Daily Times

If Iran were to settle the nuclear weapons issue completely with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the world body, then Iranians would find access to the West becoming much easier. That is precisely what the hard line clergy in Tehran and Qom fear most, and might explain the cautious response from Tehran to the recent IAEA proposal. Such contact brings the kind of socioeconomic, intellectual, and political diversity of which fundamentalist systems like that in Iran are most wary. As long as differences with the US and its allies continue, the militant clerics benefit from their country’s relative isolation. The alleged threat of powerful external enemies serves as a major justification for their theocratic governance.
So why should settling the nuclear issue be on Iran’s list of priorities at all — if not for the clerics then for others in power, including President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad?
Ahmadinejad’s regime has been obliged to negotiate by external pressure, mainly from Western nations concerned about Iran’s growing nuclear capabilities. Even more than economic sanctions, which the Iranian state and private sectors have found ways to circumvent although at added cost and risk, international isolation has taken a considerable toll on Iran’s global standing and influence. Yes, Iran has been able to make inroads into Third World countries wishing to remain impartial in the disputes over weapons of mass destruction, funding of militancy, and complications of Middle East peace. But, being regarded as a pariah state extracts a stiff price whenever Iran seeks to interact in international forums — from protests and chastisement to not having a say in important decisions.
More important, there is growing internal momentum as well — generated by Iranian citizens’ desires to normalize relations with the West, especially with the US. Iran’s burgeoning middle class have seen little benefit from religious rule. They now yearn for the economic, social, and educational opportunities that open contact with the US and E.U. will provide. Iranian corporations seek open access to Western technology and markets. Iran’s intellectuals demand exchange of ideas and persons with their counterparts in Western universities and forums. Iran’s youth claim their right to experience values and lifestyles beyond those of fundamentalist Shiism. Iran’s women too desire their economic and societal roles be recognized, valued, and respected rather than be disparaged and segregated. So many of them participated actively in the recent street protests against electoral fraud to denounce the “catastrophe” that clerical rule has wrought.
It is useful to recall that Ahmadinejad is not a mullah, nor are his supporters and advisors. And they too have come to realize that the rule of the ayatollahs is far from beneficial. Ahmadinejad has begun criticizing powerbrokers who “run to Qom for every decision.” His presidential chief of staff Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei suggested “the era of religious sovereignty is over.” So the executive branch of Iran’s government has begun to diverge from the theocrats by understanding they will benefit from enhanced interaction with Western nations. It is not just about the more welcoming reception they would receive from the US, EU, and UN but also about furthering Iran’s welfare. After all, if Iran’s economy thrives, then those secular politicians and bureaucrats may reap sociopolitical rewards at the expense of the hard line mullahs like Supreme Leader Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and Guardian Council chairman Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati who still fear the West.
As these administrators sought recently to redress some of their nation’s underlying problems, militant mullahs have denounced them for including women in the national cabinet and other leadership roles, for negotiating Iran’s uranium stockpile with the UN Security Council and IAEA, and for not bowing to clerical edicts on matters great and small. Yet Iran’s president and his supporters have followed Iranians from many walks of life by quietly and publicly questioning and challenging the theocratic status quo. Outside clerical ranks, it is now commonplace to ask why minds and bodies are captive to one particular and peculiar interpretation of Islam as the final determinant of everything.
Not surprisingly the Iranian government has begun to negotiate with the US and EU, albeit hesitantly. While striving to maintain its iron fist at home, Tehran recognizes the necessity, indeed, inevitability of improved relations with the West. As the proposal tendered by Iran’s foreign ministry to the UN Security Council in September suggests, Iran seeks a sustained, visible, positive role for itself within the community of nations. Iranians aspire to thrive economically and internationally through partnerships with western nations, while they gradually resolve sociopolitical and religious dilemmas at home.
Ahmadinejad may well have his own legacy in mind too. He was first elected president in 2005 largely as an efficient administrator who could revitalize Iran’s economy and society. Since then Ahmadinejad has chosen to follow a program of internal repression and external confrontation rather than grapple with the serious conditions undermining the nation he was elected to lead. He has three years left to rectify the past and reshape how his regime will be remembered.
Of course, even as many Iranians strive for greater links with the West, the nation’s vexed history with America and Britain plus its fundamentalist and isolationist factions tend to support a more hard line approach. It is not just certain clerics that oppose reconciliation with the US and UK. Some Iranians, irrespective of sectarian and ideological dispositions, question the prudence of granting any other nation sway over aspects of national security. Yet others look backward and fear foreigners will return to exploit Iran economically as happened in the past. Overall, however, the mood within Iran’s citizenry has shifted, especially since the flawed presidential election there. Now multiple sectors of society are increasingly in favor of cooperation with the global community.
So Iran’s hesitation in accepting the IAEA proposal, that would hinder the path to weaponization of nuclear material while facilitating civilian use, should not be seen as a termination of negotiations or a rejection of engagement. It is more an indication of the internal Iranian debate over how reconciliation with the West can occur, which security compromises Iran should make in that process, and what immediate benefits would accrue to Iranians.
Indeed, reflecting their nation’s international aspirations political factions, and domestic needs, Iran’s secular executive branch — which oversees foreign affairs, military matters, and nuclear development — had proposed international negotiations of a much broader scope than the West wanted. The US and EU, however, through the IAEA focused on only the nuclear issue and now are expressing disappointment and anger that negotiations did not proceed quickly, smoothly, or to expected conclusions. The message from a majority of Iranian politicians and common folk is clear, however, although the West seems to either misread or ignore it. Internal issues, including “technological and economic objectives” and not only the nuclear question need to be understood, addressed, and mitigated for dialogue to be fruitful — as noted again, recently, by Iran’s IAEA representative Ali Asghar Soltanieh.
The West can assist Iran in its internal struggles. Rather than narrowly-focused negotiations and largely-ineffective sanctions against Iran and its citizens, the West should emphasize the multifaceted and lasting benefits of cooperation — not only on the nuclear issue but on the larger quandaries of Iran’s internal needs and international roles. Eventually Iran may compromise on its nuclear standoff as it regains confidence and realizes threats are the least effective path to recognition.
Iran has proved in the past, before the Islamic Republic, to be not only a cultural and political stalwart but a leader among the world’s nations. It can be once more, for the good of all. Important decisions are being made, and only Iranians can ensure their leaders choose wisely. The West can help show the way. —YaleGlobal

Jamsheed K Choksy is professor of Central Eurasian, Indian, Iranian, Islamic, and International studies, and former director of the Middle Eastern Studies Program at Indiana University. He also is a member of the National Council on the Humanities at the US National Endowment for the Humanities. The views expressed are his own