Daily Times

The League went into the elections with a clear message to the Muslim voters: “Islam is in danger if you do not have Pakistan. If you want Pakistan, vote for the Muslim League.” What Pakistan meant in terms of physical boundaries and the form of government was left vague and open-ended. This broad vision was a tactics to garner support of a large number of Muslims with differing views on what rights and concessions they wanted in the power sharing of India by invoking a perceived threat to their religious faith.

Both the British and Congress could have debunked this position of the League by pointing out the real consequences, like the division of Punjab and Bengal, if the Muslims voted for a separate country. The British stayed on the sidelines, perhaps to assert their neutrality, and the Congress may have thought of ‘good riddance’ from the Muslims in the Muslim majority provinces.

Using the ‘Islam under threat’ card, the League won over the religious leaders, pirs and clerics who held sway in the rural areas of Punjab. These religious figures, in turn, issued fatwas that went to the extent of warning the Muslims that if they did not vote for Pakistan they would cease being Muslims, their marriages would be annulled and they would not be buried in Muslim graveyards. Voters were told by the pirs that they had to choose between ‘Pakistan’ and ‘Kufiristan’.

The result of the 1946 elections was a significant victory and the watershed in Muslim League’s claim of being the sole representatives of the Muslims of India. In Punjab, the League won 33 percent of the Muslim votes polled and won 75 of the 175 seats. In Bengal, the League won 95 percent and 84.6 percent of the urban and rural Muslim votes respectively and 115 of the total of 250 seats. In Sind it won 46.3 percent of the Muslim vote, while in the NWFP it secured 41 percent of those Muslims who voted. Overall, the League won 74.7 percent of the total Muslim votes at the provincial level. At the centre, the League won all the seats reserved for Muslims.

While the vote for the Muslim League, and by corollary, the mandate to create Pakistan had been obtained, there were a number of spoilers to League’s victory. First, the League’s organisation in the Muslim majority provinces was very poor and victory was achieved by breaking into the vote bank of the existing social order that could easily switch allegiance when a good opportunity beckoned. Second, the influence and power attained by the communalist Muslim pirs and clerics was bound to raise its ugly head since these pirs and clerics were not under the control of the League leadership. Nevertheless, Jinnah was satisfied with the opportunity provided by the results and as pointed out by Ayesha Jalal, “He calculated that there would be time later to impose effective control over Muslim India once the more urgent battle with Congress and the British had been won.” As Jalal goes on to point out, this was a “miscalculation” on his part. The events moved in a way that left Jinnah holding a baby with vague features that he never wanted in the first place.

Following the elections of 1946 Jinnah had expected that with his mandate from the Muslims he could now negotiate a good deal to safeguard their interests. However, what followed the elections of 1946 was a roller coaster ride that seemed in no one’s control. The British were in a rush to leave as they had concluded that it was not possible for them to exercise colonial rule over India anymore. The Cabinet Mission Plan was a last ditch initiative by the British to agree on the features of an independent India. This was the end game in a long contested match of chess, but it did not end the way Jinnah had planned it. Jinnah was ready to accept a form of government in which there would be a weak centre-controlling defence, foreign affairs and communications, and two federating units: one for the Muslims and the second for the Hindus. This solution, to quote, Jalal, “By letting the Mission know that he envisaged some form of a union government once power was transferred, Jinnah for the first time had come out with his real strategy.” But Jinnah had played his cards too close to his chest and now it was too late. The British were in a rush to pack up from India, the Muslim provinces were squabbling among themselves over their own demand, and Congress proved inflexible to accommodate Jinnah’s solution within the framework of a united India.

Without caring for the consequences, a criminal omission, the colonial masters decided to divide India. A man called Radcliffe, a lawyer, came over and drew lines over the map of India to carve out two countries in the five-week time he was stipulated by his employers. What was let loose in 1940, by way of the Pakistan Resolution, as a tactics to gain power at the centre, ended up in creating two warring countries.

The rest, as they say, is history, and a bloody one at that.

(Concluded)

The writer is an engineer by training and a social scientist by inclination. He works as a consultant in the social sector