Daily Times

Citizens of Afghanistan have not experienced perhaps a single day of peace during the last three decades of the civil war that continues to devastate the lives of their children. Since 2001, every year, the figure of civilian and military casualties register a record increase. Every year is bloodier than its preceding one. The lack of confidence in the Karzai government is growing due to the gap between expectations and the real political and economic achievements. The Taliban have re-established their offices in several provinces of the country, while Pakistan’s jihadists groups and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) are also critical of the US and NATO presence in Afghanistan. Therefore, there is a possibility of them joining the Afghan Taliban to disrupt the security network for next year’s election. The presidential election will be held in Afghanistan on April 5, 2014, amid the civil war in all 34 provinces.

Under the Afghan constitution of 2004 and election laws, the election must be held 30 to 60 days before May 22, 2014. Afghanistan’s election race ended with last week’s announcement of candidates. Former finance minister Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai and Dr Abdullah Abdullah submitted their nomination papers a few days ago. All 14 ethnic groups (Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, Baloch, Nooristani, Wakhi, Arab, Gujar, Brahuis, Qazilbash, Aimaq and Pashais of Kunar province) are participating in the election campaign to support their representatives. Some al Qaeda and Taliban-affiliated leaders and their cronies have also entered the race. Leaders of both the Mujahideen and the Taliban — who represented different ethnicities during the civil war — are being supported by al Qaeda, the Taliban and major factional war criminals in their election campaign.

These parties and groups were funded by Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, China, Russia and the United States, producing a popular aversion to formal political parties in US-occupied Afghanistan. From 2001 to 2009, 110 political parties were established in the country, while the law on political parties forced them to re-register their names and submit more than 10,000 signatures from 22 provinces to justify their political support. In May 2010, Dr Abdullah established the Hope and Change Movement. In 2011, prominent leaders of the Northern Alliance Party, General Abdul Rashed Dostum and the Hazara leader Muhammad Muhaqiq, joined Ahmad Zia Masud to announce a new alliance (The National Front of Afghanistan) of major ethnic minority groups. This group affiliated with the Northern Alliance created trouble for Dr Abdullah. On November 4, 2011, former interior minister Hanif Atmar established the Truth and Justice Party, representing some major ethnic groups of Afghanistan.

On August 30, 2013, a new Afghanistan Electoral Alliance (AEA) was announced by ethnic and sectarian groups including People’s Islamic Party, Hezb-e-Wahdat Party, National Movement of Afghanistan, National Coalition of Afghanistan, National Front, Afghan Green Trend, Afghan Naween, United Islamic Party, Iqtidar-e-Milli Party, Ittehad-e-Aqwam and Coordination Council of Arab People. The Afghan Electoral Alliance announced that it would soon announce its single candidate for the 2014 election. Two more political figures, Dr Abdullah and former foreign minister Zalmai Rasul announced to join the race for the election.

A very controversial Salafi, Abdul Rasool Seyyaf has also announced to run in the country’s 2014 election. In his first speech after submitting his nomination papers, Seyyaf repudiated the Taliban, as well as the war criminal Gulbaddin Hekmatyar. During the 1990s civil war, Seyyaf allegedly killed thousands of members of the Hazara community in Kabul. Some sections of the international community have given voice to the concern that the possible victory of Seyyaf in the April election may cause another Sunni-Shia conflict in Afghanistan. Stephen Biddle, a George Washington University professor, advised both Afghanistan and the United States, “For many members of Congress, I suspect this would be the last straw.”

Many Arab terrorists, who now fight Pakistan’s security forces in Waziristan, received training in the camps of Seyyaf. He has also been the mentor of Khaled Muhammad Shiekh — the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks — in the 1980s and 1990s. Seyyaf nominated Ismail Khan as his first vice president. His second vice presidential nominee is Abdul Wahab Irfan, an Uzbek warlord. Former governor of Jalalabad province, Gul Agha Sherzai, former defence minister Abdul Rahim Wardak and Qayum Karzai are also preparing to join the race. Other ethnic and sectarian leaders including Dr Muhammad Khan (Pashtun) of Hezb-e-Islami Party and the Hazara leader Muhammad Muhaqiq of Hezb-e-Wahdat-e-Mardoom Afghanistan filed their nomination papers on October 3, 2013.

Now coming to the security situation in the war-torn country, where al Qaeda and the Taliban control the frontier provinces of the country. During the last 12 years, the Afghan army and the police have not been able to restore people’s confidence in the security forces. The writ of the state is hardly operational and its artificial institutions are weak, enabling non-state actors to make political gains. The weak political party system is another challenging problem that is characterised by clientelism. The judicial aspect of election infrastructure is weak and the impartiality of the Independent Electoral Commission is doubtful. The integrity of some officers of the election commission and their deficiencies in vote registration and identity card distribution raises many questions. During the last two elections, security during the election was maintained by ISAF, NATO, the US and Afghan National Army (ANA), but in 2014, election security will be entrusted to the ANA and ANP, which face the challenge of corruption in their ranks.

The desertion rate in these Afghan forces is 10 percent every year. The failure of 20 percent of soldiers to re-enlist every year is a major challenge for the military establishment. War casualties and injuries are other problems for the Afghan generals to keep enough soldiers and officers in the field. The ANA should number 250,000 men to effectively defeat al Qaeda and the Taliban forces after the withdrawal of NATO and US forces by the end of 2014. However, military experts in the United States note that the number of the ANA could never grow larger than 100,000, because 42 percent of soldiers are leaving active duty every year.

Another problem is that of drug abuse. Reportedly, more than 50 percent of the ANA soldiers use drugs or have been involved in drug smuggling and fuel theft.

Taking these various factors into consideration, it is quite obvious that the Afghan government and its army lack the domestic capacity to deploy forces across the country to provide security to the polling stations.

The writer is the author of Punjabi Taliban and can be reached at zai.musakhan222@gmail.com