Daily Times

The ever-rising friction between the failing government in Kabul and the US is contributing to the fog that characterises the political landscape of Afghanistan. The Taliban are strongly poised in the south of the country with massive support lent by the Pashtuns of that area. The provinces of Helmand and Patika are also located in the south of Afghanistan where the intense exchange of bullets and missiles is an everyday occurrence. Central and northern Afghanistan is largely under the tight sway of NATO and ISAAF forces, where non-Pashtuns are the majority. Having drained more than $ 600 billion into this war, incurring 2,250 casualties of soldiers killed in addition to 19,000 wounded, the US still has to brace for an unspeakable ordeal due to the nonchalant attitude of its most cherished friend, Hamid Karzai.

The Taliban have betrayed overt signs of consent to engage in a meaningful dialogue, which intends to resolve the conundrum of Afghanistan for good. The US genuinely fears a takeover by the Taliban soon after its pullout or drawdown (still to be decided) of forces in 2014, which can raise the spectre of a civil war detrimental to the eventual survival of Afghanistan. It will once again descend into a cesspool of warfare, which will further enfeeble its political, social and economic fabric. In an exercise to avert a possible fall of Afghanistan into a state that will eventually veer it towards anarchy, the US is plucking up the efforts to outline a political solution to the costly and time-consuming war. As for now, the only hurdle in the way of building a solid consensus on a formula of political understanding is the indifference of Hamid Karzai. His policy to dissociate Pakistan from the mainstream peace talks and offer undue space to India sows the seeds of differences on the way towards shaping a mutually agreed solution.

Karzai disrupted the political process that was jump-started in Qatar between the US and the Taliban. He urged the Taliban to hold talks directly with the High Peace Council instituted by his government. Some clandestine reports reveal that some of the members of the Taliban surreptitiously carried out a liaison with the High Peace Council, but it will never bear fruit since the government in Kabul is acutely inept in the realm of diplomacy. Most importantly, Mullah Omer equates Hamid Karzai with the puppet of the British Shah Shuja in the 19th century and glories himself as being the torchbearer of Dost Khan’s legacy to liberate his nation from the clutches of foreign occupation. Karzai has been actively decrying the role of Pakistan in Afghanistan and has committed every ounce of his diplomatic and political clout to subdue the impact of policies designed by the Pakistan military (the foreign policy of Pakistan is chiefly dictated by the army). Pakistan has fostered, over the course of decades, genial ties with the Taliban and its affiliates. The Haqqani network operates with absolute freedom in North Waziristan. They tailor their stratagems in this hinterland and stage massive attacks on NATO forces and the civilian government in Afghanistan. The Hafiz Gul Bahadur group functions as a major contributor of manpower to the Haqqani network in the lawless lands of North Waziristan. Similarly, Gulbadeen Hikmatyar’s Hizbul Islam has been sighted several times in Pakistan. This legion draws its inspiration from the literature of Maulana Maududi, who is the chief architect of the modern resurgence of political Islam. His books are read even in Egypt and have been instrumental in shaping the ideologies of radical Islamist outfits. Neither the government nor the army of Pakistan ever attempted to subdue the menace of these groups, which are operating against the US forces right under their noses.

The US is mindful of the fact that Pakistan is key to engage the Afghan Taliban in a useful dialogue, which will define the political map of Afghanistan in the years to come. Mullah Omar in his recent address on Eid has conceded some of the demands of the US government. He has vowed to sever ties with al Qaeda, take every possible step to crack down on any militant activity from his soil, align himself with other ethnic parties to form an environment conducive for political maturity and consider modern education as the need of the time. Some well-informed sources are also floating the information that the Taliban appear ready to embrace the constitution that is already in place with three clauses exempted. They even seem to be in the mood to acknowledge the results of the next presidential elections on the condition that the incoming president will serve only as an interim premier till the pullout of US forces soon after which another general election should be held with all the ingredients of transparency and fair play.

With a bunch of concessions by the Taliban and the elimination of Osama bin Laden, the US finds itself in a better position to defend its heavy investment in front of its taxpayers back home. But the picture the US wants to paint on the new canvas of Afghanistan for 2014 can be distorted by the misguided policies of Hamid Karzai. His delay in signing the security deal draws darker clouds over the ambitions of the US. Back in the 1840s, Dost Muhammad and his son tapped the mistrust between the British Empire and Shah Shuja and drove them out of Afghanistan with nagging humiliation inflicted upon them. The Taliban can repeat the same saga in a new edition by exploiting the rift deeply embedded between Hamid Karzai and the US government.

The writer is currently studying Economics and International Relations at the New York University and can be reached at rehanbinnazeem@gmail.com