Daily Times

Monday’s Peshawar incident was a targeted hit on US diplomats on Pakistani soil, and must be analysed in conjunction with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) assignment in Afghanistan, especially as the occupation begins drawing down in keeping with the 2014 deadline. The hit, aimed at a US Consulate vehicle, also raises fresh questions about provision of high-level security. And while relevant agencies reorient technical nuances — like convoy vulnerability to ‘ambushes’ from the sides — the attack indicates impressive intelligence work on the part of the perpetrators. Someone was watching very closely, was aware of the officials’ route (which, apparently, accompanying security was not), and managed the strike to perfection. Significantly, Monday’s attack may have differed from the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan’s (TTP’s) recent liking for soft targets, but it presents the same mix of problems for the Pakistani authorities. Counter-insurgency, as well as counter-terrorism operations vary significantly from traditional army manoeuvring, a fact the Pakistani state has come to realise all too well since hopping onto the war on terror bandwagon. Dealing with a shadowy guerilla resistance that melts into the indigenous populace at will requires intelligence and police capability of the highest standard, another fact that the Pakistani establishment should have realised well enough by now. Yet our many intelligence and security agencies seem to work largely independent of each other, not to mention the awkward moment when their strategies are directed at cross-purposes. More than a decade into a war that has reoriented the military’s chief concerns around intelligence-intensive efforts, we are still without an overarching official body that gathers all military, paramilitary, civilian and police agencies on a unified platform. The lack of official coordination has allowed militants previously largely confined to FATA to move into major cities, reports indicating Taliban and al Qaeda infiltration into Karachi being a case in point. It is sobering, to say the least, that such ambitious expansion would have eluded these self-styled soldier-clerics if only law enforcement were up to the mark.
It seems both Islamabad and GHQ over-relied on public opinion eventually snowballing against the Taliban’s monstrosities. No doubt there is little sympathy for suicide bombers and throat cutters beyond the tribal area, but the state’s paralysis has enabled the Taliban and affiliates to spread a wave of terror across the country that has left society largely silenced. Eventually, it is the state’s responsibility to restore its writ, especially since our own agencies are directly responsible for midwifing this menace since the days of the so-called anti-Soviet jihad. It is no secret that the ISI, which once controlled the mujahideen and Taliban lot, has lost a great deal of influence over its erstwhile protégés. It must now concentrate all its energies to end their anti-state activities. This narrative must be accepted and propagated at the highest level. This way the government, and the army, will not only signal clear intentions, but also manage to gather a much larger portion of society on board. But again, such ambition will not come to fruition till the intelligence makeup reflects the changed ground realities, one that requires proactive planning, and will not be possible without streamlining intelligence work under a centralised umbrella. Until such steps are taken, we will only react to misfortunes as and when they occur, and find intelligence loopholes to blame for heart-wrenching tragedies that could have been avoided with a little more discipline and sense of purpose. *