Daily Times

After going through various ebbs and flows, the narrative of the Afghan endgame is shifting from a hardcore security-centric approach, premised around the counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency debate, to an economic, trade and investment approach, in search of peace and stability. Amid these changing dynamics of the Afghan endgame Pakistan’s Afghan policy is perhaps the most misunderstood one among the Afghans and the regional and international community, due to Pakistan’s image crisis and poor articulation of its narrative of the Afghan endgame. Instead of being seen as a peace facilitator and a stabilising agent, Pakistan’s role is negatively viewed as a peace spoiler in Afghanistan owing to its reluctance to destroy the alleged safe havens and sanctuaries of the Haqqani network in its North Waziristan tribal region.

Generally, it is believed that Pakistan is obstructing the Afghan security transition and peacemaking efforts by not using its so-called influence over the leadership of the Afghan Taliban’s Quetta Shura to pursue reconciliation with Kabul and the US. Coupled with this, continuous internal political turmoil, economic meltdown, strained relations with the US and raging insurgencies in its northwestern and southwestern regions further undermine its ability to present convincingly its discourse among various competing narratives of the Afghan endgame. This short comment endeavours to present Pakistan’s perspective of the Afghan endgame with a view to clarify various misgivings that surround its Afghan policy in the regional and international community.

Currently, there is a deadlock in the Afghan endgame and the way out of this deadlock lies in a political discourse. A sudden jump from a security-centric approach to an economic one will not work unless a genuine political reconciliation is evolved among various Afghan groups. In the absence of an agreed upon political framework, the atmosphere is not conducive to a pro-development/economic approach. The path to an economic approach from the security-centric approach passes through political reconciliation. Only a viable political framework can best guarantee a conducive environment and favourable conditions for an economic initiative. A sudden jump from the security to an economic approach without achieving political reconciliation will push Afghanistan into further chaos.

For the last 10 years, since the US invasion of Afghanistan, the security-centric approach has not worked in Afghanistan and the security transition is taking place without any positive outcomes achieved in the sphere of political reconciliation. Originally, the idea of the Afghan endgame was premised around two fundamental principles: security transition and political reconciliation. In theory, security transition and political reconciliation are meant to go hand in hand, in order to create an enabling environment for peacemaking efforts.

Despite various moots and initiatives to arrest the ever-worsening security situation in war-torn Afghanistan, not a single tangible outcome is there to show that the security-centric approach is working. The Bonn Conference 2001, which totally sidelined the Afghan Taliban from the political process, laid the foundation for this prolonged phase of violence and conflict in Afghanistan. After being routed by the invading US forces, the Afghan Taliban re-emerged in 2004-05 and to date they continue to wage a robust insurgency against the US and NATO forces.

Pakistan believes the process of political reconciliation should be inclusive and broad-based. Unlike the past, negotiations should be held with all the Afghan groups, including the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network. A selective reconciliation process is a recipe for further disaster.

In this regard, the policy-making circles in Pakistan advocate an ‘Afghan-led and Afghan owned’ approach to peacemaking efforts in the context of the Afghan endgame. An intra-Afghan consensus is the starting point of such a process. Until and unless the existing rifts and divisions among the Afghan groups along ethno-linguistic and ideological lines remain, sustainable and long-lasting peace in Afghanistan will remain an elusive dream.

The underlying logic of this approach is that an intra-Afghan consensus will enable various Afghan groups to agree on a political framework and a power sharing formula, the absence of which will trigger off a struggle (read civil war) to take over Kabul once the US forces leave the region. In order to avert such a situation, all the Afghan groups should be encouraged to sit together and join heads to thrash out their differences and evolve a consensus for Afghanistan’s secure and peaceful future.

The biggest misgiving about Pakistan’s Afghan policy is its alleged plans to support a takeover of Kabul by the Afghan Taliban after the US withdrawal. Given the regional and international consensus against such a possibility, it is suicidal thinking to bet on the Afghan Taliban. In fact, Afghanistan’s return to Taliban rule will greatly undermine and damage Pakistan’s counter-insurgency operation against the homegrown militants, i.e. the Pakistani Taliban in its tribal areas. The Pakistani Taliban have found safe havens in Afghanistan from where they launch cross-border militant raids on Pakistani soil. The nexus between the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban is a well established fact. Kabul’s return to Taliban rule will have serious implications for Pakistan’s own internal security situation.

All Pakistan advocates is inclusion of the Afghan insurgent groups in the process of political reconciliation and not a forceful takeover of the government by these groups. It is also widely misunderstood that by supporting the agenda of political reconciliation with these groups, Pakistan wants to manipulate the whole process of the Afghan endgame. This line of thinking is also erroneous and ill founded. Pakistan only advocates this approach, no matter who leads the peace process and no matter where the negotiations take place. It only reminds all the conflicting parties to tone down their rhetoric and reconcile to the existing ground realities in Afghanistan.

Lastly, it is also believed that Pakistan negatively views the recently concluded US-Afghanistan and Indo-Afghan strategic partnership agreements. It is opined that Pakistan is highly apprehensive of India’s growing role in Afghanistan, which actually is not the case. As a matter of fact, after the withdrawal of US and NATO forces from Afghanistan in 2014, firm commitments of economic assistance and investment plans by regional economic powers like China, Russia and India to fill the vacuum is viewed positively in Islamabad.

However, Pakistan strongly discourages a zero-sum game of regional states in Afghanistan. The policy of pitting one regional state against the other in Afghanistan, for furtherance of narrow strategic objectives, is a dangerous trend. The policy of awarding one regional actor a bigger role at the cost of the other is fraught with the danger of turf battles and proxy wars in Afghanistan. Such a trend is a recipe for further instability and chaos. It will further complicate matters instead of solving the existing ones.

A stable, peaceful and prosperous Afghanistan not only guarantees regional peace and stability but by virtue of its unique geographical location, being situated at the crossroads of South, Central and West Asia, it also holds the key to unlocking the economic potential of this region. There are no easy answers to the existing situation in Afghanistan. Instead of going for quick fixes and short-term stabilising measures, Afghanistan requires a muddle-through approach that looks for tangible solutions to Afghanistan’s jigsaw puzzle. An exit in undue haste will push Afghanistan toward another phase of protracted civil war, which is in no one’s favour.

The writer is a senior analyst with the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), RSIS, Singapore and a former research/security analyst at the Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS). An expert on KPK and the FATA, he is also a contributor in a book on FATA and two research papers in the PIPS journal, Conflict and Peace Studies. He can be reached at hafizbasit@yahoo.com