Daily Times

A few days ago, a Major General of the Pakistan army was assassinated together with three of his colleagues in the tribal area. Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has claimed responsibility. This group, since its creation in 2007, has reportedly killed over 6,000 people including members of the army and police. The latest incident happened just a few days after the government, following consultations with the opposition political parties, decided to hold peace talks with the Taliban. The assassination of the Major General and his colleagues has generated a wave of shock and anger. Many people have questioned whether in this climate of hostility the peace talks would produce any positive outcome. This is a genuine concern and nobody has the right answer.

The question for the government is what the options available are. Should the fight against the Taliban continue? Everybody knows that following the destruction of the Twin Towers in New York, the US military, in concert with NATO forces, launched massive military operations against the Taliban. All the suspected sites came under heavy bombardment, which had the capability to penetrate deep underground and strike targets underneath. The Taliban fighters could not withstand the ferocity of the attacks and were dispersed. Kabul and other cities were cleared. The US and NATO forces gradually moved to the rural areas with little resistance. The Northern Alliance moved to Kabul and under international mediation a civilian authority was restored in Kabul and in the provinces. The people in the region began to think that the Taliban had been liquidated and would never make a comeback. Some of the Taliban leaders were apprehended but most of the top leadership escaped to other terrains or tribal areas. A semblance of normalcy dawned in the civic life of the people of Afghanistan.

The US government and its military leadership were amongst the first to feel complacent about the short term gains on the battlefield. They believed the Taliban had been weakened, if not totally liquidated, and would pose no threat to their allies in Kabul. They turned their guns against Baghdad. The focus, including intelligence-gathering, surveillance and monitoring of the movement of enemy forces, eased. The gambit of the US government in forming the ‘coalition of the willing’ in order to invade Iraq caused division in the international community. The split in the international community slowed down the war effort in Afghanistan. In the meantime, lack of good governance, absence of cohesiveness in administration, resurgence of former warlords gave rise to frustration in people. The Taliban seized the opportunity, began to return from hideouts and regrouped. Hardly had the invasion in Iraq been completed when the Taliban began their offensives. Their military onslaughts paved the way for defections in the police and Afghan military on a significant scale.

By 2007 the Taliban gathered sufficient strength to strike the foreign military outposts and installations located even in the major cities. A number of times it attacked the convoys carrying essential supplies to Afghanistan. The Taliban in both Afghanistan and Pakistan worked as one entity to fight against the US and NATO forces. The fight against the Taliban cost the US over $ 436 billion. More than 2,000 American soldiers died and over 15,000 were seriously injured. Casualties amongst the NATO forces also began to swell. Pakistan by default became a partner of the US/NATO-led coalition against the Taliban. It deployed the military in the tribal areas in order to stop infiltration inside its territory. The Taliban fought back and the Pakistan army lost over 500 soldiers. Though the Taliban received serious blows at the hands of one of the most well equipped armies in the world, they nevertheless showed tremendous resilience and retaliated with considerable success. In the past 12 years the Taliban lost a large number of its militias but never fell short of new recruits and continued to pose a serious threat to its enemies. Should the war continue there is no reason to believe that the Taliban would give in any time soon.

Forestalling the impossibility of the mission and the forebodings awaiting, NATO decided in 2011 that it would withdraw its armed forces from Afghanistan in the next couple of years. Failing to persuade its partners to continue, the US government at one stage decided to withdraw its troops by 2014. It is a foregone conclusion what would unfold once the US/NATO forces depart from Afghanistan. The US government proposed to meet the Taliban for peace talks. The meeting was to take place in Doha a few months ago but broke down due to the intransigence of the Taliban. The decision of the US and NATO to wind up in Afghanistan and drawdown of their combat forces and hardware have boosted the morale of the Taliban, much to the consternation of the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan. In this backdrop, the Pakistan government decided to initiate peace talks. The status quo is not an option.

Insurgency does not grow in isolation. Public support is a prerequisite for the insurgency to recruit, shelter and finance its activities. During my stint in Afghanistan in the mid-1990s, I observed that people were getting disillusioned by lawlessness, infighting amongst the warlords and lack of governance. People found in the Taliban a better option who gradually ascended to power in Kabul. The Taliban restored peace and normalcy in the areas they controlled. They even took measures to eradicate poppy cultivation and with the support of UN agencies promoted wheat cultivation. However, the one-eyed policy of the Taliban, especially their position on girls education, women’s employment and their movement, total ban on cultural activities and capital punishment for adultery alienated the people. The rise and fall of the Taliban could be attributed to excess and denial of public support.

There can be no denying that the Taliban were once patronised by the ISI. Over the years, despite the attacks, the Taliban gained the sympathy of a section of the people, including the bureaucracy and army. Though the army as an institution fought against the Taliban at the command of the civilian government, there is reason to believe that the Taliban still has sympathisers in the army, bureaucracy as well as in public. Thousands of madrassas operating in the tribal and rural areas are believed to provide safe havens to the Taliban acolytes. Given this infiltration of the Taliban in society, the decision of the Pakistan government to initiate peace talks with the Taliban leadership appears very appropriate.

Experts are of the opinion that insurgency cannot be uprooted overnight. It takes 10 to 16 years to scale down violence, dismantle infrastructure and bring the militants into the mainstream of society. While the government would be engaged in peace talks it would be required to monitor the activities of the enemy, keep the madrassas under surveillance and pre-empt subversive activities. Provision will have to be made for the rehabilitation of those willing to give up violence. Retrofitting the madrassas with injections of science and technology in the curriculum would go a long way to correct the mindset of young pupils. There would be attempts to derail, if not jeopardise, the peace process, as hardliners on both sides of the aisle would prefer violence over peace, fighting over dialogue and retaliation over reconciliation. The patience of the leaderships of both sides will be tested again and again. Their brinkmanship and resolve for peace will come under serious scrutiny by the peace loving people in the region.

The author is a former official of the United Nations