Daily Times

Improvised explosive devices or IEDs are homemade bombs constructed and employed in unconventional warfare operations where the use of conventional munitions becomes impossible. Any explosive weapon that does not originate from an industrial production line can be classified as an IED. Thus such devices are being used extensively by terrorists and insurgents due to the easy availability of over the counter ingredients that can be put together with very little effort but has a far reaching and lethal effect. Therefore, the IED becomes a highly effective asymmetric weapon. These devices can be classified in several categories including roadside bombs, improvised land mines, suicide bomber vests, car bombs and others.

The use of IED is not a new phenomenon as it has been used as an effective weapon by many insurgent and combat forces previously. An extensive use of such explosive devices has been observed in the latter part of the Second World War where victim operated IED’s were deployed by retreating troops thus resulting in great number of Personnel losses. The most effective use of IEDs has so far been carried out by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Northern Ireland for using a wide range of improvised explosive devices to attack British forces. Moreover, one third of the US troop losses were owed to the use of IEDs in Vietnam.

However, the use of IED in the past has been fairly limited but has now become the post 9/11 signature weapon widely employed by terrorists and insurgents in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Further, its extensive and long term use has allowed the technology to evolve and develop and its users to gain expertise in its usage thus adding to the difficulty in counter operations by security forces. So far, 34,236 casualties have been reported in the last one decade where 4,938 casualties alone have been experienced by Pakistani soldiers and law enforcers who have borne serious injuries that include amputation of either one or more limbs.

This enhances the need to step up on the process of countering the menace. Pakistan’s endeavours in this area have undergone rapid change where both the government and armed forces have increased their efforts manifold in the past few years.

The primary and most easily purchased material used in IED production is nitrogen that is found in chemical fertilisers such as Calcium Ammonium Nitrate (CAN). Being an agricultural country it can be readily found in local Pakistani markets and misused by terrorists and insurgents without raising any suspicions over its purchase. In order to check this trend the Government of Pakistan has taken precautions by banning the export of CAN and such chemical based fertilisers and has issued NoC’s to authorised dealers for the sale and purchase of these items under strict supervision. Further it has issued notification that disallows the transport of CAN and other such fertilisers to be moved within 50km of the border areas for enhanced safety purposes.

A fertiliser control regime has been introduced and implemented by the FATA Secretariat so that its distribution occurs under strict administrative and security vigilance. The producers of CAN fertilisers have also banned its transport to Balochistan for this purpose. This tight control over explosives, detonators and related material by the ministry of industry has led to the recovery of huge caches of IEDs and the control over border areas has resulted in a considerable decrease in the cross-border transport of chemicals used in IED production.

The increased threat of IED has led to the formulation of a broad counter-IED 9CIED) strategy by the Armed Forces of Pakistan with the objective to “develop a proactive C-IED response at Army level by maintaining highly trained, adequately equipped and optimally synchronised force capable of countering IED threat comprehensively.”

For this purpose, the C-IED cell has been upgraded and converted into a much larger C-IED organisation that aims to enforce stringent checking procedures on inter-provincial borders, formulation and implementation of C-IED legislative, and to establish a national C-IED task force to tackle the growing threat within its national borders. Moreover, media awareness campaigns are being run in order to bring the issue to the notice of the public.

The armed forces have initiated efforts to minimise possibility of cross-border smuggling of CAN by increasing the number of troops manning border posts. Further, the security forces have increased their activity within the borders by conducting raids and military search operations in various areas to locate IED manufacturing sites.

Large amounts of IED manufacturing material has been recovered in Chaman in two such successful military raids one launched in 2011 and the other in 2012 by the Army C-IED forces, during which IED making gangs were efficiently apprehended. In the Khyber Agency in 2012 another army operation was made successful by the help of the involvement of local community there. Despite the fact that two suicide bombers blew themselves during the process, huge numbers of IEDs were seized from the compound and many insurgents were taken into the custody of the security forces. Further, while launching a series of three consecutive operations in Mohmand Agency, large caches of IEDs were confiscated during which some exploded while a huge pile was recovered without disastrous outcomes.

After scores of military operations administered in various areas that had posed a high degree of threat, many IED producing facilities were destroyed and a number of insurgents arrested along with seizure of huge caches. This clearly indicates that Pakistan along with its armed forces has taken some concrete steps and measures to effectively counter the threat that employs the production and consumption of improvised explosive devices to rein terror among the people and the security forces. This has been made possible through devising and implementing a sound strategy that poses sanctions and curbs upon the easy availability of items that are used in its manufacture and the effective capture of those involved in the heinous activity of its manufacture.

The writer is a lecturer in the Linguistics department of Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad, and presently working on her PhD thesis in discourse analysis. She can be reached at lubena22@gmail.com