Daily Times

In February 1986, Mikhail Gorbachev addressing the 27th Party General Congress, labelled the war in Afghanistan as a “bleeding wound.” Gorbachev announced a planned withdrawal of troops. He wanted to ‘Afghanise’ the conflict and to carry out broad-based negotiations through the Afghan government for an honourable withdrawal. The Soviets wished to have a well-orchestrated withdrawal, hence Babrak Karmal, the then president of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan since 1979, was removed in 1986 to be replaced by Mohammed Najibullah .The Soviets thought that Karmal was unnecessarily prolonging the war and might not be able to have an arranged withdrawal of the Soviet troops. Najibullah, head of the Afghan Secret Service, was installed as the president of Afghanistan in 1986. The Soviets thought Najibullah would be able to bring a compromise between various warring groups and arrange an honourable exit for the USSR army, one of the largest standing armies in the world. These negotiations were thought to ensure a peaceful and orchestrated withdrawal of the Soviet troops and also for ensuring continuous Soviet influence in Afghanistan after their withdrawal. One reason for maintaining this influence was to contain the Mujahedeen whom the Soviets feared might one day penetrate the Central Asian Republics.

On the face of it Najibullah managed to synchronise the instruments of power. Yet his scheme proved to be superficial and without much popular support. The withdrawing Soviet troops faced problems due to resistance from the Mujahedeen. At the time of the withdrawal of the Soviet troops, in February 1989, Kabul was surrounded by 30,000 Mujahedeen. A number of Soviet troops were air lifted. However, it was thought necessary that troops should also use the ground route for withdrawal into USSR to dispel the impression of a retreat. The 400-kilometre road from Kabul to the Soviet border on Amu Darya passes through the Hindu Kush Mountains and the Salang Pass. The Soviet forces during retreat suffered further casualties of more than 500 personnel.

During the final stages of withdrawal the Soviets had to use SCUD missiles with conventional warheads to give cover to its withdrawing forces; almost 90 SCUD missiles were fired just in the last quarter of 1988. The last of the Soviet troops withdrew on February 15, 1989, through the Afghan Uzbek Bridge, Col General Boris Kromov being the last of the Soviet soldier to leave Afghanistan. Out of more than 300 Missing-in-Action and POWs, the Soviets could only get back 15 personnel, that too after prolonged informal negotiations with different groups in Afghanistan. The Soviets had to pay millions of dollars as ransom for the release of Colonel Alexander Rutskoi who was captured after his plane was shot down over Afghanistan. Later in 1991, Colonel Rutskoi became the vice president of the USSR.

The Russians, ever since, are carrying the burden of an unfavourable verdict by history as well as a moral burden of causing so many human casualities. Many academicians claim that the moral burden of invading Afghanistan hastened the breakup of the Soviet Union itself. More than one million Afghans lost their lives, while three million Afghans were wounded. Officially, 15,000 Soviet troops died. Three million Afghanis had to take refuge in Pakistan alone. The psychological trauma for the Afghan nation will live on for generations to come.

No group or Najibullah’s own supposedly loyal troops came to his rescue. Before the collapse of his government in April 1992, as a last resort, Najibullah asked Boris Yelstin for help to intervene in Afghanistan, but the request was declined. By 1992, the Mujahedeen were in control of Afghanistan, and the entire structure that Najibullah thought would protect him and keep him in power just disappeared. He had to take refuge in the UN compound in 1992, and was later killed in 1996.

The Soviets before departing had made arrangements for training of the Afghan army, which was also provided with modern weaponry. The Afghan war had an adverse impact on the state of discipline of the Soviet army, exposing the Soviet Union state structure to weakness. There are lessons to be learnt from the Soviet occupation and retreat from Afghanistan.

The ease of entering Afghanistan and the difficulty of leaving it are the words attributed to Alexander the Great as far back as 327 BC. The high imposing mountains, the hills, the windswept plains and the independent Afghan people have always exposed the weakness of the invading nations and their armies. Compounded with these realities, there is little political will in the US and its western allies to continue this war that has now been going on for the last 12 years. The Afghan War is considered to be the most expensive war in history. The US has spent above one trillion dollars, and Britain has spent 37 billion pounds. The war expenditure will not end with the 2014 withdrawal; there are huge pension, medical and disability allowances to be paid to the war veterans and financial costs that are to be paid on money raised to help finance the war effort, thus making the war all the more expensive. The future generations will also be sharing the financial cost of the present war. British economy is in a depression and further financing the war in Afghanistan might be difficult. There is an absence of a political will to carry on a remote unpopular war that has lingered on for 12 years without any results.

(To be continued)

The writer can be reached at humayunshafi@gmail.com