threshold. The likelihood of a limited conventional war increases under the nuclear overhang.

Kargil War is considered a limited conventional war as it involves limited use of force and is confined to a specific territory.

Application of Stability Instability Paradox during the Pre-nuclearization Era of India-Pakistan

The issue of Kashmir is a territorial dispute between India and Pakistan since 1947 – partition of subcontinent. In 1948, for the first time, Pakistan and India fought to annex the territory of Jammu and Kashmir. Both armed forces engaged in direct war causing heavy casualties on both sides. In 1965, the same had happened again between India and Pakistan. Both states bore heavy damage in terms of human lives and finances. In both wars, the pivotal cause was the Kashmir issue. In 1971, again Indian and Pakistani armed forces came across and fought fiercely. These three wars were characterized by the full mobilization of the armed forces, heavy casualties, and territorial losses (1948, 1971).

As a matter of fact, in these three wars, both India and Pakistan were not in possession of nuclear weapons. In hindsight, the absence of nuclear weapons eventually led the conflict to the level of full-scale conventional wars. It provides substantial evidence that the absence of nuclear weapons even provokes instability at the strategic level and instability at the lower level becomes obvious. The main reason behind the engagement of both states in full-scale conventional war was the absence of the concept of MAD associated with nuclear weapons. The benefit outweighed the cost as one actor – India – was enjoying conventional superiority in these wars. There was no such instrument that could avert a conflict to a full-scale conventional war at that time.

Application of Stability Instability Paradox during the Post-nuclearization Era of India-Pakistan

In 1974, India did nuclear tests. In response to those tests, Pakistan announced the capability to detonate nuclear weapons in 1984. Now, fear was instilled in the minds of decision-makers on both sides. And that fear was of mutual assured destruction as nuclear weapons are the weapons of mass destruction. In this scenario, the cost outweighs the benefit and no rational actor dares to even think about full-scale conventional war because it could end up with a nuclear war. Hence, it can be concluded that the presence of nuclear weapons brings stability at the strategic level. But at the same time, it exposes room for instability at the lower level.

These arguments can be substantiated by two historical events that happened between India and Pakistan namely the Brasstacks Crisis and the Kargil War. In the Brasstacks crisis, India carried out military exercises that lasted from November 1986 to January 1987. More than half a million men comprising 10 divisions and three brigades were involved. Pakistan considered it as a direct threat to its physical existence. At that moment, instability prevailed but did not escalate to full-scale war because Dr Abdul Qadeer gave a statement that Islamabad would not hesitate to use nuclear weapons if it faced an existential threat. Eventually, Indian forces backed off. The threat of the use of nuclear weapons led to the De-escalation of the crisis. Hence, nuclear weapons maintained stability at the strategic level but instability at the lower level.

Another classic example to understand the stability instability paradox is the Kargil War. In 1999, the Pakistani army fought with the Indian Army at Kargil. It was waged after the introduction of nuclear weapons in South Asia – both India and Pakistan had nuclear weapons. It is considered a limited conventional war as it involves limited use of force and is confined to a specific territory. Interestingly, this war was also not escalated to a level of full-scale war as it might cause the use of nuclear weapons which have the capability of destruction at a massive level. The matter ended up without reaching full mobilization of the armed forces because that situation could cause massive destruction which was undesirable for both the actors.

Conclusion

Conventional asymmetry provides a sense of superiority to India as she explores venues to engage in limited conventional wars (instability at the lower level) with Pakistan while keeping the crisis under the nuclear overhang. Pakistan is bound or compelled to retaliate with nuclear weapons as it cannot sustain Indian aggression in conventional terms. Consequently, after the introduction of nuclear weapons and the concept of mutually assured destruction (MAD), any crisis does not escalate to a level where Pakistan feels its existence is a threat and is bound to use its nuclear weapons against Indian aggression – an undesirable action for India – which in turn brings stability to the strategic level but also make it vulnerable to engage in a limited conventional war causing instability at the lower level.

The writer is a student at National Defence University, Islamabad. He tweets at @afnanwasif