Daily Times

The Pakistan-US marriage of convenience in the aftermath of the Osama bin Laden (OBL) episode is strained, though efforts are underway on the diplomatic front to heal the fractured relations. However, rest assured that divorce is a remote possibility. The fact of the matter is that Pakistan has never been a trusted ally of the US in the war against terror. Rather, it was the most bullied ally of the allies, persistently being demanded by the US to ‘do more’, without any sincere appreciation of the losses of astronomical proportions it has incurred as a result of its engagement in this war. Such losses are not confined to human and financial aspects only but include social and political losses too. Because of the erosion of trust in the state, its institutions and the sovereignty of the country, it may take decades to regain the confidence of the people.

Pak-US relations, since the very inception of the war against terror, can best be described as relations of exchange, devoid of any strategic depth or strong partnership. Pakistan was supposed to render services in the war in exchange for US economic aid, security-related and other than security-related, that Pakistan needed, partly to compensate for its lacklustre efforts at domestic revenue generation and partly owing to its historical choice/decision of forging close military ties with the US immediately after its inception in 1947. The logical corollary of deep military cooperation was that most defence purchases were to be made from the US, which in turn meant that our dependence on the US was bound to deepen with the passage of time. Thus, defence-related and other economic aid mediated cooperation between the two countries.

The Osama episode has exposed the fault lines of the tenuous relationship between Pakistan and the US but, at the same time, it has provided an opportunity for soul-searching and reckoning. Currently, there is deep disillusionment, both in Pakistan and the US, with this relationship of exchange. In Pakistan, the opinion makers, media, intelligentsia and politicians (some major parties have also joined the bandwagon) are vehemently arguing that we should say goodbye to US economic aid, as it is the main culprit for the damage done to our security and sovereignty. Things are not easy on the US side as well. Its think tanks, media and some of its congressmen are questioning the efficacy of the aid. They are questioning: why are we stuck with Pakistan despite the fact that the US tax payers’ money has failed to buy the gratitude, loyalty and cooperation of the Pakistani nation? Is it not better to wriggle out of it and cut off aid without further draining the US taxpayers’ money in aid?

It was in this background that five senior US senators demanded a few days ago a re-evaluation of US assistance to Pakistan. The US Defence Secretary Robert Gates and the US military’s top officer, Admiral Mike Mullen, have, however, advised against cutting off aid to Pakistan. The point here is that both parties are disillusioned with the aid phenomenon as it stands today. This means that there is something fundamentally wrong with the US economic assistance to Pakistan. What is that ‘wrong’? In order to conjecture upon the possible reasons, a brief overview of statistical accounts of aid indicating the quantum and nature of US aid to Pakistan is important.

US economic assistance to Pakistan dates back to the 1950s when Pakistan entered into a military pact with the US. During 1954 to 1964, the US provided nearly $ 2.5 billion in economic aid (other than purely military aid) and $ 700 million in military aid. Almost all types of aid remained suspended during the period between 1965 and 1971.The economic aid doled out to Pakistan during 1972 to 1977 was just peanuts, when a democratic government was in power in Pakistan. During the period 1980 to 1990, economic aid of about $ 5 billion was given, about half of which was military aid. After the withdrawal of the US from Afghanistan, aid to Pakistan dropped precipitously as the US provided $ 429 million in economic assistance and $ 5.2 million in military assistance during 1991 to 2000. After 9/11, US aid became highly skewed towards the military. During the period 2002 to 2009, out of $ 11.2 billion, $ 8.1 billion (72 percent) was security-related aid. This security-related aid also included assistance from the Coalition Support Fund (CSF). During this period, $ 3.1 billion (23 percent) was given as economic aid, i.e. other than security-related aid.

Furthermore, although Congress, under the Kerry-Lugar-Berman Act, authorised $ 1.5 billion aid per annum as development aid for five years, the actual disbursements were only $ 275 million and $ 676 million during financial years 2009 and 2010 respectively. These disbursements also included $ 500 million for flood relief. According to estimates, total official development assistance (net) received from all sources in the last five years, on average, constitutes 1.5 percent of the gross national income (GNI) of Pakistan. The aid that a Pakistani citizen receives from all sources during one year is hardly $ 14 (approximately three rupees per day). The amount in per capita terms is much less than the amount his/her African counterpart has been receiving in the last half century. It is estimated that a citizen of the African continent, on average, has received $ 35 per annum since 1960 for his/her poverty reduction. The entire worth of US economic assistance to Pakistan, under the Kerry-Lugar-Berman arrangement ($1.5 billion), is equal to about five and a half days of US military spending in Afghanistan.

What do the above statistics tell us? First of all, US aid is intermittent in nature. It is not motivated by any generosity or grand moral/ethical considerations for poverty or disease elimination, and the streaks of self-interest are very much visible a la Kipling’s White Man’s Burden. Secondly, the argument that aid is meant to bolster civilian governments in Pakistan is not vindicated by statistics. The amount of aid soars up during the period of US military engagement in the region and dips when its active military involvement is over. Coincidently, the quantum of aid is higher when Pakistan has a military regime.

(To be continued)

The writer is a graduate from the Columbia University in Economic
Policy Management. He can be reached at jamilnasir1969@gmail.com