Daily Times

Despite the US’s penchant for lauding its ‘exceptionalism’ regarding ‘strategic thinking’, this exceptionalism should apply to getting that thinking right. Too often, we get it wrong or allow it to be absent without leave. Over the past century, our record has been poor. We won World War I. Yet, in the aftermath, we helped sow the seeds for World War II. Korea was, at best, a draw. Vietnam was a defeat. In Iraq, we have inadvertently enabled Iran to become a serious regional power. Guarded optimism over military progress against the Taliban is not synonymous with turning Afghanistan into a functioning state under the rule of law.

World War II and the Cold War were obviously two of the greatest conflicts of the 20th century. In the latter, while Nixon’s thrust towards China was strategically brilliant and disciples praise Reagan for defeating the ‘Evil Empire’, in fact, the Soviet Union fell because of its own weight and incompetence. Indeed, had Eisenhower had his way, and had Kennedy not been so politically motivated in distorting the Soviet threat above its actual danger, who knows if the Cold War might have ended earlier.

During World War II, Britain’s leading general, later Viscount Alanbrooke, continually criticised the lack of American strategic thinking as well as its impetuous nature to launch a second front in Europe before the allies were ready. Of course, American generals rightly faulted General Sir Bernard, later Viscount Montgomery of El Alamein for his tactical caution and timidity. The one bold operation Montgomery attempted was the failed Market Garden assault on Arnhem, dryly critiqued as “a bridge too far”. And Roosevelt complained that Churchill’s opposition to early European landings was based on his paranoia over Stalin and Soviet post-war intentions — not a faulty prediction.

Since the end of the Soviet Union, American strategic thinking has not been distinguished. One reason is that we elect presidents with little strategic experience. Of the last three, two (Bill Clinton and George W Bush) were governors with no obvious national security backgrounds. Barack Obama served for only four years in the Senate, and the Foreign Relations Sub-Committee he chaired was never convened. Of course, advisors are meant to fill this void. That does not always happen. And when it does, as Bush (the 43rd US president) learned, that does not guarantee success.

President Obama ran as the ‘uncola’ candidate, chastising Bush’s excesses in going to war in Iraq and compensating by making Afghanistan his war in large part to pre-empt his opponent, John McCain, from accusing Obama of being weak on national security. Once president, his rationale for the build-up in Afghanistan was based on “disrupting, dismantling and defeating al Qaeda”. However, to achieve that end, the Taliban became the strategic centre of gravity. This was an absurd reversal of ends and means, mainly because there were only a handful of al Qaeda in Afghanistan and many other places where this loosely defined network of extremists could and did find safe havens. Worse, the real centre of gravity for stability in the region — Pakistan — was only regarded with rhetoric and not with serious resources that would strengthen both its economy and its military capacity to deal with extremists, particularly on its Afghan border.

None of this should be surprising. After all, who in the new and young president’s immediate circle has any background in strategic thinking? Those who do come from military backgrounds — the first National Security Advisor Marine General James Jones — and the Pentagon, namely Defence Secretary Robert Gates who was appointed by President Bush and Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Pentagon, armed with greater intellectual and operational firepower than the White House civilians, predictably set the new Afghan strategy. Unfortunately, as with Bush (the 43rd), who ignored the post-war consequences of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Obama failed to appreciate that peace in Afghanistan required a regional solution, one he has been unable to generate. And the influence of his small circle of political advisors trumped that of his national security advisor.

General Jones has since stepped down and Gates and Mullen will both end their service later this year. The new National Security Advisor, Tom Donilon, is not a strategic thinker in the mould of a Zbigniew Brzezinski or Brent Scowcroft and is more akin to Clinton’s second national security advisor, Sandy Berger, an international trade lawyer. So where will this new thinking arise?

In Congress, Senator John Kerry, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, surely fits the bill. Yet, Kerry will stay where he is. And most members of Congress are understandably fixated on jobs, healthcare and domestic agendas. Does the president fully understand that across the globe, the US needs a strategy, not a laundry list of expectations? If not, we will attempt to muddle along. And if muddling does not work, then…

The writer is Chairman of the Killowen Group that advises leaders of government and business, and Senior Advisor at Washington DC’s Atlantic Council