Daily Times

(The preceding part of this column discussed problematic areas in the concept of credible minimum deterrence; this part explores some aspects of the South Asian strategic balance, and the last, forthcoming part will search for some viable solutions to the issues raised.)

Credible minimum deterrence is an unwieldy concept with varying connotations and implications for different audiences. It is used as a blanket term by India and Pakistan, which prefer to be viewed by each other as implementing a ‘maximal’ deterrence — in the event of war they are not only well equipped but also well prepared. The value of this terminology may lie more in what it conceals, rather than in what it reveals.

At least nine Indian nuclear analysts have offered their calculations on what menu of nuclear weapons development India should follow. There is a wide range in-between and no consensus. K Subrahmanyam, a leading Indian strategic thinker, is of the view that “minimum deterrence is not a numerical definition, but a strategic approach”. This has been outrightly rejected by those who believe that the number of weapons (or estimate) is indeed decided upon but not disclosed. The decision makers are attempting to suggest, through their claims that deterrence is not about numbers, that they are not willing to disclose this to their own body politic, their adversaries, or any other interested interlocutors, including the US.

In Pakistan, there has been comparatively less debate on the requirements of credible minimum deterrence. This may be seen as caused by the de facto ‘closed loop’ of military thinking and decision-making on nuclear issues during both civilian and military rule, continuing after the recent formal ‘civilianisation’ of the National Command Authority. Nonetheless, Pakistan has claimed that it will continue to develop nuclear missiles and related strategic capability to maintain minimum credible deterrence vis-à-vis our eastern neighbour who is on a path to major development of nuclear weapons, missiles, anti-missiles and conventional arms.

Leading experts view Pakistan’s strategic deterrence strategy as based around five core elements: an effective conventional fighting force, a minimum nuclear deterrence doctrine, an adequate stockpile of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, survivable strategic forces and robust strategic command and control. Conceptually, the shorter the period of time that Pakistan’s conventional military forces — notably the Pakistan Army and Air Force — can hold out in a war, the quicker nuclear weapons may be deployed.

The optimum size of any nuclear force required by Pakistan is a question that has received a few (inconclusive) attempts. Even though Pakistan may target cities, this type of targeting policy does not guarantee the country’s national defence. According to experts, under some circumstances India may opt to attack and pay the price. Rodney Jones states, “To be able to kill 50 percent of India’s population (Pakistan) might require…increase its current stockpile by about seven times….require proportionate increases in Pakistan’s ability to produce fissile material, as well as similar increases in its missile forces.” He further calculates that if Pakistan wanted to destroy six Indian ground force divisions (nine weapons per division) and the aircraft on 10 airfields (three weapons per airfield), Pakistan would require more nuclear weapons, and Pakistan’s “current nuclear forces have serious limitations with regard to the range of situations where they could successfully protect Pakistan’s independent existence”. The US government may not understand Pakistan’s predicament, its blocking the Fissile Material Treaty at the Conference on Disarmament and increased production of fissile material, but scholars from the US, such as Jones, clearly do.

Despite this type of independent analysis, it remains unclear how the ‘minimum’ deterrent is characterised by the ‘strategic enclave’ in Pakistan, which is responsible for decision-making on nuclear and military issues. Pakistan has officially adopted the same style of diplomatic language and policy as India, leaving things open-ended and undefined, keeping in view what India does with its own nuclear and conventional arsenal. This planned capability may not be exactly as ambitious as India’s, at least to begin with, but, in the long term, Pakistan may want to maximise its second strike options keeping in view a number of evolving factors including budgetary issues and Indian strategic acquisitions and developments.

India has pre-positioned any arms control or disarmament talks subject to the progress of global nuclear arms control expanding the region to ‘southern’ Asia to include China. Pakistan, on the other hand, has predicated global and regional nuclear arms control or disarmament proposals upon India. It has also put forward regional proposals and advocated potential solutions to nuclear proliferation, which India has rejected. Endeavouring to work out a relatively more precise and mutually agreed definition of what may constitute ‘minimum’ could potentially add further stability to the nuclear equation, but is patently of no interest to India. Whereas India so far seems to be merely interested in risk reduction, Pakistan is also interested in restraining India’s nuclear capabilities and ambitions. In the absence of sustained and systematic communication between India and Pakistan on their respective positions and perspectives, it has not been possible for them to explore avenues that might help to advance the interests of both states.

Nuclear opacity is also viewed as having impeded Pakistani and Indian efforts to openly propose, negotiate and accept nuclear arms control agreements. On the other hand, policymakers may not even have the room to formulate and discuss out of the box or politically unpopular proposals, had that not been the case. Opaque nuclear proliferation may have, in a way, constrained the nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan, but it has also inhibited India and Pakistan from cultivating domestic support for nuclear arms control.

(To be continued)

The writer is a Fellow at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London. She can be reached at defence.analyst@gmail.com