Daily Times

In recent weeks, the upsurge in militant attacks has reignited a bitter debate on the issue of peace talks with the militants. And each new violent event either seems to push the momentum towards peace talks, or seemingly, causes the evolving process to falter. In the wake of the death of Hakeemullah Mehsud, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) supremo, the anti-peace talks lobby– a secular, liberal minority, whose views diverge both from the right-leaning establishment and the Taliban — is advocating the utility of the military option/surgical strikes, not necessarily drone attacks, to decimate the leadership of the TTP for ending militancy. However, the pro-peace lobby has vociferously condemned the drone strike that killed Mehsud, as it might scuttle the embryonic peace process with the Taliban militants. In a series of two articles, I will evaluate the arguments of both anti-peace and pro-peace negotiation camps, and discuss, if peace talks are pursued, how the negotiation strategy must be formulated by the parliamentary committee, and not overshadowed by military authorities and unelected religious clerics.

Let us first look at the arguments of the liberal commentators against peace talks. It is argued that democratic regimes do not negotiate with terrorists and militants, who not only challenge the writ of the state, but also refuse to accept its territorial integrity. The argument goes, and not without reason, that there is a marked difference between nationalists — be it Sindhi or the Baloch — who demand autonomy within the domain of the constitution, and the Taliban militants, who intend to overthrow the constitutional order in Pakistan. Therefore holding peace negotiations with terrorists would imply that the government is unable to stamp out militancy through force and is eager to engage in talks with them to cut down levels of violence.

Second, the Taliban have a consistent track record of reneging on the terms of peace. A perusal of the history of broken peace accords show that their only motive for agreeing to peace talks has been to get breathing space for garnering resources and manpower. For instance, the past peace deals led to the release of scores of alleged terrorists, who rejoined militant outfits after the militant leaders turned their backs upon the peace agreements.

Third, the statements of General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, the army chief, point out — although the military authorities have apparently given their assent to the All Parties Conference’s communiqué on peace talks — that the military authorities seek full-throttle action against the TTP. Earlier this year, COAS General Kayani had said in a speech that the militants have to “unconditionally submit to the state, its constitution and the rule of law. If a small faction wants to enforce its distorted ideology over the entire nation by taking up arms and for this purpose defies the constitution of Pakistan and the democratic process, and considers all forms of bloodshed justified, then does the fight against this enemy of the state constitute someone else’s war?”

The army chief repeated the same words after the killing of Major General Niazi — the brutal attack took place after the communiqué on peace talks — in a suicide bomb attack in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP): “While it is understandable to give peace a chance through a political process…no one should have any misgivings that we would let terrorists coerce us into accepting their terms. The army has the ability and the will to take the fight to the terrorists.”

These statements reflect that the civil-military authorities are not on the same page regarding negotiations with the Taliban, which, at some stage, might complicate the issues of the agenda setting and modalities of peace talks, and also put strain on the delicate civil-military relations.

Fourth, military and civilian authorities have divergent perceptions regarding the militants: the military perceives certain Taliban groups as useful for their military strategy while the political parties consider some sectarian-militant outfits as their political allies. As a result, a distinction has been made between good and bad militants. Thus a question is being pertinently raised by the anti-peace talks analysts: would Salahuddin Ayubi, Hafiz Gul Bahadur and the Haqqanis be understood as the friends of Pakistan because they only attack the Afghan army and the allies, and the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Jaish-e-Muhammad deemed as important strategic tools or political allies, be included in peace parleys? Well, as things stand today in the military and political circles of Pakistan, it seems a difficult calculation.

Fifth, the Taliban are neither waging their violent struggle for economic resources nor do they want more democratic rights; they want to carve out a territory where they can define and determine, on the one hand, society’s relations with God, and, on the other, inter-personal relationships of people. Thus, anti-peace talks experts pose a question: could peace parleys be held with ideological bigots who portray themselves not as principals but as agents of God, and who are left with no moral legitimacy the moment they leave this claim?

Sixth, it is argued that a military solution must precede any political solution, as in modern history, many countries have successfully battled insurgencies and Mafiosi gangs. Colombia, Peru, Sri Lanka and Italy have done that by exhibiting forceful show of state power: military and law enforcement resources were combined for combat operations, insurgents’ supply routes and funding channels were blocked through surveillance and intelligence networks, and the legal system was strengthened to sentence militants/gangsters. Thus, the argument goes that unless a sufficient pressure is built upon militants through a military campaign, they would not be ready to make necessary adjustments to meet peace terms.

Seventh, militants are of different stripes, with varying agendas, as some have ideological pretensions, while some smaller groups are mere criminal gangs, involved in kidnapping for ransom, but, apparently, the government and other pro-peace political parties are clueless who they should negotiate with. Apparently, they lack clarity about their peace partners, that is, whether the leading peace partner ought to be the TTP or Jundullah or Lashkar-e-Islam.

Eighth, the trans-nationalist ideology professed by the Taliban complicates the agenda and outcome of peace talks. For one, it is not clear whether the Taliban militants are ready to disassociate themselves from al Qaeda’s edicts against the Pakistani state and its institutions before engaging in talks and, for another, the trans-national agenda of al Qaeda and many of its affiliates in Pakistan would not keep the agenda of talks localised and many regional power players, such as Iran and Afghanistan, as well as the US would have to be directly and indirectly associated with the peace talks. So, the anti-peace talks analysts raise an important question: can government hold multi-tiered talks, ranging from an individual militant outfit to a cross-section of militant groups to foreign powers?

Finally, liberal analysts argue that the pro-peace politicians have no idea what to offer in peace talks and this problem is further compounded, as the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) government in the Centre, and the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI)’s provincial government in KP do not perceive the issue of militancy in similar terms. The PTI contends that the suicide bombings and terrorist attacks would end once the US stops drone attacks in Pakistan, and militants are brought on the table for negotiations, while the PML-N deems that once the process of negotiations begins and development programmes are rolled out into the tribal badlands, militants would see the fallacy of fighting and lay down their arms. These are at best simplistic notions, and show ignorance of the ground realities. No doubt, drone strikes and economic grievances radicalise people in KP and the tribal areas, but militancy is inextricably linked with the homegrown jihadi infrastructure in Pakistan, which spews out hate speech, recruits youth for suicide bombings, provides them military training and collects donations to fund suicide missions. The people of KP and FATA are only one piece of the militancy jigsaw puzzle; the rest are scattered all over Pakistan. Thus by ending drone strikes and bankrolling development projects in the tribal areas, militancy levels might come down but would not be uprooted from Pakistan.

(To be continued)

The writer is a research analyst based in Lahore