Daily Times

Lately in the Middle East, particularly since the ‘Arab spring’, a new debate about adopting the Turkish model has sprung to prominence. I find it an interesting prospect that both Islamist and liberal political groups in the Arab world have idealised modern Turkey — however, for their own separate reasons. Turkey presents a model of a country that has progressively transformed from a military-ruled, secular nation to a Muslim democracy, and from an obedient pupil of the West to a rising regional superpower. However, when it comes to emulating the Turkish experience in the Middle East, one has to be careful. The political realities of Egypt, Tunisia or Yemen, for instance, are much different from those of Turkey. Yet, this prospect poses an interesting debate.

Recently, Tayyip Erdogan’s symbolic win this June 12 was the centre of attention in the West and the East alike. The eccentric leader of the Justice Party entered his third consecutive term as the premier, with promises to change the status quo in Turkish politics — from military-dominated to civilian-led. A civilian constitution is in the offing in Turkey. And it is going to be a historic achievement indeed.

While he has won the applause of many, Erdogan has had his share of critics as well. There is most notably a defined dichotomy in the attitudes towards him — you are either a diehard follower, or a complete renegade when it comes to his policies. Many of his critics have voiced the anxiety of Europe and the US over the Turkish leader’s increasingly independent stance on the country’s foreign policy, not to mention his defiant stand on the Israel-Palestine issue. This change of heart has been central to the debate on Turkey.

In the context of the Turkish resurgence on the international scene, I feel that there are a number of lessons for Pakistan too. Although one expects few in Pakistan to pay heed but Turkey, as I see it rising, is a better model for Pakistan than it could be for any other country, including those in the Middle East. Take, for instance, the Turkish economy. Its economic progress since 2002 has been remarkable, in stark contrast to Pakistan’s downfall. Turkey is being called the new face of the Middle East and, at the same time, the ‘China of Europe’.

What is interesting, however, is that the onset of the largely disparate destinies of Pakistan and Turkey were only a few years apart. The US invasion of Afghanistan was a bad omen for Pakistan, while US intervention in Iraq gave Turkey the opportunity to move away from its old and shamelessly pro-western stance. The choices made by these two nations determined, to a large extent, where each would end up a decade later. The rejection of US demands to station troops in Turkey in 2003 and shortly thereafter the election of Erdogan as prime minister marked the beginning of a new era in Turkish history. Much of Turkey’s progress owes to the re-birth of its foreign policy under the defiant, yet realist leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

There are similarities between Pakistan and Turkey. The Kurdish problem, for instance, is much like the Baloch issue, spreading across the borders of more than one country, and plaguing Turkish politics for a long time. And, as it seems from the results of last month’s elections, Turkey is moving towards a more inclusive civilian constitution, which is likely to settle the Kurdish question.

On the other hand, when it comes to their relations with neighbouring countries, Pakistan and Turkey have had a similar past — the present however is in glaring contrast. While Turkey has evolved as a successful model, Pakistan is still dragging on with its Cold War policy baggage. The Turkish doctrine of ‘zero-problems policy with neighbours’ is an excellent working model for Pakistan. Pakistan needs, desperately, vigorous measures that would open up avenues of economic and cultural integration with Iran and perhaps, to some extent, with India as well. Pakistan could benefit both strategically and economically by adopting the soft-power image of Turkey. However, such an image could only come by providing legitimacy to political governments and by adopting a sufficiently independent foreign policy.

Pakistan, now more than ever, needs to re-think its allegiances. In the Middle East, the Arab world is now moving towards a Turko-Persian future. The protestors on the Arab street are ready to embrace Turkey as a long-lost brother. Turkish influence in the Middle East is a favour over the old and waning western, and Saudi spheres of influence. Pakistan needs to start managing its relations in the region accordingly.

Moreover, events in Syria and Bahrain show that Iran is now marking its territory as well. Saudi Arabia has had a hard time countering the Iranian overtures. Its diplomatic efforts, after the onset of the Arab Spring, have been frantic and desperate. Aligning solely with the aging house of Saud, no matter how close it is to the Pakistani establishment, presents a less favourable scenario than an approach that manages both Iran and Saudi Arabia in a more balanced way — just like Turkey has done.

In the eyes of western analysts, the increasing influence of Turkey (and to a lesser extent Iran) through the past decade is a move towards rebuilding an empire. What is alleged as ‘neo-Ottomanism’ is often used to criticise Ahmet Davutoglu’s doctrine on the Turkish sphere of influence. This, coupled with the ‘Shia crescent’, a reference to the Iranian influence through the Shia population in Bahrain, Lebanon and eastern Saudi Arabia, is likely to define the modern identity of the Middle East — a populist and independent identity. Pakistan, which is ideologically more on the periphery of the Middle East than that of South Asia, should identify its role in this emerging order, before it is too late.

Lastly, some of the most important lessons from the Turkish experience are shown in the developments in its internal politics. If one looks at the Turkish ‘deep state theory’ and the historic role of its military in staging coups and maintaining a strong grip over Turkish politics, it mirrors the image of the establishment in Pakistan. A democratic government, under Erdogan, has overcome the so-called Turkish deep state by strengthening the legitimacy of civilian rule. This, again, is a lesson for Pakistan, as the Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu wrote in 2007: “If there is not a balance between security and democracy in a country, it may not have a chance to establish an area of influence in its environs.” If Pakistan indeed needs ‘strategic depth’ in its environs, it ought to balance that with internal political strength and cohesion.

While Pakistan is distraught with a myriad of problems, what might help the country is diagnosis of the disease rather than enumerating the symptoms. Some long-term planning and learning from the experiences of others might also help. It goes without saying that the problems of Pakistan are systemic. An overhauling of the system is needed. There is no harm in redesigning Pakistan’s democracy and none whatsoever in coming up with a new foreign policy.

The writer is a consultant with the Centre for International Media Ethics and a freelance writer. He can be reached at talhajalal@hotmail.com