Daily Times

Burma’s peaceful protests are nearing their tipping point, with the military junta weighing the potential costs of a full military crackdown. But Burma’s generals will have little incentive to opt for an alternative to bloodshed and repression if China continues to provide them with support and protection against sanctions at the UN Security Council.
China has more influence over Burma’s ruling generals than any other country. Indeed, without Chinese support, it is debatable whether the Burmese regime could sustain itself. So, while the current crisis in Burma is not of China’s making, any peaceful settlement may be possible only if China acts to support it. China is thus facing an unwanted test of its claim to be a responsible stakeholder in the international community. With 3,000 villages destroyed and 1.5 million people already displaced in eastern Burma, a humanitarian disaster has been unfolding for some time now. Throughout these troubles, China has held its tongue, sticking to its policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of any nation.
But that policy may no longer be tenable, because it is in China’s interest to find an effective alternative to a brutal crackdown, which would only remind the world vividly of the massacres in Rangoon in 1988 and in Tiananmen Square the following year. With some international celebrities already keen to start a campaign to boycott the Beijing Olympics because of China’s support for some of the world’s most repressive and incompetent regimes, a military crackdown in Burma is the last thing the Chinese authorities can afford.
Moreover, China’s rulers are focused on the looming 17th Congress of the Communist Party, which could likewise be spoiled by a bloody confrontation in Burma.
Yet China may be able to pre-empt such an outcome by making the option of a brutal crackdown prohibitively high to the Burmese regime. It should privately threaten to cut off all aid and trade links, and to end its protection of the regime within the United Nations from any additional international sanctions.
As an inducement to peaceful change, China can also guarantee the personal safety and wealth of the military junta should its members have to leave Burma suddenly. But China should make it clear that such protection requires the Burmese generals to cooperate in finding a peaceful solution. China should also publicly work within the UN and with ASEAN to find a way in which the international community can help to resolve the crisis peacefully.
Ultimately, a solution can be found only within Burma itself. The junta can do worse than releasing and working with Aung San Suu Kyi, who still has sufficient status and appeal to rally public support for a peaceful transfer of power to civilian rule and, in due course, to a democratic government. It may be morally repulsive to allow the junta’s members to retire with their ill-gotten gains, but any alternative will exact a dramatically higher price from Burma’s people.
China’s national interest does not require it to prop up the Burmese junta forever. Of course, China benefits greatly from access to Burma’s energy and other natural resources. But, by playing a positive role in bringing about a successful and peaceful transfer of power, China can secure a friendly neighbour in Burma more effectively than with its current policy, which merely incurs the hatred of the Burmese people.
As a matter of geo-political strategy, taking a positive lead in Burma can help China reassure its neighbours that its policy of a “peaceful rise” is real and beneficial. Whatever ASEAN governments say in public welcoming that rise, their lingering doubts and suspicions will not be erased unless they see China actively playing a positive role in assuring regional stability. The current crisis in Burma offers China a rare opportunity to do so.
The international community, too, has a vested interest in seeing that China rises peacefully. It should encourage and support China in taking the lead over Burma, so long as China commits itself to finding a peaceful solution. The international community’s objective should be restricted to a peaceful outcome that allows Burma’s people to work out their own solution.
Any change of regime in Burma will not be the result of international intervention, but of political negotiations between the junta and its domestic opponents. China should thus recognise that using its influence would not imply accepting as a matter of principle intervention in other countries’ domestic affairs. — DT-PS

Steve Tsang is a Fellow of St. Antony’s College, Oxford University, and author of The Cold War’s Odd Couple: The Unintended Partnership between the Republic of China and the UK, 1950–58