Daily Times

Once again, as was
pragmatically expected, India and Pakistan failed to get a much-propagandised breakthrough on the issue of demilitarisation of Siachen. This should not be a tad shocking to people from the two countries, who have not resolved even a single issue between them through their bilateral negotiation processes and mechanisms. The reasons are many. Who was at fault and who was not will take a number of pages to discuss; the grim reality, for the moment, is that a political impasse continues on the Siachen issue.
The two countries have solved their bilateral issues, except Kashmir, only when they had approached an international body or sought arbitration. One such issue was the distribution of waters from the Indus River System, which cropped up just after the birth of Pakistan in 1947. The two Punjabs were against each other over the issue of sharing of water from the river Sutlej. An interim arrangement was made, which failed in 1948. Then an inter-dominion conference took place in New Delhi where the two countries agreed on the formula to share water from the River Sutlej. The problem remained and the Indus Water Treaty finally settled it in 1960. This treaty was signed after eight years of negotiations, and it was mediated by the World Bank on the initiative taken by David Lilienthal, who persuaded the then President of the World Bank, Eugene Black. The treaty, with a few hiccups, is still the most successful trans-border water sharing treaty between the two archrivals.
Another issue that was resolved between the two countries was the demarcation of the Gujarat-West Pakistan boundary line. This was possible through setting up a tribunal by the United Nations in 1965.The head of that tribunal was Gunnar Karl Andreas Lagergren, who after in-camera meetings and heated arguments, came out with a 900-page judgment. Though Indian nominee Ales Bebler voted against the award of some areas to Pakistan, the matter was settled.
Now the question arises, why the two have reached a conclusion over bilateral disputes whenever there is an outsider? Are we as nations not mature enough to seal conclusive deals over existing bilateral conflicts? The answer is no, because we have not behaved in a way two mature nation-states behave in international politics. The old issues like a trust deficit and partition still dictate our relationships; we have utterly failed to come out from those things to show a rational side to our behaviour. In addition, besides our institutions, our peoples are responsible too because they are ready to flow with whippings and cries made by various stakeholders who do not want peace to be made between the two countries.
For example, take the issue of Siachen. Both countries are fully aware of the hazards of maintaining armies in the uninhabitable glacier region, but are adamantly unprepared to give up their posts, despite casualties they experience almost every year. The Pakistan army chief, General Pervez Kayani’s statement on Siachen is a welcome one, but there are others who differ with him. In India too, often the political leadership, in order to prevent problems for their government, just give up. The document published in The Hindu on June 10, 2012 has discerningly shown how for political reasons, even the mutually accepted good solutions to bilateral problems have been scuttled. The then defence secretary and now governor of Jammu and Kashmir, N N Vohra, who was leading the talks in 1992, was about to conclude the deal with Pakistani negotiators in New Delhi, when he got instructions to not go ahead with it. That marred the whole process and the arduously prepared draft was trashed.
The Indian Prime Minister P V Narasimha Rao scuttled the talks in 1992 because the right-wing political party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was on the rampage over the issue of Ramjanambhoomi. At that time, Prime Minister Rao was leading a minority government and did not want to give another issue to the BJP that could threaten his government. Also, inside the Congress Party, many wanted his head and he was not ready to give them an opportunity to ‘chop’ it. In 1994, the Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto did the same. She too was having a tough time in managing the army for her political survival in office. The brewing opposition against her inspired a few army officers to plot a coup, which she survived, but could not remain long in office, as her government was sacked by President Farooq Leghari in 1996.
To conclude, the political leadership can go ahead only when there is no threat to their political survival. They need support, which is not possible from opposition groups. In this situation, civil society from the two sides has to come forward and help them. It must support the bold initiatives of their leaders by not falling in line with political opportunists and demagogues. The sensationalisation of almost all issues between India and Pakistan must be stopped and people at large must be politically educated to understand the harm of living in a bitter relationship for more than 65 years.

The writer is a PhD student at the South Asian Studies School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University. He can be reached at amitranjan.jnu@gmail.com