Daily Times

If Pakistan is committed to
fighting the war on terror, what purpose a dialogue with the Pakistani Taliban will serve is still unknown. The dialogue means that Pakistan is shying away from fighting the war on terror. However, the question is this: can Pakistan fight the war on terror?

It seems that Pakistan has divided the war on terror into two halves: the US half and the Pakistani half. The US half of the war ends the moment drone strikes launched by it eliminate al Qaeda members on the Pak-Afghan border. However, the collateral damage in the shape of liquidating their Taliban accomplices begins the Pakistani half of the war on terror.

It also seems that Pakistan has divided its part of the war on terror into two halves: the military half and the civilian half. The military half of Pakistan has been fighting the (Pakistani half of the) war on terror at least since 2004 when drone strikes started. Now, in 2013, the government of Nawaz Sharif, Prime Minister of Pakistan, is trying to project the point that because his government has entered the national scene for the first time since 9/11, the civilian half of Pakistan is considering the case of the war on terror anew: there should be a dialogue first and a conflict later with the Pakistani Taliban. Certainly, the military half is more experienced than the civilian half of Pakistan on the war on terror. The question is, what has the military concluded so far? It is their conclusion on which the civilian half should build their strategy. It is not possible that the civilian half devises a strategy to deal with the (Pakistani half of the) war on terror not in line with the conclusions gathered by the military half.

Only one drone strike does hold the potential of sabotaging the whole process of dialogue with the Pakistani Taliban. The other conditions such as declaring a ceasefire and withdrawing troops from FATA are secondary in nature. Sharif has raised the issue of drone strikes (for its being counterproductive in nature) at the platform of the United Nations (UN), but the question is, will the US stop drone strikes? The next best question is how long will the US take to halt drone strikes? Till that time, should Pakistan keep the option of holding a dialogue with the Pakistani Taliban on hold?

From amongst the proponents of dialogue, no one knows for sure how many groups the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) comprises and how many of its splinter groups exist. It is also unclear whether the interests of the main body (TTP) and the splinter groups are one or diverse. The attack on the vehicle of Major General Sanaullah Khan was claimed by the TTP while the attack on a church in Peshawar was claimed by Jundullah, an extension of Sipah-e-Sahaba. The former attack was in the domain of the military half while the latter was in the sphere of the civilian half. The responsibility for the bomb attack on September 27 in Peshawar on a bus of civil secretariat employees was claimed by the Ansar al-Mujahideen group. It is yet to be seen which group owns the responsibility for the bomb blast that took place in Peshawar on September 29. There may be a fourth group that comes forward. Does it not mean that there may be a rivalry between various Pakistani Taliban groups vying for seeking the attention of the government to be contacted for the dialogue?

Though Imran Khan of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI) has been reviled for his statement of allowing the TTP to open an office in Pakistan, what is the way out if the dialogue process has to be materialised? The critics are right in saying that if the TTP is allowed to open an office in Pakistan, the act will be tantamount to recognising the TTP as a legitimate body vis-à-vis the state of Pakistan. Can it be asked of the TTP to control the splinter (Taliban) groups and surface as a unified body representing all the Pakistani Taliban? It is apparent that the dialogue process is clouded by several answers in the negative.

The military half might have briefed the members of the All Parties Conference (APC) held recently, on its willingness and preparedness to take on the Pakistani Taliban militarily; as is apparent, the civilian half led by Sharif is hesitant to fight the Pakistani (civilian) half of the war on terror. There are two reasons for this: first, the military half has so far failed to win the war, and second, in certain parts of Pakistan including Punjab, a kind of tacit compromise has brought peace. The military half is suffering under the perception that it is fighting against the Taliban on behalf of the US. However, the civilian half is trying its best not to let the Pakistani Taliban harbour the same perception of them too. That is, the civilian half thinks that it cannot withstand the repercussions of the perception that it is acting against the Pakistani Taliban at the behest of the US. The civilian half knows well that it does not have the necessary trained force and wherewithal to repulse the Pakistani Taliban from the civilian areas or launch counterterrorism operations. Resultantly, the civilian half is not ready to let the war spill over from the military half. The question is what the options are left with the military half, which can neither stop drone strikes nor end the war on terror?

To express one’s intention to conduct a dialogue is one thing while to actually carry it out is a different matter. If the mechanism of conducting a dialogue is not put in place, the dialogue cannot take place. The civilian half may be thinking of conducting any such dialogue in November when the winter season sets in and drone strikes abate in number.

The writer is a freelance columnist and can be reached at qaisarrashid@yahoo.com