Daily Times

The scandalous Memogate affair, regardless of the whole or half the truth, appears to have placed the civilian and the military establishments, at the apex, on the two seemingly irreconcilable ends of the argument.

General James Jones, former US National Security Advisor, the self-confessed carrier of Mr Mansoor Ijaz’s memo to Admiral Mike Mullen, the retired Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has since delivered his position on the veracity of its substance.

Mansoor Ijaz’s memo (hence Memogate) named Husain Haqqani, then Pakistan’s ambassador to Washington, as the original scribe of the memo requesting Washington to pre-empt a likely army coups against President Zardari, much to the embarrassment of the army.General Jones’s absolving Haqqani leaves the army unimpressed. Whereas Prime Minister Gilani views General Jones’s testimony, absolving Haqqani, as the end of the affair, the army and the ISI chiefs stick to their guns despite the government’s unilateral ceasefire.

The ‘sequence and contents’ of the text messages, record of telephone calls, etc, shown to the ISI chief by Mansoor Ijaz in London created a ‘reasonable doubt’ about Haqqani’s non-involvement in the affair.

ISI chief Lieutenant-General Ahmed Shuja Pasha said that he was “completely satisfied” that there was “enough corroborative” evidence to prove Mansoor’s ‘version’ of the incident.

In his original statement, General Jones also ‘confirmed’ having ‘passed’ the memo he had received from Mansoor Ijaz to Admiral Mike Mullen.

Who was who in the case? What was his little game? Finally, what General Jones might have been trying to achieve was the deflation of General Kayani’s prayer to the Supreme Court to investigate the issue to ‘determine’ who ‘conceived’ the memo to create all the confusion approaching a real crisis in civil-military relations. Worse of all, it can have an adverse impact on the morale of the young officers and soldiers laying down their lives for the security and defence of the ‘territorial integrity and political independence and sovereignty of the country’.

Reference to ‘political independence’, even if used loosely, betrays the army high command’s concern at the disturbing volatility of the current politics at the national level.

Why should the high command have anything to do with ‘political independence’ except for its disturbing potential to create a grave national crisis unless called a halt to without loss of precious time? General Kayani remains convinced of the ‘reality’ of the memo. He views it as a ‘conspiracy’ hatched against the army and national security. He would go on to assure that despite ‘all this’ the Pakistan Army remains in high spirits ‘fully determined’ for the defence of the homeland against all challenges. He went on to assure the Supreme Court of the army’s full cooperation with the court in the due process to fix responsibility. He views Haqqani as the key player in the sordid affair along with the American Mansoor Ijaz.

Unlike the views of the army and ISI chiefs about the unquestioned ‘reality’ of the episode and the vital need to pursue it to the bitter end, Prime Minister Gilani would rather have it closed after the deposition of the retired US General on the veracity of the memo.

In his confidential affidavit to the Supreme Court, Jones said that he had ‘no reason’ to believe that Mr Haqqani had ‘any role’ in preparing the memo. He went on to claim that, in his opinion, Haqqani had ‘no knowledge’ of the memo. Even the type of language in the memo, he went on to argue, was “similar to how Ijaz would speak”.

The memo ‘flaunted’ the exclusive style typical of Mansoor Ijaz. General Jones’s rejoinder was in response to questions raised by Haqqani’s defence counsel, Asma Jahangir in an e-mail addressed to him. That would not deter Mansoor Ijaz from changing his original statement. He would choose to be even more categorical on Haqqani’s role in the scandal.

The ISI chief, for his part, stood firm on his claim that Haqqani was the ‘driving spirit’ behind the memo and the scheme to ‘rein in’ the Pakistan military. He went on to stress that Haqqani ‘discussed’ the scheme’ with President Asif Ali Zardari. Quite a kaleidoscope of half-truths and lies. Whatever!

Since the matter is sub judice, one must wait until the final verdict of the Supreme Court.

What has happened in the meantime in terms of the impact of widely varying stands of the civil and military on the case is bad enough. It bodes ill for the future shape of civil-military relations. More specifically, for the rank and file and their loss of respect and trust in the word of their chief.

No matter how hard the prime minister might try to sweep the matter under the rug, it remains a matter of civilian credibility (legitimacy?) on the one hand, and, of military honour on the other.

Both the army chief and the head of the ISI stand firmly committed: a) to the existential reality of the memo and, b) on its adverse impact on the status of the army as an integrated and disciplined force.

The mere fact that General Kayani had himself requested the Supreme Court to investigate the case to ‘determine’ who ‘conceived’ the memo leaves him little space to manoeuvre out of it.

Unless fully vindicated, he would lose the force of his word as the army chief.

It is the word of the army chief regarding the reality of the memo pitted against the stand of the government on its unreality and dubious character. The two are headed for a faceoff or an outright confrontation depending on the verdict of the Supreme Court. While the government could take refuge under political verbiage and reinterpretation, the army chief would have no such safety device available to him vis-à-vis the institution and the men under his command.

Once lost, military honour cannot be restored.

The negative impact of Memogate on the future shape of the relation remains ‘beyond reasonable doubt’.

The writer is a retired brigadier and can be reached at brigsiddiqi@yahoo.co.uk