Daily Times

What service Pakistan can render to make the transition of power smooth in 2014 in Afghanistan is the question the answer to which the US authorities are looking for. The US comprehends that the transition of power from foreign (US/NATO forces) to local hands (Kabul government) in Afghanistan will be excruciating without the active involvement of Pakistan in the process. The active involvement of Pakistan is required in terms of its influencing Afghan Taliban to halt their attacks on the departing foreign forces and come to terms with the Kabul government.

If asked, Prime Minister of Pakistan Nawaz Sharif, who is on a short state visit to the US, may express the inability of his government to have any sway over Afghan Taliban in this regard. He would be right in saying so, because a level of mistrust seems to have surfaced between Afghan Taliban and the state of Pakistan. The former considers that the latter sided with the US in 2001 not only to help oust the Taliban regime ruling over Kabul but also to hand over Taliban officials to be confined in Guantanamo Bay. Consequently, since 2001, Mullah Muhammad Omar, the (spiritual) leader of the Taliban (both Afghan and Pakistani versions), spent (most of) his time in Afghanistan, in contrast to his past practice of residing in the border area of Pakistan.

One of the situations that disquiet Pakistan is an active involvement of India in Afghanistan. Pakistan considers that the presence of Indian forces in Afghanistan will be tantamount to Pakistan’s encirclement, which it finds unacceptable. Though the US has made some efforts in making both Pakistan and India develop healthy — if not amicable — relations with each other by at least making people-to-people contact possible, there are several irritants that obviate any chances of harmony. India’s insistence to handover or penalise the mastermind of Mumbai attacks (2008) is one such issue. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, has recently highlighted this point both at the United Nations level (through his speech) and in one-to-one meeting with US President Barack Obama subsequent to his speech. It is now obvious that the US is intent on offering a role to India in post-2014 Afghanistan. It is also apparent that in their meeting, Obama will press on Sharif to meet the Indian demand pertaining to the brain of Mumbai attacks.

How to retain the Kabul government intact will be the major challenge the US will be facing in the post-2014 Afghanistan. Nonetheless, this is not the only challenge. The next challenge will be how to forestall the resurrection of al Qaeda sanctuaries in Afghanistan. The US fears (and rightly so) that the al Qaeda may regroup in Afghanistan on the departure of the US/NATO forces, and may pose another terrorist threat to the US or Europe in near or far future. Consequently, the US thinks that there should be a kind of government in Kabul that daunts al-Qaeda, as the al Qaeda threat is not yet over completely. One of the indications of the threat being alive is the survival of Aiman-ul Zawahri, who is considered now in charge of the al Qaeda. Looking from this angle, it seems that the US is leaving Afghanistan with an unfinished agenda. In this regard, the question is this: will the planned US residual force of 10,000 combat troops be enough to finish the agenda? Similarly, will Pakistan, India or another country be asked to do that job? Will the Afghan National Army (ANA) do that job? Will the reliance be placed on drone strikes? By killing Osama bin Laden in May 2011, the US might have achieved a symbolic victory over the al Qaeda, but can the US say that it has achieved a real victory when Zawahri has not been eliminated? The answer must be in the negative. In this regard, another question is simple: has the US/NATO forces diminished the ability of any Zawahri-led al Qaeda from swelling? Leaving the job half-done is a difficult proposition, which may have strong repercussions for Pakistan, as Pakistan killed several al Qaeda members, and remained instrumental in handing over captured al Qaeda members to the US to stay in Guantanamo Bay. Pakistan must also think in terms of what kind of future awaits it in the post-2014 era.

On October 13, Mullah Omar denounced the proposed US-Afghan security pact called Bilateral Security Arrangement (BSA), one clause of which demanded the Kabul government to provide a constitutional immunity to the proposed US residual force in post-2014 Afghanistan. Instead of resorting to the constitutional amendment, President of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai, has asked his officials to convene a Loya Jirga (a grand assembly of elders) and to seek its approval first. Through the assembly, Karzai might be thinking of seeking a consensus on the matter that may marginalise Afghan Taliban. However, there is a catch: Karzai will not be the president after April 2014, and the consequences of the absence of any such clause on immunity will be faced by the next president. That is, in case of the absence of immunity, the proposed residual US combat force will limit the range of its operation for fear of being penalised and the onus to do any such operation will rest on the ANA. The next question is this: does the ANA have the resolve and capacity to conduct operations especially against al Qaeda, especially when the operations run the risk of causing collateral damage? (Here, the presumption is that any Afghan giving refuge to or helping an al Qaeda member is necessarily a Taliban.) Will the ANA launch operations against those pockets of Afghan Taliban having any association with the al Qaeda?

The future of Afghanistan hangs in the balance, as several factors and policies will determine it. Nevertheless, the same future compels Pakistan to ponder over what kind of Afghanistan it can afford in its neigbourhood: the one identical to what emerged after 1991 or a different one.

The writer is a freelance columnist and can be reached at qaisarrashid@yahoo.com