Daily Times

In a pattern that is very familiar to close observers of South Asia, tensions between India and Pakistan escalated during the past few days. An air of anticipation created by an exchange of goodwill statements between Dr Manmohan Singh and Nawaz Sharif after the latter’s ascendency to power in May and the subsequent flurry of Track II diplomacy went up in smoke in the wake of a series of incidents. Just as the two countries were close to formally resuming the composite dialogue, first the bombing outside the Indian consulate in Jalalabad and then firing incidents on the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir quickly heated the atmosphere in both countries. It appears someone is not happy with the progress in talks and tried to throw a spanner in the works.

The Indian leadership has exercised considerable restraint and tried to keep the public calm, an effort discernible in the narrative first put out by the Indian government. India’s Defence Minister A K Antony told parliament that 20 heavily armed terrorists along with “men dressed in Pakistan army uniforms” killed five Indian soldiers along the LoC. The Congress was duly trashed by the media for being ‘soft’ on Pakistan. There have been calls by the opposition as well as the strategic community in New Delhi to go slow on resuming dialogue with Pakistan that has been halted a number of times since 2004, the last of which was in January this year when India accused Pakistan of beheading its soldiers.

Internet access and proliferation of news channels have given immense power to the public to air their views, which sometimes acts as a catalyst for building strong opinions on emotive issues. Each incident perceived as hostile by the other country creates such a cacophony of noise in the media that it is hard for either government to ignore it. Elements who want to sabotage the peace process can use even small incidents to slow or halt progress through public opinion. After the LoC shooting, the Indian government had to progressively harden its stance against Pakistan to please the domestic audience. Although Pakistan strongly denied being involved in any incident of firing at the LoC, there are few takers of this stance among the Indian opinion makers and the public, who firmly believe that all attacks against India could be traced to the Pakistan army or the ISI.

The saboteurs are benefiting tremendously from the confusion and lack of coordination amongst civilian and military institutions in Pakistan. Lack of coordination between the police and army was the main reason for the failure to prevent the Dera Ismail Khan jailbreak. The Abbottabad Commission report highlighted large gaps in information sharing among the military and civilian intelligence agencies. Still more is this visible in foreign policy, important areas of which have been firmly controlled by the military, i.e. relations with India, Afghanistan and the US.

Prime Minister Sharif’s desire for improving relations with India is laudable, but we do not know what leverage he has with the Pakistan army on his peace project with India. Another important question is how he would deal with a large number of anti-India jihadi forces in his backyard, Lashkar-e-Tayyaba being on the top. After the recent spate of incidents that escalated tensions, these are precisely the questions being asked by the Indian opinion makers and the opposition.

It is hoped that Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has learnt lessons from the past, when his dream of peace with India was crushed under the army’s boots in Kargil. This is not to suggest that the army is unhappy with the PML-N’s peace overtures. The real issue is whether the government has the ability to implement its strategic vision in the presence of entrenched forces that enjoyed complete command over foreign policy for over three decades. Peace with India is intricately linked with Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy. India has invested $ 2 billion on reconstruction projects and is keen to maintain or expand its current level of involvement after the foreign troops’ withdrawal from Afghanistan. Pakistan’s strategic community views India’s presence in Afghanistan with great apprehension and has often blamed it for fuelling the insurgency in Balochistan through its consulates in that country.

Pakistan cannot have one policy for India and another for Afghanistan. It cannot hope to build trade and commerce on the eastern side while harassing and hounding India in the west in Afghanistan through its proxies. If any group considered close to Pakistan’s intelligence agencies carries out attacks against Indian interests in Afghanistan, it would inevitably build opinion within India against peace with Pakistan. No Indian government can go against its public opinion without incurring political costs, hence the constant threat of derailment of the peace process.

Whether some elements are carrying out attacks against India on their own or at the behest of elements within Pakistan’s military and intelligence community, it represents a big problem for Prime Minister Sharif. If the media reports are anything to go by, so far there has been minimal interaction between the government and the military. It is imperative for the prime minister to first sort out the civil-military equation and build a constituency for his foreign policy within the military. Before embarking on any grand projects, he must first get the military on board to prevent them from unravelling later.

The writer is a freelance journalist based in Washington, DC. She tweets at @ishrats and can be reached at isaleem@syr.edu