Daily Times

Introduction: the term administration rather than establishment has been used deliberately since the latter as understood in our part of the world identifies the men in khakis in GHQ, with some elements of the bureaucracy in tow. Administration on the other hand encompasses all major players of the state headed by the directly elected political elites who alone have been given the mandate of formulation and execution of national policies at all levels. Administration, rather than the establishment, therefore, must answer for the current ambiguity in the covert and overt stands on the CIA drone attacks on Pakistani soil.

Critics would point out that despite the democratic credentials of the present government, the establishment, rather than the administration crafts and executes the country’s security policies, which parliament merely rubber stamps. On the issue of the drone strikes logically, the establishment rather than the administration should be asked to come clean. Even if this assertion is true, it would still reflect the failure of the political leadership for abandoning and abdicating one of its key responsibilities to a non-elected entity of the state while in the final analysis only they are answerable to the general public, who voted them into power. Should the administration express their inability to harness the establishment and exercise the mandate given to them by the people, they should make way for those who have the gumption to do so.

This article will examine the rationale being presented by the administration for its fierce public opposition to the US drone attacks and the harsh realities that had earlier forced them to adopt a far more conciliatory tone in private. Currently a complete cessation of the armed drone operations in our tribal belt is one of the key conditions for the resumption of the NATO supply routes through Pakistani territory. Because of some inherent shortcomings in the logic being presented for Pakistan’s opposition to the CIA-operated drone strikes, the US is unlikely to agree to such a demand. Subsequent paragraphs will elaborate on this aspect.

Drone attacks violate Pakistan’s sovereignty: sovereignty like honour is a very noble concept and like honour, it is not an absolute entity and varies according to circumstances and environment. The more vulnerable one is, the lower would be the threshold of honour and also of sovereignty. Pakistan’s stand on the violation of its sovereignty by the US drones when viewed in isolation is on solid moral and legal grounds but when seen in light of the existing environment, it gets diluted. For one, where the writ of the state is absent, the claim to sovereignty weakens and unfortunately in the unruly tribal belt of Pakistan, the state’s writ is at best marginal. And finally, the presence of ISAF/NATO forces in neighbouring Afghanistan has been sanctified by a UN resolution. Much as the Pashtun Afghans and nearly all Pakistanis look at them as an occupying force, they are there with the legal if not the moral go-ahead of the premier world institution, which has the mandate of sanctifying or declaring illegal military interventions by a country.

The UN’s rules of business condemn the territorial use of any part of a country for mounting offensive raids/campaigns against another state. If the party at fault is either unwilling or unable to control acts of sabotage and subversion of a neighbour from its soil, the latter can, after UN approval, mount raids across the border, and these will not be considered violation of sovereignty. Pakistan is confronting such a perilous scenario where should the US decide, they can get the UN’s endorsement for boots on the ground cross-border raids in our tribal belt. That they have not adopted this line of action so far has more to do with their being overstretched militarily in two major conflicts and that Pakistan with all its perceived inadequacies is still considered a better bet as an ally than as an adversary.

Drone strikes may provide tactical gains but are strategic disasters: drone strikes may provide tactical gains but are strategic disasters is the conventional wisdom few in Pakistan can dare to disagree with. It is not easy to verify the accuracy of the statement because besides the alien drones, the campaign against the non-state actors in our tribal belt has other components as well that have a direct bearing on the outcome of the anti-insurgency operations. In this form of asymmetric warfare, military actions are but a small part of the overall strategy to defeat the enemy. Establishing the state’s writ where the insurgents are based, bringing visible development in the area, creating job opportunities and enhancing the quality of life for the locals are necessary steps to win the hearts and minds of the people. To paraphrase Mao, ‘only then the rebels would not have the medium of water to swim and flourish.’ How has the state of Pakistan fared in these critical fields once military actions by our own forces in Swat and Waziristan had managed to create a window of opportunity for other strands of strategy to be applied? Are the drone strikes the principal cause of the failure of the state to eliminate the insurgents? Unbiased analysts and historians can better answer the question.

That the drone attacks result in collateral damage is irrefutable though the extent of damage is open to debate. Criticism of drones as a promoter of terror has much merit but Pakistan’s objection is weakened to an extent because the state itself employs air power assets (fixed and rotary wing) to target insurgents in the tribal belt. The weapons employed in these operations have a much larger warhead (hence wider footprint) and less accuracy than the much smaller and more accurate Hellfire missiles fired by the drones. All other factors being equal, the Pakistani aerial onslaught is likely to cause comparatively more collateral damage than the drones. Since Pakistan has not discontinued the aerial assaults despite the collateral damage risk, which it makes all efforts to minimise, its objection is not so much on the use of armed drones as a launch platform but because it is owned and operated by its so-called ally, who fails to coordinate and inform about the types of targets that are engaged. While the US is unlikely to cease drone operations over FATA in the near future, it might be more amenable to allowing a greater role to Pakistan in intelligence sharing and final target selection. This part appears to be doable.

Conclusion: sentiments have no place in statecraft and slogans like ‘most allied ally’ and ‘higher than the Himalayas’ are excellent after dinner and post-negotiation speeches but have little relevance in the state’s final decision-making process. Statecraft and statesmanship demand a cold, logical assessment of the situation and adopting a course of action most likely to promote state interest in the given environment. Politicking, on the other hand, cannot ignore public sentiments even if these might not be beneficial in promotion of national interest. Successful leaders in democracies do keep the public sentiments in mind but are able to mould them sufficiently if they are convinced following their logic will eventually harm the wellbeing of the state. To be able to do that leaders must have the vision of a statesman and also enjoy the confidence and trust of the people they represent. Are the current leadership of Pakistan and those waiting in the wings up to the task?

The writer is a defence analyst and Director of Centre of Airpower Studies. He can be reached at jamal4701@yahoo.co.uk